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ABSTRACT
I ask whether or not the Lyric can be defined solely in structural terms as a self-referential 
linguistic artifact, and if so, in what sense we should construe the poem’s relationship to 
the world and to knowledge. Using close readings o f ancient and classical Greek epigrams, 
I first turn to Michael Riffaterre’s semiotics o f poetry, in which it is proposed that the 
sign/signifier relationships generated in the text o f poems can be exhausted in principle in 
an intertextual system o f signs that makes no reference to the world. I then turn to Paul de 
Man, who suspects that Riffaterre may be conflating semiotics with interpretation in a 
rationalistic attempt to account fully for the nature o f literary language. This critique 
serves as a bridge to a brief look at Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain’s contention 
that the lyric poem displays both a rational correspondence to a linguistic system and a 
pre-rational connection to the body and soul. His comments are compared to those of 
Julia Kristeva, who asserts that the body itself is the matrix o f  signification and that this 
phenomenon is foregrounded in poetic language. This primal relationship o f experience to 
language leads to an examination o f Martin Heidegger’s advice to philosophers to “listen 
to the poets.” His contention that language is a gift o f Being that comes to us through the 
poet is analyzed in the light o f de Man’s criticism that Heidegger, in his eagerness to attain 
transcendence via language, oversteps the boundaries of legitimate philosophical inquiry. 
Then it is taken up in the context o f Paul Ricoeur’s more generous appraisal that poetic
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language, understood as a form o f linguistically innovative metaphor, can transcend 




When asked to define poetry, Dr. Johnson remarked that “it is much easier to say what it 
is not” and further likened the task to explaining the phenomenon of light: “We all know 
what light is, but it is not very easy to tell what it is.” The Lexicographer had demurred, at 
least this once, at making definitions. With this cautionary tale in mind, I try nevertheless 
in this series o f essays to discover something to “tell” about poetry, especially about the 
tradition o f Lyric, that will contribute to an understanding o f what it is and what it is not. I 
am particularly interested in exploring whether or not we can define a lyric poem solely in 
structural terms as a self-referential linguistic artifact, and if so, in what sense we should 
construe the poem’s relationship to the world and to knowledge. I draw many o f my 
examples o f lyric poems from one o f the major sources o f Western Lyric, ancient and 
classical Greek poetry, especially the epigrams preserved in the Greek Anthology. To 
guide these readings, I engage the ideas o f several modem and contemporary literary 
critics and philosophers who have described lyric poetry as that subset o f language that 
most clearly foregrounds the issues involved in comparing so-called literary language with 
so-called ordinary language.
Before beginning this quest for an adequate characterization o f Lyric, however, 
some distinctions have to be made in regard to the word lyric and some of its related
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forms, especially the adjective lyrical and the noun that names the concept o f being lyrical, 
lyricism. Lyric as the noun that names a subset o f the genre o f poetry is derived o f course 
from the historical sense that some poems can be recognized as being lyrical. That notion, 
in turn, can be traced etymologically to the Greek word for the musical instrument, lyre 
[XeAu], that was used to accompany singers in ancient and classical Greece. Being 
described as lyrical is associated, however, not so much with the instrument itself as with 
the music o f song. That which can be characterized as being “song-ful” can be described as 
lyrical. The adjective has become synesthetic, that is, it can be used to describe works in 
all the fields o f fine art, including poetry. The case o f poetry is especially complicated, 
however, because the words to the songs first sung to the accompaniment o f the lyre, 
which are now called “the lyrics,” eventually evolved into the genre o f  lyric poetry. There 
is, therefore, such a close affinity between musical lyricism and poetic lyricism that it is 
difficult to discern where one ends and the other begins. Melodies traditionally are 
described as lyrical when their movement and tone are extraordinarily expressive o f a 
subject’s emotional state. Both an aesthetic judgment (“extraordinarily expressive”) and 
judgment o f category (lyric as opposed, for example, to narrative) are involved in the 
ascription of the adjective. Visual artists have appropriated the term as a way to describe 
an intangible yet somehow perceptible movement o f tone and color in painting that might 
be said either to mimic melos, or, it might be argued, to embody what melos is, not just for 
music, but for all the arts. Koshiro Onchi, for example, has described his painting in 
general as a “lyrical” art form, and an entire series o f his paintings, which he named 
“lyrique,” (1932) was “intended as visual analogies o f his responses to hearing works of
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[impressionist and modem] composers” (Fiorillo). Onchi wrote in the same year that 
“there was an equivalence between the sounds in music and colors and shapes in the 
pictorial arts” (qtd. in Fiorillo).1 Other fine art forms—sculpture, dance, even cinema—also 
use lyrical to describe a certain musical quality inherent to a work. The term, then, seems 
paradoxically to be forever tied to, yet separable from, its musical origin. A song is not 
necessarily or only lyrical when accompanied by a lyre; a melody played upon a lyre is not 
thereby lyrical, although it may indeed be so. If a poem, however, was first deemed 
“lyrical” because its effect on the listener resembled that o f a lyrical melody, it might seem 
sufficient to define the lyric poem, or the genre o f  Lyric, as that poetry which owes its 
development to music, whose essence is music, and whose essential qualities may 
therefore be exhausted in the metaphor o f music. Insofar as music is ultimately 
inexpressible in words, and insofar as lyricism is defined in musical terms, lyricism, or the 
quality o f being lyrical, would remain intact as the ineffable “muse” not only o f music, but 
the other fine arts and poetry as well.
In the realm o f music, song may be the happy marriage o f words and melody. The 
question remains, however, o f what happens when the words o f a song are divorced from 
the melody to be fixed in print and subsequently “performed” by the solitary reader. This is 
the process that is recognized to have happened in ancient Greece, where before the 
development o f the alphabet and reading, song and performance were inextricably linked. 
Often the words do not fare well on their own; they resolve into sentimentality and 
melodrama, as a quick look at the texts (lyrics) o f  hundreds o f popular songs would attest. 
On the other hand, sometimes they succeed in remaining intellectually viable and even, we
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would say, “lyrical.” At any rate, I suggest in this series o f essays that poetry occupies a 
special category o f art form in terms of its relationship to music because its medium o f 
expression is the word. Words bear a logos that transcends emotion because they 
necessarily engage the cognitive world o f discourse with the intent o f referring to the 
world.
To support this hypothesis, I follow a course of investigation that enters the 
mysterious relationship o f music and words in the context o f several theoretical 
approaches to Lyric, beginning with the semiotic approach o f Michael Riffaterre. I place 
Riffaterre’s semiotic method o f approaching poetry in the historical context o f the 
structuralist movement in literary criticism in general, which made certain assumptions 
about language (borrowed largely from early modem positivist philosophy) that affected 
structuralists’ views on the cognitive status o f  literary language. The poem is, for 
Riffaterre, a system o f signs that can be understood in the structural context o f the 
relationship o f signifier to signified, that is, by explicating or pointing out the semiotic 
relationships o f  the poem as a whole to other texts. In the case o f poetry, these 
relationships are at first obscured by language that purports to mirror the real world, the 
world o f empirical objects as described in the language o f science. The more sophisticated 
readers become, however, the quicker they recognize that this mimicry is an illusion, and 
they then move on to a second, truly semiotic reading.21 give a generous reading to 
Riffaterre to investigate in what way or ways his semiotic analysis o f poetic texts 
contributes to the understanding of how Lyric achieves its effects, that is, how a reader 
successfully negotiates a reading so as finally to understand the poem in a manner that can
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be expressed in so-called non-figural language. Using examples both o f Riffaterre’s 
choosing (usually modem French poems) and very early examples o f Greek lyric (in the 
form o f the epigram), I try to determine what his method yields, and it does yield a 
considerable harvest. As Paul de Man observes, discerning in what way a poem is itself a 
signifier in a larger system o f literary signs can give readers a remarkable insight into a 
given poem’s textual genealogy. In addition, in response to de Man’s friendly critique, 
Riffaterre is coaxed into speculating that there is indeed an extra-textual factor at work in 
the genesis (and therefore o f the genealogy) o f a poem that is an essential characteristic of 
poetry (if not a definition) namely, prosopopeia—the performance of an address or 
dialogue, first between poet and world and then between reader and text. At the same 
time, I take seriously de Man’s warning that Riffaterre’s method, useful as it is as a 
pedagogical tool, may blind the reader to this surplus. It is not exhausted in the rigor o f 
structuralist analysis; it is accessible only by way o f a hermeneutic—the understanding of a 
text beyond its function in a system. This is the thrust o f his critique o f Riffaterre, and I 
explore it further in the following chapters.
Chapter Two takes up two approaches to the question o f whether the origin or 
genesis of literary texts can be recovered from previous texts (at least sufficiently to make 
them explicable) or whether we must posit an important and material aspect o f textuality 
that escapes a system o f linguistic signs because its source lies elsewhere. First, I look at 
Julia Kristeva’s argument, as set forth in her Revolution in Poetic Language, that the 
genesis o f text lies in a matrix o f bodily, therefore material, impulses that are only later 
captured in the diachronic architecture o f linguistic systems. I try to explicate further her
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complex and polysemous approach by comparing it to the aesthetic philosophy o f Jacques 
Maritain, whose assimilation o f Freudian psychology into a Thomistic approach to art 
strikes me as substantially prefiguring and supporting Kristeva’s insights. Maritain’s 
discussion o f literary texts, like Kristeva’s, makes central the issue o f the poem’s relation 
to the world. He suggests that the genesis o f  literary texts begins with an individual’s 
burgeoning knowledge o f the world before it is textually constructed by mind. Although 
that knowledge o f the world must be conveyed through the structure o f  a linguistic and 
semiotic system, it remains connected to the world by its intention to refer. This 
conclusion is at odds, o f course, with a positivist approach to literary language that assigns 
to literary language a purely affective role, chiefly illustrated by its use o f rhetorical 
figures. As a cognitive activity it plays a broader role in contributing to human experience, 
according to Kristeva and Maritain, than merely providing emotional color.
In order to explore further this broadening o f the base o f literary texts (especially 
as foregrounded in the Lyric), I move in Chapter Three to a discussion o f Martin 
Heidegger’s appropriation o f Friedrich Holderlin’s lyric poems to explicate his own project 
o f the recovery o f philosophical wonder about existence, the origins o f which he finds in 
the writing o f the pre-Socratics. In his word studies o f Anaximander, Parmenides, and 
Heraclitus he claims to recover a sense in which language can open out upon a space, 
however fleetingly, that provides a glimpse into Being. This language is before discourse, 
therefore inaccessible to the philosopher, but available to the poet. From Heidegger’s 
perspective, Holderlin, as well as some o f the ancient Greek poets that he occasionally 
references (especially Pindar) grasped this dilemma. His philosophical lyrics are a
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testament, according to Heidegger, to Holderlin’s tragic recognition that he, as a poet, 
could speak about his journey into the realm of Being and therefore enable others to 
recognize Being, but that it was unlikely that he as poet would be heard. For Heidegger, it 
was the very delicate task o f the philosopher to listen to the poets’ words and ponder them 
“out loud” for others, all the time running the danger, just like the poet, o f having these 
thoughts devolve into mere discourse—a system o f signs. In keeping with this “listening,” I 
try to explicate at some length Pindar’s Olympian Ode IX, in which Pindar articulates what 
Heidegger calls the poet’s “measuring” o f Being, the broad overarching relationships 
between earth and sky, humans and gods.
Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine the approach to language taken by Paul 
Ricoeur, especially in his Rule o f  Metaphor, in which he suggests that metaphor, 
traditionally taken as the chief analog or metonym of literary expression, is that aspect of 
language, most noticeable in literary language and specifically in poetry, that makes 
available to cognition formerly hidden aspects o f the world, thereby contributing to our 
knowledge o f it. If  literature might be said to non-referential in its fictionality, it does refer 
nevertheless, according to Ricoeur, at another level to (borrowing Heidegger’s term) a 
possibility o f  Being that cannot be captured in a system o f linguistic signs. Language 
therefore at some point transcends its own system.
Taken together, these essays suggest that structuralists in the field o f literary 
theory acceded early on and too readily to modem philosophical positivism. This approach 
did open up a new realm of study in which long and often fruitless discussions about an 
author’s intent or a particular reader’s interpretation could be set aside in favor o f what
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seemed like a more scientific and pragmatic discussion o f discovering universal ways in 
which literary language is structured to achieve rhetorical effects within the genres. It did 
not, however, abrogate the conclusions o f philosophical positivism; it merely sidestepped 
them. Structuralism’s concession to positivism meant that hermeneutics in literature came 
to be seen as divorced from serious discourse as had theology and metaphysics to the 
positivists; the rhetoric o f figural language could never yield a stable interpretation. 
Literary structuralists, and those who followed them in semiotics, had no real quarrel, 
therefore, with postmodernists who lamented, or alternatively, rejoiced over the death o f 
meaning, except to note with some trepidation that the universal claims o f structuralism 
might soon come under attack, as they did. Eventually, structuralism was caught in a 
dilemma. On the one hand, the structuralist wants to assert that the structures o f  language 
and, for semiotics, the systems o f signs, that allow readers to recognize language as 
literary artifacts are universal in such a way that we can understand what a given work 
“says” or signs. We therefore can interpret, that is to say, translate or decode a work, on 
the basis o f these universal characteristics into a language that is not literary but truly 
meaningfiil and capable o f  a hermeneutic because it is cognitive; it engages the real world. 
Philosophers o f language, in the meantime, were having their own discussions about what 
language is and how it refers to the world. So-called postmodern literary critics, such as 
Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, were inclined to characterize all language, even the 
metalanguage o f theory and philosophy, as intrinsically rhetorical, leaving them skeptical 
about the role o f logic and truth in any analysis, and collapsing literary theory
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(including structuralism and semiotics) and literary language into one genre or language 
game. This move left theorists little to say about literature; they could only join in its 
production.
The monumental efforts o f the structuralists, therefore, led to a curious effect. By 
looking at the structure o f  a literary work, we could discover not only how it worked, but 
an understanding o f its central content as well, however much that understanding would 
be limited, in one person’s understanding, by the impossibility o f perceiving the infinity o f 
signifier/signified relationships within a linguistic system. But this structuralist 
“understanding” has a necessary if obscure relationship to hermeneutics, and the question 
remains as to whether or not there is something in the literary work that escapes the 
strictures o f system and refers to the world, or even a new world. Next to Riffaterre, then,
I juxtapose theorists such as De Man, Heidegger, Maritain, Kristeva, and Ricoeur, who 
labor to explain that literary language, as foregrounded most noticeably in the lyric poem, 
grows out o f a “matrix” o f material human experience that precedes language acquisition, 
yet is expressible within and even despite a system o f signs that is exhausted in the logic of 
its structure. This expression, the offspring o f the union of nonlanguage and language, is 
anchored in experience o f the world and is open as well to new experiences o f the world, 
and ready to be translated, as it were, into the discourse by which we understand the 
world. It therefore rises beyond mere affect, or feelings o f experience, to the level o f 
knowledge. According to Heidegger, this expression in words is unique to poetry, but he 
ventures to align it with philosophy, which also attempts an understanding of the world. 
For Ricoeur, the expression, although foregrounded in literary language in general, is a
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characteristic o f the potency o f all uses o f language to re-describe the world and thereby 
add to our knowledge o f it.
In the context o f Ricoeur’s argument, I suggest that there are two orders of 
reference exhibited in literary language in general. The first takes place within the system 
o f signifiers and signified that refer to a linguistic sign discoverable in the fabric o f  existing 
texts. Once this cipher is solved, that is, once the sign is found, the work can be said to be 
explicated, and this explanation yields a type o f understanding. While it is true, then, that 
in literary language, the visible, surface features o f a literary work guide the reader to 
cancel a prima facie reference to the world, this same nullification o f original reference 
generates a second-order reference to the world that extends beyond the linguistic system 
in which it gained expression. This second reference occurs when the reader recognizes 
(perhaps not without the help o f the text’s affective features) that something new has been 
proposed for consideration as knowledge.
This model o f  reading, derived from Ricoeur’s bifurcated analysis o f language, 
brings us foil circle to Riffaterre’s suggestion that the essence o f  lyric poetry might be best 
expressed as prosopopeia. He concedes to de Man that in poetry at least there is always a 
material reference to an author, who by virtue o f inscribing the poem, has set in motion an 
hypothesis that is expressed as a dialogue between the writer and the world, a kind o f 
masque that, for the reader, must first be read as an obvious fiction that dispenses with 
both the author and the world. The last section o f Chapter Four, in fact, reviews a variety 
o f  prosopopeiaic structures at work in ancient and classical Greek epigrams, 
demonstrating that a variety o f forms o f dialogues exist. A new dialogue begins when the
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poem, almost in spite of the linguistic system from which it takes its form, speaks to the 
reader in what Heidegger would call the language o f Being, proposing a new way o f 
experiencing the world that allows for an engagement o f being with Being, and which in 
turn yields a new understanding o f the world.
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CHAPTER II
INSCRIPTION ABOVE AND BELOW:
THE GREEK EPIGRAM AND MICHAEL RIFFATERRE’S HYPOGRAM
<271 5r| x ^Xv 5ia  p.01 Xeye 
tpuvaeoaa be yiveo. —  Eaiupw
Come, divine lyre, speak to me andfind yourself a voice. —  Sappho
The Development o f  Greek Lyric
In his Greek Lyric Poetry, Willis Bamstone characterizes the Lyric as “simply . . . 
a short poem that sings” (16).3 C. M. Bowra also proposes melody as Lyric’s defining 
metaphor: “In the main it [Lyric] refers . . .  to poetry which, if not actually sung, has in 
itself an element o f song” (1). O f course, the singing o f songs was ubiquitous in ancient 
Greek society, and as Eric Havelock observes, ‘“Poets’ were not read in their own day but 
listened to . . .  .” (17). Even as late as the fifth century BCE., including the period o f 
Plato’s famous symposia, oral performance was traditional at private dinners and the like. 
Although some poems were transcribed to share with other small audiences, “[t]he act o f 
composition is itself oral. The language is ‘melic,’ to use the correct ancient term. It is 
framed to be sung” (Havelock 18).
The analogy o f Lyric as music, however, invites a perception o f oral texts as 
subordinate to the melodies that “carried” them. This certainly would be a mistake, at least 
in the case o f epic poetry, for example, where all o f the elements o f the ancient craft o f
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mousike—word, song, and dance— conspired to foreground a mythos, a narrative 
depository of cultural values that existed apart from any single performer. The epic 
inculcates a tradition “displayed at a second ‘diachronic level’ o f the memory; the song 
[text] is a ‘feedback’” (Havelock 157).4 Melody with dance accompaniment was intended 
primarily to aid in rendering mythos literally and figuratively memorable by exciting or 
energizing the soul. Werner Jaeger, for example, claims that the Greeks “considered that 
the only genuine forces which could form the soul were words and sounds [in tandem 
with] rhythm and harmony” (xxvii). Yet the oral text acted as a “first among equals” 
because o f its logos, that is, its capacity to articulate tradition in terms o f  formal concepts. 
Melody and dance served as necessary supplements to verbal mnemonic devices: “Its 
[melody’s] function so far as it was employed [was] to assist . . .  in imprinting that syntax 
[of what was to be learned] on the memory by maximising the pleasure in reciting it” 
(Havelock 136).
Havelock speculates that what enabled melody to emerge and develop into 
independent form was the invention o f alphabetic writing—a technology that allowed 
speakers to dispense with other mnemonic devices, including dance and melody (136).5 
Melody was free to exist in its own right as a form of expression, no longer under the 
constraint o f concepts. Havelock describes the written form o f the epic, for example, as 
mythos embedded in the very words and syllables o f the text via “[p]honetic redundancy 
o f diction, producing alliteration, anaphora, chiasmus, and the like . . . ” ( Havelock 157). 
Musical accompaniment assists in this recreative process, but it is the text that must serve 
as the “phenominalisation” (Havelock 157).6 Here, however, Havelock has confused the
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technology o f the alphabetization, which makes possible the transmission o f the text 
without accompaniment, with the audible effects as well as the rhythm o f syntax, which 
creates its own inner music. Although it is true that rhetorical features become visible in 
writing, they are bound to the sound and order (rhythm) o f the words o f the text and not 
the alphabet. The question remains therefore concerning the relationship between 
syntactical structures and their audible effects and the lyrical nature o f the text. In 
subsequent chapters, therefore, we will examine in the syntactical “music” that poetry 
generates. Since we know, however, that reading can be done in the absence o f musical 
accompaniment, it is safe to say that the invention o f  an alphabet that could visibly 
represent both consonants and specific vowel sounds provided the context for a formal 
separation o f melody produced by an instrument as accompaniment to the written text.
According to Havelock, ancient Greek Lyric, like epic and drama, was “an 
invention . . .  designed for the functional purpose o f a continuing record in oral 
cultures”—a complex o f skills that together constitute a “mnemonic necessity” (186-7). 
Jaeger also contends that even though in early lyric poems this “record” appears to be 
expressed in terms more personal than in epic narrative, the context o f live performance 
made the dialogue o f the poem a public event: “It is true o f Greek art as well as o f Greek 
literature that until late in the fourth century it is principally the expression o f the spirit o f 
the community” (xxvii). Archilochus’ sardonic observations about military life, for 
example, are often cited as an initial turn toward subjectivity, but according to Jaeger, 
such an interpretation would be anachronistic: “Nowadays we must find it difficult to 
imagine how entirely public was the conscience o f a Greek. (In fact, the early Greeks
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never conceived anything like the personal conscience o f modem times.)” (9). Thus 
Archilochus’ famous lyric about hastily abandoning his shield in the midst o f battle in 
order to save himself is not so much an expression of personal history as it is a reflection 
o f a contemporaneous shift in cultural values.7 Havelock also observes, “Its [Lyric’s] style 
and substance is ‘other-oriented,’ not in any abstract sense, but in the sense that the other 
is an audience,. . .  often symbolized in the vocative as single person, but always felt as a 
listener who is a partner in the poetry” (20). It was not until private reading became 
widespread (after Plato) that poetry could become a thoroughly textual discourse 
(Havelock 9-10; 147-148). Once musical accompaniment was abandoned, however, it was 
as if words, despite their conceptual power, had lost a certain invocatory power, and so 
began a long and distinguished history o f attempts to discover or recover the inherent 
melody that could still be “heard” in speech, until in the end one could argue that some 
poets, such as Mallarme, achieved an inversion (never intended by the Greeks) that, in 
semiotic terms, made words serve as signifiers o f  a musical signified.
We can, in any case, imagine several evolutionary stages o f poetic performance 
and writing during the periods o f ancient and classical Greece. From approximately 700 to 
500 BCE there would have been performances o f lyric poems parallel to, but less public 
than, an epic performance, where melody and dance remained integral to a verbal text. 
During an intermediate period (approximately 500-400) writing became increasingly 
widespread, so that poems, although still perceived as a composite o f melody and word, 
also were starting to be “heard” as words alone.8 Finally, the craft o f writing took over 
the mnemonic function o f melody, which was then abandoned in favor o f  private reading
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and composing. It might appear, then, that the Lyric at this stage was consigned wholly to 
the world o f texts. Lyric would be defined subsequently not in terms o f music, such as in 
Bamstone’s phrase “a short poem that sings,” but in terms of a linguistic system, that is, a 
short poem that signs. It is not self-evident, however, that the essence of Lyric can be 
wholly subsumed under the category o f a linguistic artifact, and in subsequent chapters 
this definition will be challenged or at least modified. Our first step nevertheless is to 
explore the ways in which Lyric might be approached semiotically.
Michael Riffaterre and the Hypogiram
In his Semiotics o f Poetry, Michael Riffaterre attempts a semiosis o f Lyric, taking 
it as a system o f signs, the structure or pattern o f  which holds the key to its meaning. He 
begins with a structuralist presupposition that "the language o f poetry differs from 
common linguistic usage,” and he claims that readers grasp this difference "instinctively" 
(1-2). Jonathan Culler, for example, outlines this approach in his Structuralist Poetics: 
"[Tjhe primacy o f formal patterning enables poetry to assimilate the meanings which 
words have in other instances o f discourse and subject them to new organization" (163). 
The structuralist project is "to specify what is involved in these conventional expectations 
which make poetic language subject to a different teleology or finality from that of 
ordinary speech" (164). Culler thus sees poetry as serving an entirely different linguistic 
purpose (“teleology or finality”) from that o f  ordinary language. In Riffaterre's semiotic 
application, learned textual conventions predispose readers to expect that when they 
encounter certain structural characteristics in a poem (signifiers), they will perform a shift 
in the relationship between these signifiers and their signifieds: "The literary
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phenomenon . . .  is a dialectic between text and reader" that is rule-governed 
(Semiotics 1). Although ordinary communication depends upon the capacity o f words to 
refer, “that is, upon a direct relationship o f words to things," the rules o f the 
literature/reader dialectic dictate that when a reader encounters certain signals (“aberrants” 
or “ungrammaticalities”) in the text that "threaten the literary representation o f reality, or 
mimesis," the competent reader should expect a shift in signification (Semiotics 2). The 
syntactical patterns perceived by readers serve to make it clear that a particular unit o f text 
is serving, in its signification, a difference purpose from that o f simply referring to the 
world. He offers these lines o f a poem by Paul Eluard as an example:
De tout ce que j ’ai dit de moi que reste-t-il 
J’ai conserve de faux tresors dans des armoires vides 
O f all I have said about myself, what is left? I have been keeping false 
treasures in empty wardrobes. (Semiotics 3)
Ungrammaticalities become apparent when, upon first reading, the reader attempts to
make "false treasures" refer to or represent a literal object (mimesis) and then tries to 
make a false treasure exist in an "empty" wardrobe. Having recognized these anomalies, 
the reader then tries a shift in signifiers. In this example, Riffaterre suggests that the first 
line, "of all I have said about myself, what is left?" implies an obvious, if disheartening, 
answer: "nothing" (Semiotics 3). Having realized that the second line can not be 
interpreted straightforwardly, that is, in terms o f ordinary language, the reader is in a 
position to make a shift in signification. The reader reads again, this time noticing that the 
second line's figures might be distilled into a "...periphrastic statement o f disillusionment
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(all these things amount to zero)," which means that the line is essentially a figurative 
variant o f the key word 'nothing' that is already implied in line one (Fig. 1) {Semiotics 4).
Signifier =  "false treasures"
S ignified  (em pty set - no objective referent) new  Signifier =  n o th in g  (ordinary language)
Signifier =  "keeping nothing in nothing"
Signified  (em pty set - no objective referent)
*
new  Signified  =  n o th in g  (ordinary language)
Figure 1. Riffaterre’s analysis o f  a shift in signification made by the reader after 
recognizing ungrammicalities in the text.
Riffaterre calls the initial reading an "heuristic reading" in which meaning is sought 
according to "an assumption that language is referential—and at this stage words do 
indeed seem to relate first o f all to things" (Semiotics 5). But when "incompatibilities" or 
ungrammaticalities occur, the reader is forced to do a "retroactive" reading—a second 
reading—which Riffaterre calls a "truly hermeneutic reading" {Semiotics 5). This second 
reading is a "structural decoding" o f the text, which Riffaterre defines as the reader 
"working his way back to the structures that generate the text" {Semiotics 6, 168). Any 
key or kernel words discovered by this decoding process are "hypograms," which are 
related as signifiers, that is, they refer not to things but to a second-order set o f verbal 
signifieds that can be described as a matrix or origin o f all o f the variant hypogrammic 
kernels and which can be, in turn, converted to an ordinary language sentence.9
It is here that Riffaterre parts company with an emotivist approach to poetry by 
presupposing that the ordinary, referential language o f the matrix to which the poem’s
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text refers is unproblematic. Paul de Man, for example applauds Riffaterre’s refusal to 
“valorize the irrational” (“Hypogram” 27). Riffaterre in fact displays a penchant for 
choosing texts that foreground a certain “morbidity,” but he remains well within the realm 
o f structural poetics, “o f the Slavic as well as o f the French variety” (“Hypogram” 27).10 
His semiosis o f Lyric tries to show that while poetry does not mirror nature, it does, 
nevertheless, yield a reverse image o f ordinary statements. Yet he does not go on to offer 
a philosophical argument about the relationship o f ordinary language to reality. Linguists 
o f a positivist bent had freed poets o f any obligation to speak (or to be interpreted) in 
propositions that had any truth-value, but, according to structuralist critics who retained 
positivist assumptions about language, it did not render poems incomprehensible. They 
remain intelligible as exemplars o f the way language works. Words will refer, if not to the 
world, then to each other. The poem as “verbal icon,” illustrates an intuition of 
signification, but signification wholly linguistic and wholly semiotic. As a semiotician, 
Riffaterre simply advances the theory that Lyric can be understood as the signifying 
component o f a self-referring intertext. The poem’s significance, what it “signs,” can be 
ascertained by ferreting out the poem’s relationship to other texts, that is, by discovering 
how the poem as a unit is a textual signifier that, along with its textual signified (the 
hypogram) becomes the sign o f a text that can be expressed in ordinary language (the 
matrix). Because the number o f signifier/signified relationships in a text is finite, readers 
can achieve a reasonably certain and theoretically exhaustive understanding o f the poem.11
Lyric, then, is defined by Riffaterre as a form o f “scrambled transmission” or, to 
put it in traditionally rhetorical terms, periphrastic communication—a play o f words that
19
engages the intellect without raising questions o f  how language refers to the world 
(Semiotics 165). But the dual problems o f reference and meaning, mimesis and 
hermeneutics, are not thereby rendered irrelevant but merely displaced. The signifying 
poem may be intertextually overdetermined, that is, wholly comprehended within the 
boundaries o f  inter-related texts, yet the questions remain first, whether or not it can be 
reduced to, or translated into, ordinaiy language and second, whether or not ordinary 
language succeeds in referring to the world where poetic language fails, or indeed, 
whether poetiy steps in where ordinary language already has failed. For example, in 
“Hypogram and Inscription,” Paul de Man gently critiques what he regards as Riffaterre’s 
otherwise lucid semiosis, suggesting that deciphering a poem by uncovering and specifying 
its matrix o f ordinary language “kernels” reveals only another cipher. His point is that the 
ordinary language we use for communication and even the philosophical language we use 
for criticism already (and necessarily) has been, to use a perjorative term, infected by 
figures. Having admired Riffaterre’s clarity o f explication, de Man here suggests that 
lucidity, even in ordinaiy language, is unattainable.
De Man claims that the boundaries o f logic and rhetoric always have been blurred, 
to the consternation o f those philosophers who search for transparency in language.12 Is it 
possible, then, that poems that at first glance may seem to be a playful, ciphered way of 
saying something very ordinary (for example, a cliche), or at the most, something 
traditionally regarded as wise (a saying or proverb) could play the more serious role o f 
unpacking the meaning o f what has, in ordinary language, become opaque to 
understanding? Poetizing would then becomes a function o f t hought— a creation o f fresh
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metaphor that either truly awakens understanding or, from de Man’s point o f view, merely 
poses as a new insight. From this perspective the “play” has become a game o f deception. 
As he famously puts it in the title to his collection o f essays on the rhetoric o f criticism, the 
reader o f literature inevitably exhibits a corresponding “blindness” in achieving any 
“insight.”
The Roots o f Western Lyric
Since ancient and classical Greek Lyric is one o f English Lyric’s major roots, it 
would seem natural to pursue the answers to these questions about the semiosis o f Lyric in 
that context. The dearth o f complete poems from the period, however, remains a major 
barrier to comparative studies. As Richard Lattimore laments, the greatest o f these lyrics 
have three things in common: they are from the same period, they are short, and they are 
mostly destroyed (v). Granted, however, an expansion of the strictest taxonomy, which 
would restrict the genre o f Lyric to monody accompanied by the lyre, to include more 
abundant extant forms o f elegy (especially the epigram) we can perhaps gain sufficient 
access to the form during the period o f its Greek origins to apply to it Riffaterre’s semiotic 
method.
At first glance, it would seem sufficient simply to distinguish between lyric poems 
and the dramatic and epic poetry o f ancient and classical Greece. According to J. W. 
Mackail, however, the Greeks themselves made additional distinctions that reflect an 
evolution of lyrical forms. Deriving from Homeric meters and diction, the elegaic couplet 
emerged first. The iambus, for which Archilochus (680-640 BCE) became famous, then 
broke with these formal structures and introduced more “restless” rhythms and meters
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couched in a kind of street language. Lastly, the melic developed from the iambus into a 
form especially associated with music, employing many meters in a combination o f 
dactylic and trochaic rhythms. The closest o f the forms to prose, it also found its way into 
the language o f the theater. These solo performances o f poetry with lyre accompaniment 
(monody) developed in Ionia in the seventh century BCE, and especially flourished 650- 
500 BCE, a period which, according to Mackail, could be compared to Tudor England, 
when medieval social structures were superseded by monarchy and a semblance o f later 
democracy (.Lectures 84-86). According to Bowra, the poems o f Sappho, Alcaeus, and 
Anacreon probably were composed for the edification o f friends in secular settings (5, 13). 
In Mackail’s estimation, monody reached its height after the Persian wars in the poems o f 
Simonides (Lectures 133).
The seven-stringed lyre used for accompanying monody may have been invented as 
early as the Mycenean period, but Archilochus is the first to mention it (Bowra 2-3). There 
would have been no harmony in the accompaniment; there was simply a tune, which in 
turn set the meter for the poem. Since the tunes are lost, it is difficult to discriminate 
among the multitude o f meters to which they were conjoined, but it is likely, according to 
Bowra, that a triad o f strophe/antistrope/epode (in which the strophe-antistrophe carried 
the same meter, then varied in the epode) was common (10, 11). This marriage o f melody, 
meter, and words can still be appreciated even though only the words are left: “[Ejven in 
their divorced state the words have an astonishingly melodious movement o f their own, 
and this certainly owes much to the demands o f the accompaniment” (Bowra 10). As early 
as the second century CE, in his On Literary Composition, Dionysius o f  Halicarnassus, for
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example, praises Sappho’s “polished and exuberant style” and observes, “The euphony 
and charm o f this passage [referring to an invocation o f Aphrodite] lie in the cohesion and 
smoothness o f the joinery. Words are juxtaposed and interwoven according to certain 
natural affinities and groupings o f the letters.. .  ” (qtd. in Campbell 53).13
According to H. J. Rose, the early elegaic couplet employed two halves o f the 
Homeric hexameter, which totaled five feet: — ~ - ~ ~ ” -  ,14It probably
was sung, but the tunes were associated with music o f the flute or oboe that originated in 
cultures to the east o f Ionia (80-81). After the Greek alphabet was invented, it evolved 
from its oral form into the written form of epigram, a term first attested in Herodotus and 
an exact equivalent o f Latin inscriptio and English inscription (Mackail, Select Epigrams 
1). Since Martial, the epigram has most often been understood as a short, witty poem that 
makes a whimsical or moral point, but in its first use in ancient Greece, it denoted simply 
words engraved in verse upon a stone, tablet, or sepulcher. Its original formal limit o f a 
single couplet evolved to include up to four couplets, with occasional longer exceptions to 
the rule. In addition, the descriptor elegiac did not correspond to what became known as 
the tristis elegeia mode of the Latin poets; rather, it was used to describe everything from 
simple memorials to war chants and political commentary. Mackail observes that over the 
course o f  its early history, the elegaic epigram evolved into “a vehicle so facile and 
flexible that it never seems unsuitable or inadequate” to any occasion or use {Select 
Epigrams 6). Its consistent meter was sufficient to distinguish it both from the epic 
hexameter and the melic modes, but very often its affinity to what we have come to know 
as the Lyric in English is self-evident. Compare, for example, this seduction poem by
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Asclepiades to Andrew Marvel’s “To His Coy Mistress”:
tpe(,8r) itapdevnr]g, m i tl irXeov ; ou yap eg 'AiSt^v 
eX$oua’ euprjaeig tov (piXeovta, Kopiy 
’Ev c^ootai to: Tepuva Ta Ku-itpidog- ev S’ AxepovTt 
oatea Kai (ntoSnj, irapdeve, Keiaop.eda. (9.8)15 
Maiden, you prize your maidenhead, but what does it profit you? When 
you arrive in Hades, chaste girl, you will find no lover. The Cyprian’s 
delights are among the living; having crossed Acheron, O virgin, we shall 
lie still—dust and ashes.
In fact, as Mackail notes, fragments o f long lyric poems (as well as other forms of poetry) 
sometimes were included in the Greek Anthology because, in their unfortunately 
fragmented form, they could be read as epigrams:
. . .  and the epigram in Greek, while it always remained conditioned by 
being in its essence and origin an inscriptional poem, took in the later 
periods so wide a range o f subject and treatment that it can perhaps only be 
limited by certain abstract conventions o f  length and metre. Sometimes it 
becomes in all but metrical form a lyric;. . . .  {Select Epigrams 3) 
Discerning the Hypogram o f the Epigram 
Riffaterre defined a lyrical poem’s hypogram as the signified o f  the linguistic 
matrix out o f  which the poem arose. This matrix may, in the end, be an artifact o f the 
sociolect (for example, a cliche, pun, or proverb) or a philosopheme, both o f which 
ultimately can be stated in ordinary language. The poem as a whole signifies that matrix
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and nothing else. This means that poems axe not mimetic, that is, they do not directly refer 
to the empirical world in terms o f re-presenting it to the reader {Semiotics 12-13). Rather, 
every poem presents to the reader features that make it recognizable as a literary artificact. 
Ungrammaticalities, for example, force the reader to do a second, hermeneutical reading, 
the object o f which is to find out in what other system these ungrammaticalities become 
grammatical. The greater the ungrammaticality, the more constrained the reader is to find 
a specific intra-textual or inter-textual referent. There are a finite number of referents, 
even though the more complex the poem, the more referents there may be and the less 
likely it is that the reader can discover them in one reading {Semiotics 164-166).
In Asclepiades’ epigram, for example, an initial reading suggests a mise en scene; 
however, it becomes evident that the epigram is an artifact (that it does not “re-present” 
anything) when we encounter an ungrammaticality, which is the absurdity o f the lover’s 
rationale for a consummation—“on 7 a p  ecr'AiSriv eXftoua’ ehprjaeig t o p  
tpiXeov-ra, Koprp.” This is a reference to stock cliches about the brevity of life, as well as 
any number o f other epigrams lamenting the shortness of life and the loneliness o f death, 
that function as the matrix or ultimate source o f the poem’s text.16 A second reading 
therefore performs a shift that places the lover’s apparent skepticism about the virtue of 
virginity in the context o f a joke addressed not to a female lover but a (probably) male 
reader. Duly amused, the reader is likely to read again, however, recognizing that the 
writer has structured the epigram in a way that dispenses almost immediately with its 
initial cavalier attitude toward the subject o f seduction and reiterates instead in each o f the 
subsequent clauses a reference to the more serious hypogram. Finally, it reads as an elegy,
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which Mackail, in his own arrangement of selections from the Anthology, appropriately 
places in the section entitled “Fate and Change” rather than “The Human Comedy,” or 
“Love.”17
In his own work on semiotics, Culler commends Riffaterre for contributing to the 
structuralist project a powerful and ingenious semiotic method o f discerning poetic 
structures. He defends Riffaterre against a common complaint— that Riffaterre "violates 
critical decorum in claiming that reading a poem is a matter o f discovering the word or 
sentence from which it is generated o f which its every element is a variant" {Pursuit 
91)—by noting that Riffaterre explicitly states in Semiotics o f Poetry that the meaning o f a 
poem is not "deducible from a comparison between variants o f the given, and it would be 
a reductionist procedure" (12). The poem's significance is, "rather, the reader's praxis of 
the transformation, a realization that it is akin to playing, to acting out the liturgy o f a 
ritual. .  ."(12). This defense seems to be based on the notion that reading is a performance 
that never yields a stable meaning. Culler argues that structuralism seeks to discover the 
conditions o f  the possibility o f various interpretations o f  the text, but it does not seek to 
perform those interpretations or discover new ones; the structuralist enterprise is not 
hermeneutical. Semiotics is valuable as an instrument used to "identify effects o f 
signification . . . .  Then one can attempt to construct models o f signifying processes to 
account for these effects" (48). Yet he admits that if a competent reader will be led 
ineluctably by the poem's markers to a definite matrix, this “solution to the puzzle” 
effectively cancels out other interpretations (98). Despite his initial defense, then, Culler 
ends by chastising Riffaterre for falling prey to the temptation to do hermeneutics—to
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offer interpretations superior to and more subtle than any offered thus far. Riffaterre tends 
to muddy the semiotic waters: "It is difficult to treat the efforts o f  previous readers 
simultaneously as the phenomena one wishes to explain and as the errors one is attempting 
to surpass" (94).18
In his 1981 paper "Hypogram and Inscription," Paul de Man, too, praises 
Riffaterre for discovering a powerful and productive methodology. He calls Riffaterre's 
approach "probably the most reliable didactic model for the teaching o f literature . . .  
available at the present" (28). De Man also notes, however, that Riffaterre seems to 
conflate structuralism and hermeneutics. While Riffaterre accepts without reservation the 
traditional assumption that formalism entails description but not "understanding," he is at 
the same time "compelled to integrate the hermeneutic activity o f  the reader within his 
enterprise" (“Hypogram” 30-31). For de Man, then, Riffaterre becomes "a model case for 
examining if and how the poetics o f literary form can be made compatible with the 
hermeneutics o f reading" (“Hypogram” 31).
In the end, however, de Man's critique o f Riffaterre has less to do with keeping 
open the prospect o f producing a multitude o f interpretations than it has to do with the 
possibility of making an interpretation, which in turn resolves into a problem of language. 
De Man points out that Riffaterre, in the last chapter o f Semiotics o f Poetry, does 
acknowledge that even after careful decoding, hermeneutics is a "chancy" business and 
"interpretation is never final" (Riffaterre 165). But de Man suspects that in the 
hermeneutical difficulties lie problems more intractable than those involved in accurately 
solving a verbal puzzle. He suggests that reading is vexed by a problem inherent to the
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relationship between rhetoric and grammar, and that this is a problem that emerges in the 
very notions o f the hypogram and matrix. It is this hesitation to affirm the strict separation 
o f  literary and non-literary language that marks a transition between structuralist and post­
structuralist theory.
De Man argues that, traditionally, the stability o f  the relationship between 
quadrivium and trivium depended on the assumption that logic served as the link between 
the sciences and grammar, which then served to articulate in language the findings o f 
science (“Resistance” 102-3). Rhetoric retained a dignified but subordinate position; it 
functioned as an ornament that enhanced the affect, or affective effect, o f language. 
Structuralists inherited this presumption of a strict separation between logic/grammar and 
rhetoric and carried on a “reduction o f figure to grammar” (“Semiology” 907-8). De Man 
claims, however, that "the grammatical decoding of a text leaves a residue of 
indetermination that has to be, but cannot be, resolved by grammatical means, however 
extensively conceived" (“Resistance” 104). He speculates that critical readings are 
destined to oscillate forever between mounting an explanation o f the text in grammatical- 
logical terms and recognizing that its final content has not, alas, been comprehended fully 
because its figures resist translation (“Resistance” 104-105; “Semiology” 906).
Responding, for example, to Riffaterre’s reading of Victor Hugo’s poem “Ecrit sur 
la vitre d'une fenetre flamande," de Man first agrees with Riffaterre that the poem certainly 
is not mimetic, that is, it does not purport to describe the actual sound o f a carillon, but 
refers to certain figures that had their origin in other literary exempla that can be traced as 
soon as a reader recognizes the pertinent ungrammaticalities, such as the dancer who
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enters through a door o f air. But de Man also wondered whether or not “inscribed” within 
the hypogram that Riffaterre had discovered {carillon flamande) there was yet another 
metaphor—a figure for the cognition or consciousness o f the passage o f time.
“Ecrit sur la vitre d’une fenetre flamande”
Jaime le carillon de tes cites antiques,
O vieux pays gardien de tes moeurs domestiques, 
Noble Flandre, oil le Nord se rechauffe engourdi 
Au soleil de Castille et s’accouple au Midi!
5 Le carillon, c’est l’heure inattendue et folle,
Que l’oeil croit voir, vetue en danseuse espagnole, 
Apparaiitre soudain par le trou vif et clair 
Que ferait en s’ouvrant une porte de fair.
Elle vient, secouant sur les toits lethargiques 
10 Son tablier d ’argent plein de notes magiques,
Reveillant sans pitie les dormeurs ennuyeux,
Sautant a petits pas comme un oiseau joyeux, 
Vibrant, ainsi qu’un dard qui tremble dans la cible; 
Par un lfele escalier de cristal invisible,
15 Effaree et dansante, elle descend des cieux;
Et l’esprit, ce veilleur fait d’oreilles et d’yeux, 
Tandis qu’elle va, vient, monte et descend encore, 
Entend de marche en marche errer son pied sonore!
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I love the carillon o f your ancient towns, o old land, keeper o f your 
domestic customs. O noble Flanders, where the benumbed North warms 
itself in the sun o f Castille and mates with the South! The carillon is the 
unexpected and mad hour the eye thinks it sees, dressed as a Spanish 
dancer, appearing suddenly through the keen, bright hole made by a door 
o f air as it opens. She comes, shaking over the lethargic rooftops her silver 
apron, full o f magical notes, pitilessly waking the wearisome sleepers, 
taking little jumps, like a merry bird, quivering like a spear trembling in its 
target. By a fragile stairway o f invisible crystal, alarmed and dancing, she 
descends from the heavens. And as she goes and comes and climbs up and 
down again, the mind, that watchman made of ears and eyes, hears her 
resonant foot wandering from step to step, (trans. Riffaterre, 
“Prosopopeia” 109)
De Man argues, against Riffaterre, that the matrix o f this poem is articulated most 
accurately as “j ’aime le carillon,” which is a figure o f speech that could be expressed in a 
sentence that describes the relationship o f the mind to time (Fig. 2) (“Ftypogram” 32).
Under this model, various signifiers o f the carillon are displaced to a new verbal 
signified— "time," and the "love" that first refers to the poetic construct o f the "I" but is 
displaced to "mind" or consciousness. These verbal signifieds reveal an underlying matrix 
that hypothesizes a relationship between subject (I) and object (time). But both time and 
mind are invisible; they can only be "seen," according to de Man, by virtue o f  a kind o f 
hallucination induced by a figure o f  speech. It is "the claim o f all poetry to make the
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invisible visible," and it is just this invocatory power that puts the distinction 
between (stable) sign and (unstable) trope in question (“Hypogram” 34). It is not certain 
whether it is the sign that makes metaphor possible or metaphor that is the condition of 
the possibility o f the sign. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the latter alternative 
significantly broadens the role o f metaphor in cognition.
sound (and sight) (signifier)
ch im es (sign ified) -M im e (new  signified)
tim e (new  signifier)
love (signifier)
y  m ind (new  signified)
I (sign ified ) ^  m ind (new  signified)
Figure 2. De Man’s analysis of the transition o f signifieds and signifiers in Victor 
Hugo’s “Ecrit sur la vitre d ’une fenetre flamande.”
Furthermore, de Man observes, the title o f the poem, “Ecrit sur la vitre d'une 
fenetre flamande," clearly indicates a material inscription that constrains the reader to read 
the poem under the aegis o f a material reference, namely, the author o f the poem 
(“Hypogram” 35). The fantastic crystal stairway that stages the dancing figure o f the Hour 
is solidly paralleled in the glass pane, which only the hardest o f substances is able to 
engrave, but which becomes visible to the eye only when it is willfully (implying an 
intentional subject) stained by inscription. Thus the material subject of the poem is
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inscribed within its own creation, memorializing its consciousness in a manner that time, in 
the fleeting sound o f the carillon, never can.
De Man's critique brings us full circle to the presupposition with which Riffaterre 
began his semiotic project, namely, that there is a clear distinction between so-called 
ordinary and literary language. If  the poem, on first reading, is a confusion of 
contradictions, discovering the hypogram/matrix will yield, at the least, a figure or trope, 
an inter-textual connection that can be converted to ordinary language (Fig. 3).
poem (language o f  trope) Signifier
hypogram (intertextual figure) *^ m a tr ix  (intertextual structure or system )‘■►“ordinary language” proposition
‘♦ ob ject or state o f  affairs (ontological status bracketed)
Signified
Figure 3. Riffaterre’s hierarchy o f signifying relationships.
When Riffaterre observes, "The text functions something like a neurosis," that is, 
repression precipitates its own expression under a variety o f  initially cryptic forms, he is 
transposing to poetry what had become a commonplace among philosophers who hoped 
that an analysis o f language might solve some o f the more intransigent philosophical 
riddles, especially in the realm o f metaphysical and religious propositions (Semiotics 19). 
De Man warns, however, that when the conversion of the matrix results in a philosopheme 
such as the relationship between time and mind, or even in a cliche such as "time heals all 
wounds," the reduction o f poetry to ordinary language becomes problematic, even if the 
critic wishes not to enter into that particular philosophical fray, because it raises the
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question o f whether or not ordinary language is any more transparent to the understanding 
than the so-called periphrasis o f the poem (“Hypogram” 27).
In a reply to de Man’s critique, Riffaterre does admit that de Man’s reading of 
“Ecrit” altered his perspective. Recalling Kant’s famous comment that David Hume had 
awakened him from his epistemological “dogmatic slumbers,” Riffaterre observes, “I 
rested happily on my conclusions, sure that I had covered all angles, until Paul de Man 
jolted me out o f my complacency” (“Prosopopeia” 108). Unlike Kant, however, he was 
not convinced that a critical Copemican revolution was in order. He concedes only that de 
Man had shown that Hugo’s poem involved a “figure o f a figure,” namely that the figural 
description o f the carillon (metaphor and thing) is itself subordinated to an association 
between two figures that are ultimately organized into a new sign “where mind is the 
signifier and time the signified” (Riffaterre, “Prosopopeia” 110). This new sign can be 
comprehended, however, under the traditional rhetorical category o f prosopopeia, which 
Riffaterre then proposes, in agreement with de Man, as one o f the essential characteristics 
ofLyric.
Following Pierre Fontanier’s taxonomy o f rhetorical terms (published in 1821), 
Riffaterre defines prosopopeia as the rhetorical device o f “staging, as it were, absent, 
dead, supernatural or even inanimate beings” who are then made to “act, speak, answer as 
is our wont” (qtd. in “Prosopopeia” 107). He uses the terms supposition and hypothesis to 
explain how the poem’s author proposes to the reader a “natural impossibility” 
(“Prosopopeia” 110). In the case o f Hugo’s poem, the first level o f “staging” is a 
prosopopeia o f the Hour, signified by the sounding carillon that is personified in the
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Spanish dancer on a crystal stairway.19 For Riffaterre, this is a simple illustration o f the 
principle that poems do not refer to the world but to “familiar [verbal] stereotypes.” He 
grants nonetheless that he had ignored a second level o f “staging” in the poem that, in its 
turn, makes visible or gives face to what he now recognizes as the essence o f the poet’s 
art—prosopopeia, reflected in the etymology o f the term itself: Ttpoaoitov Ttoeiv 
(“Prosopopeia” 108). The opening address o f the poet to the land, “I love the carillon o f 
your ancient towns,” Riffaterre acknowledges, “must slant uniformly all its [the poem’s] 
subsequent functions” (“Prosopopeia” 108). It is this apostrophe that effectively 
“proposes a new sign for ‘consciousness o f time,” ’ and through which is revealed a 
“prosopopeia o f prosopopeia.” The reader now “sees” the figure o f  a figure, namely, the 
cognition o f Time “figured in” the dancing Hour, who/which (the Hour and its “human 
face”—the dancer—are now identical) is a figure o f the ringing o f the carillon.
In addition, it is this meta-staging that reveals both the inscription o f the author’s 
self in the poem and necessarily a return to a material reference: “Inscription, as he [de 
Man] points out, refers to the real. Even the most unreal play o f postulates presupposes a 
subject. . .  .” (“Prosopopeia” 111). The very title o f the poem, “Inscribed on a Flemish 
Window,” refers to this material subject. Riffaterre observes, in fact, that “this persona 
cannot therefore be distinguished from the author (this being the one instance [sic] in 
literature where the intentional fallacy does not apply); consequently, any metonymic or 
synecdochic periphrasis substituted for the subject (like the title in Hugo’s poem) is the 
inscription o f  the self in the text—the very definition o f  the lyric” (emphasis added) 
(“Prosopopeia” 111).
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The distinctive nature o f the Lyric, RifFaterre concludes, must be inextricably 
linked to “the I-Thou relationship [of the poet] to the universe,” an association that 
ineluctably surfaces in the text. At this juncture RifFaterre also acknowledges a second 
“insight” offered by de Man, which is that apostrophe presupposes the possibility o f 
dialogue: “the address calls for a reply o f the addressee, the gaze that perceives animation 
invites gazing back from the animated object to the subject daydreaming a Narcissistic 
reflection o f itself in things” (“Prosopopeia” 112). Earlier in the same essay, RifFaterre 
had been careful to emphasize Fontanier’s distinction between prosopopeia, apostrophe, 
and dialogism (107-108), but in this concession, a conflation o f apostrophe and dialogue 
return here as the very “structure” o f prosopopeia, which he further subsumes under the 
rubric o f chiasmus, defined as “the transfer or crisscrossing exchange between subject and 
object. . . .” (“Prosopopeia” 112). Finally, RifFaterre proposes an intertext that, once 
and for all, “fuses” the window’s material inscription (subject) with the dancing Hour 
(object)—a famous graffiti etched on a window at the royal Chateau Chambord: “Woman 
often changes. Foolish he who trusts her” (qtd. in “Prosopopeia” 112). The mutability of 
time, the supposed fickleness o f  Woman (now transposed into the dancing woman o f the 
Hour), the fragility o f glass (and thus the risk implicit in inscription), and love are 
inextricably patterned and overdetermined by the poem’s title (“Prosopopeia” 112-13).
RifFaterre eventually uses this doubled-image essence o f Lyric (apostrophe and 
reply) as the foundation for his larger proposal, which cannot be taken up here, that Lyric 
is capable of generating narrative (116-123). First, however, he makes a key observation 
for the study o f Greek lyrics: Chiasmus, that necessary corollary o f  prosopopeia, is
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demonstrated most transparently, he argues, in the epitaph. He cites de Man’s example o f 
Milton’s epitaph on Shakespeare, in which Milton laments that he and all other writers are 
themselves turned into stone— struck dumb— in the very midst o f inscribing a memorial to 
the great playwright: . .  thou our fancy o f itself bereavingdDost make us Marble with 
too much conceiving.” This apostrophe generates a dialogue in which a “dumb” object 
takes up the address and in reply, speaks the subject into its own image: “prosopopeia thus 
stakes out a figural space for the chiasmic interpretation: either the subject will take over 
the object, or it will be penetrated by the object” (“Prosopopeia” 112).
Inscribing the Epigram
In the case o f the ancient and classical Greek sepulchral epigrams collected in the 
Greek Anthology, the context, like Milton’s monument to Shakespeare, is memorial. This 
context alerts readers to a cultural ritual and enables them to respond to the texts 
appropriately, that is, not to expect to receive information about states o f affairs but to 
perform a ritual dialogue: “[A] constant component o f poetic significance is that the 
poem’s language looks as much like a ritual or a game . . .  as it does like a means o f 
conveying sense” {Semiotics 164). Thus the condition o f the possibility o f understanding 
an epigram, whether literally inscribed on a monument or later written as text, is that it is 
already literary when readers come to it, predisposing them to understand the inscription 
as a unit o f signifying text. This poignant epigram, for example, is representative o f a large 
class o f epigrams dedicated to those who perished at sea:
Kai a e  KAerivoptSti, troOoc oiXeae irctrpiboQ a attic 
ffapofyaavra Notou XaCXam xetp.eptT|-
36
’ Opr) yap ae •Kedr)oev aveyyvog- vypa be tt|v or)v 
KiJiiax’ dtp’ l|AepTr|v eicXuaev f)XiKiriv. (11.33)
And son o f Cleanor, desire for your homeland utterly destroyed you- 
for trusting to the South’s wintry wind, the unfettered season fettered you, 
and the surging wet waves washed away your lovely youth.
This epigram is a direct “staging,” to use Fontanier’s term, of an absent or dead 
being. The encounter is a “mock hypothesis” (“Prosopopeia” 108). The youth, like an 
actor in a Greek drama, wears a mask that makes visible the otherwise faceless dead. Once 
the reader accedes to the hypothesis, the drama unfolds as an invocation and response. 
What appears on first reading to be a monologue addressed to a dead person becomes a 
dialogue between “I” (the poet, who is the one and only subject inscribed in the memorial) 
and “Thou”-the “calling back” o f consciousness. In this case, the figure o f destroyed 
youth is the figure for a simple but ancient sentiment: “There’s no place like home.” It 
only remains for the reader to work out the periphrasis, that “place” where the figure 
makes play with the hypogram (“Prosopopeia” 112).
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CHAPTER III
GENERATING TEXT: MATRIX AND LOGOS IN 
RIFFATERRE, KRISTEVA, AND MARITAIN
"OTrXia|iai itpog ’'Epuia irepl aTepvoiai \ 07Lapov. . . .
Girded with the breastplate o f reason, I  am armed against Love . . . .  —  Rufinus
Michael Riffaterre proposes that the “I-Thou” relationship, traditionally catalogued
as prosopopeia, is “the lyric figure,” and he concedes, in response to Paul De Man’s
critique, that every lyric bears witness to material inscription. “Inscription, as he [De Man]
points out, refers to the real” (“Prosopopeia” 111). Both critics use the words material
and real in their ordinary sense o f something physical and sensible. They therefore agree
that, writing, even though it is governed by linguistic codes, necessarily entails an inscriber
who is (or at least has) a body existing in the world o f space and time and that the
inscription itself can be described as a physical object. His own semiotic project, however,
is focused upon discovering the structure o f the dialogue between reader and text, in
which the subjective experience and ontological status o f the subject-author (as well as the
reader) is bracketed. Using this astringent method, Riffaterre hopes to offer a solution to
the puzzle o f how an apparently idiosyncratic subset o f language works within a larger
linguistic system; to precisely describe the linguistic province of lyrical speech is to define
it since, by definition, to define is to set the boundaries or limits o f something. De Man,
however, continues to doubt that the “ghost o f referentiality, which has theoretically been
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exorcised in the model o f the hypogram,” is truly gone, speculating that when RifFaterre 
characterizes reading as “an undecisiveness [sic] resolved at one moment and lost the 
next” he is acknowledging that something exceeds the method (Semiotics 29-30). In this 
chapter I examine Riffaterre’s method in the context o f his theory o f text production. I 
then suggest that for both Julia Kristeva (b. 1941), whose work in literary 
theory, grounded in her background in Marxist theory and Freudian/Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, spans the periods o f structuralism and post-structuralism, and Jacques 
Maritain (1882-1973), a Thomist whose philosophy o f aesthetics predates structuralism, 
there is a corporeal “plus,” signifying the original intuition o f experience between subject 
and object, which is communicated through, yet in spite of, language.
In her 1975 essay “From One Identity to An Other,” for example, Kristeva notes 
that even in the case o f so-called ordinary communication, and despite powerful 
constructionist critiques o f the notion o f a discreet ego, linguists still confront the problem 
of the “communicable sentence between speakers,” which seems to presuppose a 
Cartesian notion o f the autonomous self (Desire 131). She does not argue, however, that 
there is nothing that “exceeds the operating consciousness”; in fact, it is this “excess” that 
Kristeva explores in her various analyses o f poetic language and the semiotics o f the body. 
According to Kristeva, poetic language, which she extrapolates to include literary 
language in general, has manifested a sea-change dating from Mallarme {Revolution 82- 
3).20 But she also contends that this diachronic “revolution” is always present 
synchronically along the borders o f the symbolic and semiotic in the body. The trespasses 
o f the semiotic upon the symbolic therefore are apparent in any literature, ancient or
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modem (Revolution 15).21 Unlike Riffaterre, however, Kristeva locates the semiotic not in 
language or other public systems o f signification, but in the body itself. The semiotic is a 
pre-authorial and pre-linguistic matrix o f  bodily impulses and rhythms generating the 
process o f self-formation only later recognized in language {Revolution 36).
Maritain and Kristeva ultimately differ in their metaphysics.22 Like Kristeva, 
however, Maritain describes in his works on creativity a preconscious matrix o f drives, 
emotion, and will that is pre-linguistic and incarnated, that is, o f the body, and which 
generates something not yet expressible yet destined to be expressed. He also shares with 
Kristeva a profound aversion to Cartesian rationalism as well as an affinity for Aristotelian 
materialism, and he precedes her in identifying a revolution in poetic language (although 
he chooses Baudelaire rather than Mallarme as its pioneer) and in adopting a Freudian 
standpoint toward consciousness (262, 91).
Riffaterre’s Theory o f Textual Production
According to Riffaterre, the space and expression o f the hypogram are generated 
in the recursive processes (expansion and conversion) that establish a semantic 
equivalence between the kernel word or matrix sentence (a lexeme that is “always 
rewritable”) and its syntagm, which is ensconced in the poem (47). Expansion “transforms
Lexeme 4> Syntagm
Expansion^ ■^-Conversion
Figure 4. Expansion and contraction establish an equivalency between lexeme and 
syntagm.
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one sign into several”; conversion transforms “several signs into one ‘collective’ sign” (47) 
(Fig. 4).
Expansion is “the chief agent” in generating “textual signs,” which Riffaterre 
defines as “signs that stand for a whole text” that are already well-known or “easy for him 
[the reader] to reconstruct” and is “therefore the principal generator o f significance, since 
a constant can be spotted only where the text spreads out into successive variants o f its 
initial given, the more complex issuing from the simpler” (47, 174). It “transforms the 
constituents o f the matrix sentence into more complex form s” (48). Thus the reader reads 
the periphrasis o f the poem as a whole by gradually reconstructing the matrix o f the 
expanded sequence, which is “the text imagined by him [the reader] in its 
pretransformation state” and may comprise one or several sentences, a cliche, a quotation, 
or a “descriptive system” (63).
The text o f the “son of Cleanor” epigram , for example, might be read as a 
reference to cultural idiolects about the close relationship between death and desire.
Within the space o f its apostrophe, the poem develops an equivalence between the two 
concepts announced in the first fine by transforming irodoo “yearning for something 
absent” into coAeae “destruction.”
K a i ae  KAe'qvopiSr), iro$oc wAeae iraTpihoc oar|C
And you, too, son o f Cleanor, desire for your homeland utterly destroyed
you—
Lines two and three then complicate this doomed relationship by recalling the ancient ties 
between intemperate trust (Oapoew) and its all-too-frequent outcome in deceit, that is,
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being tripped-up or caught in a bind (irebato).
•fro'pa'qaavTa Notou AaiXata xei|xepir)- 
’ flpTl y a p  ere nebiqaev a veyyvo ^- vyp a  be tt|v ctt|v 
for trusting to the South’s wintry wind, 
the unfettered season fettered you,
These terms serve as an interpretive node leading to the periphrasis o f the final line: 
vulnerability to deceit is the fruit o f desire, and the outcome o f deceit is destruction. 
KUp.ttT’ dtp’ L|i.epTT|V €kAiXJ6V T)XlKtT]V. 
and the surging wet waves washed away your lovely youth.
Sea-billows “wash away” the lovely youth (figuratively and literally), establishing the 
equivalence o f desire, deceit, and destruction. In the end, drowning accomplishes both a 
baptismal release from the fetters o f deceit and a dissolving o f  the bonds o f life 
“€K Auto”—only to be replaced by the bonds o f death.
A hypogram’s reconstruction, therefore, is essentially a conversion process that 
subsumes the text’s syntagms under a single signified. This reconstruction, Riffaterre also 
notes, possesses a negative “pejorative” or positive “meliorative” charge that is mirrored 
in the expansion/production o f the text: “This means that the significance will be a positive 
valorization o f the textual semiotic unit if the hypogram is negative, and a negative 
valorization if the hypogram is positive” (63-64). This linguistic charge applies a common 
radical or marker to the sequences generated by expansion, and it is this semiotic role that 
the symbol plays: “[Individual meanings o f words are subordinated to a single overriding 
symbolism, and the symbolism is the opposite o f the hypogram’s connotations” (emphasis
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added) (65). For example, in the following anonymous epigram, the hypogram is expanded 
in the text into a positive valorization o f its opposite on counts both o f life/death and the 
trick o f memory that make an impossibility “possible.”
Tovto toi fjp.eTep'nc ijwrprjiov, eodXe Sa(3Ive,
T) Xidoc T) ptxpr| Tfjc pe7 dXiriq (piXi/qc;- 
Aiel ^TiQao) ae- <ji> 8’, ei depic ev tpdipevoiaiv,
tou Aiqdin<; err’ epoi ti mr|<; uSaTOQ (3.64)
This little stone, good Sabinus, is a memorial o f our great friendship.
I will always miss you; and if with the dead 
you must drink o f the waters o f Lethe, 
drink not forgetfulness o f  me.
The “time must have a stop” o f death is marked in the poem by an opposing radical, which 
is the hope that memory can overcome it— even a command that it do so.23 What is 
implicitly denied in the physical inscription is explicitly affirmed in the text o f  the 
inscription. The diminutive little and its antonym great conjoin to restore to life the 
warmth and intimacy o f friendship, and they are followed by an “amplificatio, ” the 
“simplest form” of expansion, in which repetitive sequences accumulate to create a single 
effect (49). In this series o f  amplifications the possibility o f eternal remembrance is 
repeatedly posited by a negation o f the pejorative connotation o f the hypogram.
Ultimately, and given the magnitude o f what the memorial attempts to achieve, the 
maximum must be supposed: a conversion o f the waters o f Lethe from the waters o f death 
to the waters of life, so that forgetfulness itself becomes a memorial to memory, and a
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stone monument becomes a watery memorial. Like Hugo’s inscription on glass (Chapter 
One), the epigram is marked by the subject’s consciousness o f vulnerability. The 
inscription is the last trace of “the ‘here’ and the ‘now,’” as de Man puts it (“Hypogram” 
32).
The same conversion o f pejorative hypogram to meliorative text is evident in 
Plato’s “Morning Star” epigram.
'aaTrip irpiv pen eX ap itec  ev l £coolaiv Ewoc,
vuv be dancdn Aap/rceic ’'Eairepog ev cpdipevoic. (11.53) 
Once you shone, the Morning Star, among the living, 
now in death you shine, the Evening Star, among the dead.
This epigram places in dramatic parallelism the relative functions o f the morning 
and evening stars, resulting in a parallax— a shift in position relative to the eye o f the 
beholder, the subject who writes the epitaph. In the initial encomium the poet posits a 
dialogue that effects a denial o f death—a meliorative, reverse image o f the matrix 
sentence, “All must go down to the darkness o f Hades,” so that the deceased is still alive 
though among the dead, still shining, and still a star. The present tense o f the second line 
makes explicit this proposal to undo death.
Percy Bysshe Shelley translated this epigram into English to use on the title page 
o f Adonais, his elegy on the untimely death o f John Keats. His rendering of the epigram as 
a quatrain intensifies dramatically, via the amplification that additional lines afford, the 
symbolism o f immortality:
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To Stella
Thou wert the morning star among the living,
Ere thy fair light had fled;—
Now, having died, thou art as Hesperus, giving 
New splendour to the dead.
Shelley’s second line, which is not part o f the original, is a gloss on the first. The morning 
star traditionally symbolizes hope and new \ife;fair adds soft, appealing beauty to the 
star’s reliquary o f icons, and fled  connotes an intimate relationship with someone who, 
suddenly discovered, departs unwillingly, in haste, and perhaps even blushingly—as a 
comely youth might hasten from a bedchamber. Enhancing the implications o f the present 
tense, Shelley’s last line expands Xap-tretc to connote both new, which affirms the divine 
power o f Hesperus to revivify “the dead” each day by reinstating a role as morning’s 
herald, and splendid, which enhances the delicate beauty connoted by fa ir  to an effulgent 
brightness.24 Most powerful because o f its absurdity, then, is the hypothesis that this lovely 
soul will achieve a general resurrection o f the dead.
Syntagm as Metalanguage
This analysis o f the relationship between lexeme and syntagm inevitably involves a 
hierarchy of language. In his discussion o f humorous poetry, for example, Riffaterre 
comments that the linguistic fun o f humor amounts to “a means o f testing new semantic 
and semiotic relationships,” which leads to him to speculate that “poetic language is a 
special case o f metalanguage” (138). There are many examples o f humorous poetry
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among the Greek epigrams, one o f  which is Nicarchus’s dark commentary on judging the 
value o f life:
Xeipoup7 uv empcdjev ’ AKeoTopiSir]v ’ AyeAaoc'
7 a p  xwAeueiv, <pr\aiv, ep.eAXe ra X a q . (10.30)
Agelaus killed Acestorides during surgery because,
he said, “The poor wretch would have been a cripple for life.” 
According to Riffaterre, readers recognize jokes when it becomes clear to them that two 
formally or semantically incompatible codes are present in the same text (125).25 In this 
case, both the form and meaning o f the traditional war-hero epitaph is negated. For 
example, Simonides’ paean to the Athenians who died at Plataea begins, “If  to die nobly is 
the chief part o f excellence, to us out o f  all men Fortune gave this lot” (Mackail Select 
3.1). The grim humor Nicarchus’s epigram elicits in the reader depends on the reader’s 
recognition o f the absurdity generated by this formal intertextual conflict. Semantic 
conflict is perhaps more subtly but just as effectively produced in the first line by 
eacpa^ev, a word derived from the slitting o f an animal’s throat during sacrifice, cr<pdfa, 
only later applied (by Pindar) to human sacrifice (.Intermediate 784). According to medical 
historian Ludwig Edelstein, Pythagorean physicians distinguished between practicing 
medicine (prevention, medication, setting fractures, and the like) and performing invasive 
surgery. They eschewed any use o f the knife, contending that it was too closely associated 
with animal sacrifice (30-32). Hippocratic surgeons remained dubious about the practice. 
As Edelstein dryly observes, “Predictable occurrences o f . . .  mutilation argue for the use 
o f special caution and special means” and “[T]he desire to perform an operation correctly
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combines with the realization o f how harmful it is to one’s reputation to treat a patient 
poorly” (92). The notion o f sacrifice is further amplified in xcoAeueit', which carries the 
negative connotation o f its root, XcoAoc, a metaphor for something imperfect and thus 
unsuitable for sacrifice. Lastly, r a A a c  is a descriptor that in its ambiguous sense of 
wretched can convey both pity and contempt.
Humorous poetry comments upon these tensions within naturalized concepts using 
an extreme form o f catechresis, and Riffaterre regards it as a kind o f metalanguage that 
opens up ordinary language’s “potentialities” by “testing new semantic and semiotic 
relationships” {Semiotics 138). While Riffaterre generally conceives o f Lyric as a 
determined unit o f language that refers to its matrix for explanation, in the case of humor 
he inverts the hierarchy, so that to be understood, the matrix must wait for its explication 
in the poem: “[H]umor is nothing other than a special case o f  poetic language, and . . . 
poetic language is a special case o f metalanguage {Semiotics 138). This concession that, at 
least in the realm o f humor, the poem can act as a “metalanguage” that “opens up” and 
“tests” ordinary language, can serve to alert us to theories examined in later chapters.
Riffaterre’s phenomenology o f text production begins, then, by using the organic 
metaphor matrix but ends with manufacturing metaphors such as expansion, conversion, 
and reconstruction that, appropriate to Riffaterre’s approach, connote the production o f 
artifacts. Readers o f  texts engage in a reverse engineering that retraces steps leading to the 
product’s raw materials. This analogy implies, however, that the dialogue under discussion 
is solely between text and reader. The material author, although a necessary condition for 
inscription to occur, is no longer necessary for understanding and re-production.26
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Riffaterre, therefore, can concede with some equanimity that a poem is a material trace o f 
an unavoidable and fascinating I-thou relationship while continuing to affirm that 
understanding it is a matter o f dialogue between reader and text. His analysis implies that 
there are two subject/object relationships—the prosopopeia o f the poem itself and the 
communication that takes place between text and reader. It may be that there are two 
distinguishable matrices as well—a mathematical matrix that is the formula by which the 
reader potentially can resolve all the linguistic elements o f a poem and an organic matrix 
out o f  which is bom the material inscription.
Julia Kristeva’s “semiotic chora” and “the symbolic”
Kristeva’s technical term for the latter, organic matrix is the semiotic chora 
“Xwpa,” which is borrowed from Plato’s Timaeus. In this dialogue, Timaeus, renowned 
for his knowledge o f astronomy and “the nature o f the universe,” first describes the 
creation o f the world and world soul (27a). He then moves on to explain how individual 
things, as images o f divine ideas, were created. In the context o f  his discussion of the 
relative natures o f self-existent ideas and material bodies, he argues that space {chora) 
must be postulated as a third nature in which things are generated and make their 
appearance. This space, however, is never apprehended by the senses or the intellect; it is 
a necessary but inchoate notion, “apprehended,. . .  by a kind o f spurious reason, and is 
hardly real” (52b). Timaeus also likens the x^po: to a “mother,” a “receptacle” (51a), and 
a universal “receiving principle” (50d). The elements o f earth, air, fire, and water are 
mixed in it—their disproportionate energies having incited a constant motion in this 
“receiving vessel” (53a). The subsequent admixture generates the initial appearance o f
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created things, but their affiliation remains, to this point, random—“without reason and 
measure” (53b). Kristeva describes this choric environment as “an extremely provisional 
articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases” {Revolution 25).
Having borrowed the term, Kristeva adapts it to a Freudian analysis o f the pre- 
conscious—what one o f her translators describes as “an economy o f primary processes 
articulated by Freud’s instinctual drives . . .  where social family structures make their 
imprint through the mediation o f the maternal body” (Roudiez 6). This “imprint” 
subsequently is sealed by “the symbolic,” a regulated order that bears the icon of the 
Cartesian ego, full o f presence and rationality. Kristeva describes the turn in Western 
philosophy since Descartes toward rationalism as the ascent o f the symbolic and observes 
that it was one o f the conditions for the rise o f the study o f structural linguistics, itself an 
effort to identify the structure o f language so as to re-present it to the self as a transparent 
object o f knowledge {Desire 127). By her account, however, the chora resists such 
rationalization. When grasped by the symbolic, it excretes a surplus—an impolite 
transgression of the social order that signifies nonverbally even in the context o f language. 
Literary language most clearly exposes what, to the rationalist, must be odious:
If  there exists a “discourse” which is not a mere depository o f thin 
linguistic layers, an archive o f structures . . .  and is, instead, the essential 
element o f a practice involving the sum o f unconscious, subjective, and 
social relations in gestures o f confrontation and appropriation, destruction 
and construction . . .  it is “literature,” or, more specifically, the text. 
{Revolution 16)
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When texts “behave” irrationally, Riffaterre confidently intervenes with a key—an 
originating matrix iterable in ordinary language that is the text’s rational mirror image. 
Kristeva, however, thinks that literature reflects a dialectic incarnated in the writer-subject; 
the text never completely submits to logic nor escapes into madness; nor can it be reduced 
to a fetishist “play o f language” {Revolution 82). Rather, it instigates a return from the 
symbolic to the semiotic chora by introducing an “excess that would be ‘more than 
logical’” {Revolution 83). This warfare at the boundaries o f the semiotic and the symbolic 
ultimately constitutes the subject as ego {Revolution 82). A decisive victory by either side 
would render the subject psychotic.27 For Riffaterre, matrix and text are equivalents. For 
Kristeva, the semiotic chora is Timaeus’ “third nature”—a receptacle or space in which a 
collocation o f pre-conscious images are generated and eventually become “visible” in the 
text as traces when they accommodate themselves to the logic o f  the symbolic order. The 
body, as nexus o f the preconscious and the symbolic, releases drives that erupt into 
language at the same time that language is working its regulation o f the body. From this 
point o f view, the sepulchral epigram, for example, is the scene o f a battle already lost; the 
subject either has been murdered, literally or figuratively, by ideology, or it has succumbed 
to its own death wish. Yet, as text, the subject once again confronts an other. In this 
epigram by the Byzantine Paulus Silentiarius, an unquiet spirit begins by questioning the 
reader and ends by questioning Logic’s first principle— identity:
Ovvopd (jlol—tl be Ton to ; naTptc 8e poi—ea tl be rovro ; 
KXeivou 8’ el|xl yevouc—ei yap dtpaupoTatou ;
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Z rja a c  ev56£wc eXiirov (3tov—e i 7 ap  aSoljcoc ;
Ketpm  5’ ev d a5 e  vvv—t ic  tivi T aura  X eyeic  ; (11.51)
My name—why? and my country—what for?
I am o f illustrious race— but if I had been of the meanest?
Having lived nobly, I died—-and if ignobly?
So then, I lie here now—Who says this, and to whom?
Just as an absurdist play makes visible its own theatrical conceits, Paulus’ question 
and answer, address and response, reveals the conceit o f the epigram’s ritual dialogue.
The pointed questions and the beginning o f the last line, “Kelpm  5’ ev d ah e  vuv” [So 
then, I lie here now] refer to two philosophemes. The first—that a final journey to Hades 
is the inevitable result o f being bom, no matter one’s birthplace, class, or position—can be 
traced throughout Greek literature. The second is more closely affiliated with a late 
classical Greek attitude that discounted even the life well lived and articulated a 
disillusionment with and melancholy about life and its brevity.28 To this point in the poem, 
however, the subject and addressee remain within the symbolic—the realm o f a possible, 
regulated hermeneutic o f life and death, even when its final conclusion is that found in the 
final line o f  another epigram by another Byzantine, Glycon:
I la v r a  yeXag  Kai i r a v ra  kovk;  Kai navro: to p 'qhev 
ira v ra  7 «p e£ aXo7 uv e a r i  to; 7 i7 v6|xeva.
All is laughter, and all is dust, and all is nothing; for out o f  unreason is all 
that is. (12.34).
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The entire last line o f Paulus’ epigram, statement and questions—  “K elpm  S’ evftaSe 
vhv— t ic  tlvi TavTQ: XeyeiQ  [Who is saying this, and to whom?] intensifies this 
sentiment since a dead person cannot say anything and therefore can speak to no one. 
Paulus equivocates, then, on presence, calling attention to the way writing seems to enable 
speech in absentia. Yet the riddle o f  identity remains. There is the absence o f Paulus, who 
first inscribed but is no longer present or necessary as speaker. There is the paradoxical 
presence/absence o f a dead man who “is saying this.” There are readers who come to ask 
questions that can be answered under the regime o f the symbolic order but who are invited 
forthwith to ponder the mystery o f their own death. Finally, there are current, “real,” 
readers, who are invited to ponder the mystery o f no one saying anything yet something 
being said by virtue o f  their own reading/saying. And what is being said, as much as it can 
be, is a “more than logical” upsurge from the matrix o f semiotic chora: that life and death, 
presence and absence, do not possess their own identity. No one is “saying this,” no one 
hears it being said, and no one understands it— not even those who solve the poem’s 
riddle.
Jacques Maritain’s “Creative Intuition”
In his 1952 A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts at the National Gallery o f Art, 
Jacques Maritain explicated his notion o f “creative intuition.” Maritain presupposes the 
Aristotelian notion that matter and form are inextricably bound together and that 
knowledge arises only after sense perception, that is, a posteriori. The intellect knows the 
world by means o f ideas; however, the intellect is not identical to its ideas; they are the
52
instruments by which we arrive at a knowledge o f what things are—their ratio. This 
Aristotelian adjustment to Plato as adopted by Aquinas, has kept open, according to 
Maritain, an alternative doorway to knowledge that Descartes inadvertently closed. 
According to St. Thomas, the soul is not (just) the intellect; it acts in several ways. One of 
those ways, Maritain maintains, is through creative intuition, which is a mode o f knowing 
the world that is pre-conceptual and nonrational. In a chapter entitled “Creative Intuition 
and Poetic Knowledge,” Maritain offers a schema o f the soul’s activities (Fig. 5). The 
intuitive mode o f knowledge is pre-conceptual because its apperception o f the object is
Figure 5. Schema o f the soul’s activities, according to Maritain (108).
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preconceptual; it comes before the formation o f concepts giving us rational knowledge 
about the object. It is nonrational because it is a union o f subject and object that depends 
on emotion (desire) and will and can be known only mediately as a concept. The first 
circle encompasses the world o f discursive reason. Because its mechanism is logic, we can 
suppose that it corresponds in part to Kristeva’s symbolic. The second circle Maritain 
describes as the “waking state,” wherein the imagination takes up sense perception and 
uses it to enable a person to function in the world o f things and ideas, third circle 
represents sensation, a mixture of “intuitive data” that “becomes sense perception” when 
it encounters memory and imagination (108-109). Finally, the “top” o f  the soul is infused 
with what Maritain calls the “preconscious” o f the spirit while its “bottom” participates in 
the “automatic unconscious,” Maritain’s acknowledgment o f Freud. In words reminiscent 
both o f Kristeva’s description of the energies o f the chora and Timaeus’ account o f a 
primeval mixing o f elements, Maritain describes the circle o f the Intellect as “an immense 
dynamism emanating from the very center o f the Soul,” and the circle o f the imagination 
as “an immense dynamism working upwards and downwards along the depths o f the 
Soul.” Finally, the bodily sensations migrate to “the depths o f the Soul” so that finally, “all 
that it [the soul] receives from the external world, all things seized upon by sense 
perception, all treasures o f that sapid and sonorous and colorful Egypt, enter and make 
their way up to the central regions o f  the soul” (109).
For Maritain, an artist’s essential intuition takes place in the context o f an I-Thou 
relationship before reason (logos) comes into play. The soul (subject) grasps the object
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(which may be an event, a person, a thing, etc.) intuitively in a dynamic matrix o f instincts, 
drives, energies, images, will, and emotion. But these “rhythms” (Kristeva Desire 28), or 
this “musical stir” (Maritain 300) subsequently must pass through the regime o f reason in 
order to become something made and something public, that is, a work o f art. Maritain 
uses the word pulsions to denote this type o f “mental wave or vibration, charged with 
dynamic unity” (302). Kristeva uses the same term, which according to her translators has 
been translated into English as “drives” to correspond to Freud’s “Trieb” (Roudiez; 
Waller). Poetic intuition must submit to the logos in order to become intelligible and to 
enter the social world o f communication. When it does, a dialogue can occur between text 
and reader.
Maritain agrees with Kristeva that modem poets often consciously seek to 
minimize the interference o f the symbolic in communication. They rupture the text in order 
to transmit a “flash o f  reality which has been grasped without concept and which no
Figure 6. Maritain’s schema showing the relationship between intuition and text in 
classical poetry (319).
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Figure 7. Maritain’s schema showing the relationship between intuition and text in modem 
poetry (320).
concept can express” (312). He offers two schemata to illustrate the differences between 
what he describes as “classical” and “modem” poetry (Figs. 6 and 7).
The first diagram represents poetic intuition in a so-called classical poem passing 
through “Logos-dominated concepts” and submitting thoroughly to the “logical 
organization required to signify definite things” (320). The danger is that the reader will 
perceive in this work just Reality 1, which is “definite things standing as objects o f 
thought” and miss the “transreality” (R2) that had been apprehended in the original 
intuition.
The second diagram corresponds to Kristeva’s “revolution” in poetry. Here, the 
initial “process o f spiritual production” is dominated not by logos but by imagination, and 
the structure o f the work is nonrational because it depends “only on [the] transreality to be 
signified” (320). The happy result is significance at the original level o f  reality—the “trans­
reality caught by poetic intuition” (320). Kristeva echoes this notion when she writes that
56
the signifying economy o f poetic language is specific in that the semiotic is 
not only a constraint as is the symbolic, but it tends to gain the upper hand 
at the expense o f the thetic and predicative constraints o f the ego’s judging 
consciousness. (Desire 134)
Referring to the second diagram, Maritain comments that in modem poetry “[t]he creative 
process is free to start developing in the nest o f dynamic unity” (320).
The music o f the words, still necessary as it may be, yields the foremost 
place to another, more internal music . . . .  What matters essentially now is 
the music o f intuitive pulsions, which passes into the work o f words 
freely—without being repressed or obliterated by the exigencies o f the 
logos—and to which the reader in his turn is taken by this work of words. 
(321 )29
Maritain agrees with Kristeva, however, that because these energies are an essential aspect 
o f truly poetic language, any literary period can bear witness to it. His finds in his own 
eclectic list o f exemplars (which includes Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Racine, 
Pushkin, and Baudelaire) that
in the fullness o f the poetic sense the intelligible sense expands freely, and 
supreme clarity appears as the privilege o f supreme mastery. Creative 
innocence is so powerful in them that it permeates with intuitive freedom 
the stoutest materials . . .  and brings them to a state o f fusion. (400)
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He also cites two Saphhic fragments:
SeSuxe |iev a  aeXavva 
Kat nXiriia5eg- pieaca be 
vvtneq, irapa b epXeT wpa,
€7(0 be p.ova KaTeubw.
The moon has set and the Pleiades; and now
it is midnight, and time goes by, and I lie alone. (Campbell 168B)30
and the famous
Hpap.av |i€v e y u  ae$€V,’ AT$i, iraXai -koto.
I loved you, Atthis, long ago. (Edmonds 48)
These poem fragments are remarkable for their simplicity, but that is not what 
Maritain meant by clarity. He is referring to a process o f textual production that involves a 
minimum o f  inhibition or malformation o f the poetic intuition by discursive concepts as it 
comes to be expressed in language. For both Kristeva and Maritain the semiosis o f the 
poem involves this essential characteristic—the signified is the matrix o f the drives, 
emotions, and imagination o f the author that is set into motion by an act o f knowing that 
precedes concepts; the poem signifies this knowledge. Transparency, then, is not 
necessarily a matter o f simplicity in language; indeed, clarity, insofar as it is ordered by 
grammar and logic, is liable to be sacrificed for the sake o f shattering the opacity of 
concepts.
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Signs, Concepts, and Reference
Maritain anticipated the structuralist precept that poems are not products o f 
mimesis, that is, they do not refer to empirical or mental objects, and Kristeva agrees. Yet 
their semiotic analyses differ. Each analysis proposes a different set o f signs. For Kristeva, 
it is the material body that is signed in and under language but not by it. The body is a 
matrix o f organic drives that seek expression. On the other hand, the symbolic order 
continually seeks to constitute it as subject and therefore dominate it. The body therefore 
becomes the locus o f these contending forces. Language, as a communication system 
within the symbolic order, is thetic; it seeks to maintain subjects as closed systems under 
the control and guidance o f concepts in order to maintain the stasis o f social order. 
Literary, or poetic, language affords the significance o f “jouissance”:
In cracking the socio-symbolic order, splitting it open, changing 
vocabulary, syntax, the word itself, and releasing from beneath them the 
drives borne by vocalic or kinetic differences, jouissance works its way into 
the social and symbolic. (Revolution 79-80)
It is through the literary text that the body, as matrix o f change and revolution, insinuates 
itself into the “code o f linguistic and social communication” by upsetting its logic and 
creating fissures in it as a closed system. This threat o f anarchy sets up a dialectic between 
readers o f the text and the dominant social order (Revolution 17).
Maritain, while proceeding in a more irenic vein, carries out a similar analysis. He
59
alludes to a saying o f the “old Logicians”: “Words refer to concepts, and concepts refer to 
things.” Words in a poem will refer to any number o f  concepts that, in turn, will refer to 
specific things (physical or nonphysical), but the poem itself does not refer to any thing. 
The poem itself is a signifier only o f the poetic sense, which is a nonconceptual act that 
uses the system of language to express experience. Poetic knowledge, unlike intellectual 
knowledge, does not have an object that it knows or intends; it creates an object that 
refers only to itself, that is, the matrix o f  intuition, will, emotion, and images out o f which 
it arose. In her quatrain about being alone on a summer’s night, for example, Sappho is 
expressing knowledge, but not o f an intelligible object— something known through the 
intellect that can be paraphrased. Because words are ordered by logical and semantic rules 
to refer to intelligible concepts, a conceptual framework for the experience will emerge, 
but it will be a secondary sign.
For Riffaterre, if the language of the poem does not refer to the world, it must 
refer to another text. Signs, in their role as material signals, must be available to any 
competent reader and be publicly verifiable, just as a scientific experiment must be iterable 
for its working hypothesis to be generally accepted. Breaking the semiotic code o f a poem 
provides at one stroke the operating structure, the language system, and the meaning of 
the poem as a signifier o f its matrix. There is no meaning beyond or behind this meaning, 
and the proscription o f the intentional fallacy—that the writer’s experience is neither 
discoverable nor relevant—remains intact. Kristeva characterizes this as an 
anthropological attempt at a “phenomenological reduction”:
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. .  . structuralism retains only the image o f the unconscious as a depository 
o f laws and thus a discourse. Since they are considered solely from the 
point o f view o f their relationship to language and deprived o f their drive 
bases, these structural operations depend on the phenomenological 
reduction, just as they depend on what this reduction is able to make 
visible: thetic symbolic functioning.. . .  {Revolution 41).
The crux o f the difference between the approach taken by Riffaterre as opposed to 









Sign = --------------------------------->  Refers to: Poetic Intuition
Signified (semiotic chord)
Figure 8. Sign and reference as conceived by Riffaterre, Maritain, and Kristeva
All three accept that the poem does not refer to things in the sense o f reproduction or 
mimesis. For Riffaterre, the poem’s significance lies in the matrix o f texts out o f which it is 
produced: “[T]he stock epithet is thus poetic because it implies a hypogram, usually a 
descriptive system . . .  whose nuclear word remains unsaid and appears only in the
expanded form o f a sentence. This sentence is the word’s periphrasis, so that the true 
referent is not a lexeme in the text but a syntagm in the intertext” (31). For Kristeva and 
Maritain, however, the poem’s significance lies in the experience o f the subject who is 
inscribed within the poem. These approaches, however, are not incompatible, and 
recognizing both o f them can shed some light on the limits both o f structuralism and 
hermeneutics.
Escaping the Figural
Although Riffaterre embraces the notion o f the subject/object relationship that is 
essential to Lyric, his real delight is in finding the key allusion that explicates just where 
the inscription o f the author/subject is made manifest in the text. Since inscription is 
language, it must be ultimately determined by language itself. What Riffaterre does for 
structuralism is to offer a semiotic method o f uncovering how a text has been produced, 
and to that extent, what the text means in terms o f its generating matrix. The text does not 
perform this uncovering, it is the competent reader who does this by playing the game o f 
catechresis. For Riffaterre, literature is a “verbal game” and poetry the verbal game par 
excellence (Semiotics 138). Meaning, however, is susceptible to equivocation. Semantic 
meaning does not capture other ordinary uses o f the term. Most readers will continue to 
ask, even after deciphering a poem, what it means in terms o f prosopopeiaoeia—its 
material reference. As Kristeva notes, the “externality” o f  the ego to the text has “always 
been a particular problem for semiotics, which is concerned with specifying the 
functioning o f signifying practices such as art, poetry, and myth that are irreducible to the
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‘language ’ object” (emphasis added) {Revolution 21-22). Lyric, then, might be considered 
as signifier o f nonrational knowledge that, because o f its expression in language, tempts 
readers to fall under the thrall o f concepts. If Kristeva and Maritain seem to ignore 
intertextuality, it is because in their view the translation o f codes from one linguistic 
system to another does not speak to the will o f the subject either to make (Maritain) or to 
resist being made (Kristeva). For Kristeva the importance o f this point is even greater, 
since in her view language as the expression o f the symbolic order is continually fastening 
itself upon the semiotic chora in order to realize a self that is static, determined, and 
incapable o f resistance. I f  and when Lyric becomes significant, it is because it has elicited a 




“MAKING POETRY AND THINKING”
“ What at first looks like the title o f a thesis—making poetry and thinking—turns out to be 
the inscription in which our destined human existence has ever been inscribed. The 
inscription records that poetry and thinking belong together”—Martin Heidegger31
In Martin Heidegger’s “A Dialogue on Language” (1954) the “Inquirer” concludes 
that “the essential being o f  language cannot be anything linguistic” and that “language, as 
sense that is sounded and written, is in itself suprasensuous, something that constantly 
transcends the merely sensible. So understood, language is in itself metaphysical” (On the 
Way 23-24; 35). Although this thesis appears in a new and specific context o f a 
comparison between German and Japanese conceptions o f language, Heidegger had been 
developing this perspective for some time.32 The notion o f language as something other- 
or more-than a signifying system is reflected, for example, in his studies (1943 to 1946) o f 
the pre-Socratic philosophers, which include commentary on fragments from 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. In Early Greek Thinking, Heidegger examines 
the pre-Socratics’ use o f  terms such as to ov, toc ovtoc, A eyeiv, aAr)$€La, and 
ipaoKeiv (Krell 6). Each o f these word-studies is crucial to his explication o f the 
relationship between poetry, language, and philosophy as well as being central to his
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overall project o f  reinstating in the Western philosophical tradition a true appreciation o f 
the question o f being.33
Being and the “Presencing” o f Beings
According to David Krell, Heidegger first focused on the terms to 6v [Being/das 
Sein] and r d  ovtqc [the world o f things/Aw Seiende], concluding that these terms 
connote not only the stasis o f “presence in time and place,” but the phenomenon o f 
“coming to presence o f whatever presents itself, the Being o f beings, the eov o f eovTa” 
(Krell 7-8).34 The relevant fragment from Anaximander is
e£ uv be rj yeveoiq  e o n  TOiq ovai Kod tt|v <p$opdv etc; tccuto: 
7 iv e a $ a i  K ara to xpecov §i56vai 7 «p a u td  8Ckt|v kcci tictlv 
dXArjAoic; Tfjg aStKiag KaTa tt|V too xpovou Ta^iv. (qtd. in Early 
Greek 13)
But where things have their origin, there too their passing away occurs 
according to necessity; for they pay recompense and penalty to one another
for their recklessness, according to firmly established time. (Diels, qtd. in 
Early Greek 13)
What Diels translates as “things” in the very first phrase “e£ div be f| 7 evecdg 
e o n  TOtq ouoi” Heidegger takes as “t«  ovto:” [things/beings] {Early Greek 20). It is 
only later in the essay that he makes clear that he also takes eivoti, e o n v , ov , and r d  
ouroc, traditionally translated as “to be,” “is,” “being,” and “beings” to be so integrally 
related as to raise the same problems o f interpretation and translation {Early Greek 23).
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This is the nexus o f words surrounding the question o f how Greek philosophers before 
Plato conceived the question o f Being— a question that to Heidegger’s mind remains 
unanswered: “all the notions and representation we have inherited from Greek philosophy 
remain in the same confusion, exiled for millennia” (Early Greek 25). For his part, 
Heidegger proposes a phenomenology o f “presencing” as that which thinking first takes 
up as its concern. It is a two-fold process o f revealing and concealing, which can 
appropriately called “Becoming,” conceived in a positive sense rather than in its 
traditionally pejorative sense o f something not yet actual (Early Greek 31). Being, which 
Heidegger defines at one point as “the incipient power gathering everything to itself, 
which in this manner releases every being to its own self,” brings beings into presence, 
while necessarily hiding itself in the very act o f doing so (Poetry, Language 100). What it 
reveals about itself in beings is therefore always imbued with paradox: “Beings come to 
pass in that errancy by which they circumvent Being and establish the realm o f error (in 
the sense o f the prince’s realm or the realm of poetry)” (Early Greek 26). Traces o f this 
sense o f Becoming can be found, according to Heidegger, in archaic uses o f the terms 
yeveo tq  and <pdopa, used by Anaximander in the fragment, that stem from <pvoLq 
‘nature,’ which Heidegger claims also bears the sense o f a “luminous rising and decline”: 
Teveoig is coming forward and arriving in unconcealment. $ flopa  means 
the departure and descent into concealment o f what has arrived there out 
o f unconcealment. The coming forward into . . .  and the departure to . . . .  
become present within unconcealment between what is concealed and what
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is unconcealed. They initiate the arrival and departure o f whatever has 
arrived. {Early Greek 30)
What is concealed or unconcealed is, according to Heidegger, toc OPTa ‘beings,’ and he 
notes at least one ancient use o f this term that “poetically brings to language what ovt«  
names” {Early Greek 32-33). It occurs in an early passage (lines 68-72) in The Iliad, 
where Kalchas the augur is described as one who sees past, present, and future.
. . . toloi 5 dveoTTi
KdAxa? ©eoTopidiqg oioovoiroAwv ox’ dpiarog 
oq 'qS'p to t eovTa t« t’ eaaopeva itpo t govto 
Kai vtiead T|7T^ aa:T, ’Axaicov ’'IAiov eiaw
6ia pavToauvriv, rr\v oi nope tpoipog ’AnoXAtov 
. . .  and among them stood up 
Kalchas, Thestor’s son, far the best o f the bird interpreters, 
who knew all that is, is to be, or once was, 
who guided into the land o f Ilion the ships o f the Achaeans 
through that seercraft o f his own that Phoibos Apollo gave him.
(Lattimore, qtd. in Early Greek 33)
According to Heidegger, it is important to note the etymological link between oq 
tfdri, characterizing Kalchas as one o f those who “knew,” and this verb as a form of 
olbep  [he has seen] {Early Greek 33). This relationship provides Homer with a way o f 
understanding the seer as one who has already gone forth to see the future and who now 
“sees” it as something that has already happened. Therefore what becomes present to the
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seer is, as the passage states, the “three-fold” o f “to: t eo v ra  Ta t’ eaao|xeva irpo t’ 
eovTa.” These three presences, as the seer perceives them, are both discreet and the same. 
They are:
an open expanse . . .  o f unconcealment, into which and within which
whatever comes along lingers......... What is past and what is to come also
become present, namely as outside the expanse o f unconcealment.........
Even what is absent is something present, for as absent from the expanse, it 
presents itself in unconcealment. What is past and what is to come are also 
eovTa. Consequently eov means becoming present in unconcealment.
(Early Greek 34-35)
“True time,” according to Heidegger, “ is the arrival o f that which has been” (On the Way 
176).35 Here Heidegger’s “preliminary observation” about the ancient Ionian and Aeolian 
forms o f TO OP and Ta optoc becomes important as a mode o f thinking of “being” as that 
which “is” or “exists,” since he believes that “[t]he epsilon in “eov” and “eovTa” [dropped 
as early as Plato and Aristotle] is the epsilon in the root ea  o f “eoTiv, est, esse and ‘is’” 
{Early Greek 32). A few decades after Anaximander, Heidegger observes, Parmenides 
establishes both eop and e lp a i  as the “fundamental words o f Western thinking” {Early 
Greek 38). But he denies that Parmenides or his followers understood eoTiv  chiefly in 
terms o f the copula; rather, he contends, even Aristotle understood “essence” not as a 
predicate that categorizes an object, but in its primal sense o f napovoLa  ‘presence o f 
things’ {Early Greek 38).
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“Saying” as “Laying Before”
Heidegger admits that the concept o f future and past as implicit in presencing or 
unconcealment is a difficult one, and he contends that the experience o f Being comes to 
language as a riddle that in the end only poetic thinking can solve (Early Greek 58). Greek 
thinkers offered their own solution by “designating” this presencing or unconcealing as 
A oyoq  (Early Greek 39). A e y t iv  ‘saying’ is therefore taken up by Heidegger as a key to 
understanding what poetic thinking is, and he takes care, especially in his study o f a 
fragment attributed to Heraclitus, to articulate what he regards as its original usage. This 
fragment (B50) reads,
ouk e|iou aXXa tou A070U ctKouaaTag
6|xoXo7 elv  aotpov ea-riv 'E v  IlavT a. (qtd. in Early Greek 59)
When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning, 
it is wise within the same Meaning to say: One is All.
(Snell, qtd. in Early Greek 59)
The key to understanding this particular “riddle,” according to Heidegger, is to think 
about a.KOvaavToi.Q, A oyov, and o^ioXoyelv  in their basic forms o f aKOveiv, A oyoq  
and Xeyea* {Early Greek 59-60). He outlines three successive, diachronic ways in which 
ancient writers employed X eye iv  and which still occur (synchronically) in current usage. 
The first use was in the sense o f  a “collecting” and “gathering” that which is heard. 
“Hearing is primarily gathered hearkening,” Heidegger observes, adding the startling 
comment, “ We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e., our bodies are 
equipped with ears, because we hear” {Early Greek 65). This “hearkening,” Heidegger
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asserts, is the prerequisite for a gathering together o f  that which comes to be expressed in 
language, and he compares it to the Latin legere, rendered as “collecting and bringing 
together” {Early Greek 61). He assimilates this usage with a second that, for the most 
part, eventually supersedes it—that o f “laying down” or “bringing before”: “Ae7 Gtv is to 
lay. Laying is the letting-lie-before—which is gathered into itself—of that which comes 
together into presence” {Early Greek 63). Finally, “laying before” attains a third and 
perhaps more commonly understood sense o f “saying.” But even this saying, as the fruit of 
listening and gathering, is not yet an element o f  a signifying system: “A e y e iv  as laying, is 
determined neither by vocalization (cpuv'q) nor by signifying (arj|i.oaveiv)” {Early Greek 
64). Rather, saying as showing or ushering-into-view is a mode o f conceiving Being that is 
more ocular than oral. Heidegger had emphasized this point already in Being and Time: 
“Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and 
only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure 
beholding” (215). Like Homer’s p.avToauviqv ‘seercraft,’ it is a beholding-in-advance o f 
that which becomes present as one thing:
Do we wonder off the path if we think Ao^og as A e^eiv  prior to all 
profound metaphysical interpretations, thereby thinking to establish 
seriously that X eyeiv , as gathering letting-lie-together-before, can be 
nothing other than the essence o f unification, which assembles everything 
in the totality o f simple presencing? {Early Greek 70)
Heidegger’s notion o f Xoyoq is here identified with his explication o f X eye iv , he can 
therefore say that “the Xoyoq by itself brings that which appears and comes forward in its
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lying before us to appearance— to its luminous self-showing” {Early Greek 64). In 
addition, Heidegger’s metaphors continue to forge a close relationship between becoming 
present and becoming visible, which leads him to two additional important terms for 
defining poetic thinking—ipaaiq and aX i)$e ia .
Illumination and Truth
Heidegger introduces <paoLg in the context of two fragments by Parmenides on 
Moipa [Fate], the first o f which is the short phrase “to Yap ai>TO voelv eariv T6 Kai 
elvai” [For thinking and Being are the same] (qtd. in Early Greek 79). In the second, 
longer fragment there appears the similar line “raurov 6' earl voelv re Kal ovveKev 
e o n  vorjpa” [Thinking and the thought “it is” are the same], followed by the cryptic “ov 
Yap aveu tou govtoq, ev w TretpaTiapevvov ecmv, /  eupriaeic; to voelv:” [For 
without the being in relation to which it is uttered you cannot find thinking;] (Diels-Kranz, 
qtd. in Early Greek 79).36 Heidegger argues that in the second fragment Parmenides 
“experiences voelv as TteipaTiopevvov” in the sense o f thinking as a process of 
revealing: “Noelv, taking-heed-of, and what it takes up, are something said, something 
brought forward into view” {Early Greek 90). Once again, Heidegger makes an 
identification o f terms, this time claiming that the “essence” o f ipaoKeiv, from which 
TTe(paTiOfievvov is derived, means “to invoke, to call upon,” as in “letting something 
appear,” and as in describing the “phases” [y?dw], that is, the coming into view and fading 
from view o f the moon and stars {Early Greek 90). [I say], which shares the same 
root [<FA], is thereby identified with the “essence” o f XeYCo: “to bring what is present in
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its presencing forward into shining appearance, into lying-before” (Early Greek 90). This 
etymology allows Heidegger to propose that Parmenides and Heraclitus were “saying” the 
same thing: “What Parmenides thinks as tpaaig  Heraclitus calls the A070Q, the letting-lie- 
before that gathers” {Early Greek 93). In sum, “[W]e have to learn to think the essence o f 
language from the saying, and to think saying as letting-lie-before (A070C;) and as 
bringing-forward-into-view (<pacng)” {Early Greek 91).
Heidegger’s genealogy o f  saying uncovers for him the metaphor o f language as 
that which illuminates what is coming to presence as being. The moment o f illumination in 
speech, however, is not equivalent to its expression. In “The Way to Language,” 
Heidegger argues that
saying is in no way the linguistic expression added to the phenomena after 
they have appeared—rather, all radiant appearance and all fading away is 
grounded in the showing Saying.. . .  Saying pervades and structures the 
openness o f that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every 
disappearance leave behind, and in which every present or absent being 
must show, say, announce itself. {On the Way 126)
In the phenomenology o f saying, there are two phases: speech that enables things to 
emerge or become ontologically visible as things and speech that utilizes language as 
iteration:
To satisfy this demand [of preserving language’s first phase] remains a 
difficult task because the first illumination o f the essence o f language as 
saying disappears immediately into a veiling darkness and yields
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ascendancy to a characterization o f language which relentlessly represents 
it in terms o f ipcoviQ, vocalization, and ultimately o f data and information. 
{Early Greek 91)37
4>doig, for Heidegger, comprises a synonymic series o f dual metaphors: 
hearkening/beholding, collecting/gathering, illuminating/concealing, laying 
before/presencing, and showing/saying. Although he begins his discussion with Xeyeiv ,  
followed by cpaaig, he eventually inverts the hierarchy o f their relationship. In the end, 
A oyoq  receives its valence from <pa.aiq via that term’s derivation from the root <PAfl ‘to 
shine.’ Schein and Scheinen as “appearing” and “coming to light” are similarly emphasized 
in An Introduction to Metaphysics, where Heidegger alludes to one o f Sappho’s 
fragments:
ao rep eg  |xev d|jupi K a \a v  aeX avvav 
cty diruKpuirTOiaL ipaevvov et5og
otnroTa itXridotao: paX iaT a Xap.'jrq yctv  (34 Eust. U. 729. 20)
The stars hide away their shining forms around the lovely moon when in all 
her fullness she shines (over all) the earth, (trans. Campbell 83)
Heidegger concludes, “When we say: the moon shines \scheint\, this means not only that 
it spreads a glow [Schein], a certain brightness, but also: it stands in the sky, it is present, 
it is. The stars shine: glittering, they are present. Here appearance [Schein] means exactly 
the same as being” (85). For Heidegger, Schein does carry the double meaning of 
“glowing” and “being present.” It is, however, the second meaning, “being present,” or 
perhaps more precisely, “appearing” that he wants to point out as equivalent to “being.”
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The ultimate importance o f this illumination, succinctly if cryptically summarized in 
his oracular “The event o f lighting is the world,” leads Heidegger to consider its relation 
to Truth {Early Greek 118). The initial “disclosure” and immediate reciprocal concealment 
o f the Being o f beings, according to Heidegger, is indeed what the pre-Socratics meant by 
aAfjdeio: [truth,] so that in the end we have the ultimate identification o f cpaoig, \ 070g, 
and dA rjdeia : “Because Ab^oq  lets lie before us what lies before us as such, it discloses 
what is present in its presencing. But disclosure is ’ A X rjdeia. This and Aoyog are the 
Same. A eyetv  lets d A r^ e ia , unconcealed as such, lie before us” {Early Greek 70).38 
Once again, however, Heidegger calls attention to what he perceives as an original use of 
the term that, since Plato, has gradually become opaque to the very language to which it 
gave birth. Disclosure (  A A rideia) engenders a beholding-saying (<pdaicr-\e7 eiv), 
which, for the thinker-poet, illuminates the reason {Ao'yoq) such that it can “think” the 
disclosure in an assertion (<paaeiv-ipcdv<o). In Being and Time, Heidegger had argued 
that this asserting (“discourse”} “helps to constitute the disclosedness o f Being-in-the 
World” (205). A070C;, later conceived as the “natural light” o f Reason in Western 
philosophy, therefore has a dual nature:
Lumen naturale, natural light, i.e., the illumination o f reason, already 
presupposes the disclosure o f the duality. The same holds true o f the 
Augustinian and medieval views o f light—not to mention their Platonic 
origins— which could only develop under the tutelage o f an ’ AArjdeLO: 
already reigning in the destiny o f the duality. {Early Greek 97)
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Heidegger’s perception o f this inherent duality in what it means both to say and to 
assert the truth is central to the relationship he establishes between poetry and thinking. 
The “thinking” o f which he speaks in conjunction with poetry is a hearkening to Being that 
is prior to the illumination o f reason and the formal fashioning o f any poem (or art in 
general): “Thinking o f Being is the original way o f poetizing. Language first comes to 
language, i.e., into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the truth o f Being dictates .
. . .  [It] is primordial poetiy, prior to all poesy ,. .  . since art shapes its work within the 
realm o f language” (Early Greek 19). And while he concentrates on this synchronic 
revelation o f truth in language, it is nevertheless important to Heidegger’s own “thinking” 
that historically it was the Greeks who first “beheld” Being: “What is Greek is the dawn of 
that destiny in which Being illuminates itself in beings and so propounds a certain essence 
o f man . . . . ” (Early Greek 25). Heidegger calls this “the poetizing o f the truth o f Being in 
the historic dialogue between thinkers” (Early Greek 57). The original and fecund 
dialogue is one in which Being “shines,” speaking in this way to mortals as beings who 
care and who, ever cognizant o f error, endeavor nevertheless to shadow this dialogue to 
fellow mortals in order to invoke in them a memory in kind. Heidegger argues that 
“Mvp-oauviq is mother o f the muses,” (Early Greek 36) and in one o f his own poems 
published under the collective title o f “The Thinker as Poet,” he writes,
The oldest o f the old follows behind 
us in our thinking and yet it 
comes to meet us.
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That is why thinking holds to the 
coming o f what has been, and 
is remembrance. {Poetry, Language 10)
Holderlin and Thinking Poetry
According to Steiner, it is Heidegger’s “strangely Platonic” view that “[t]o think 
fundamentally is not to analyze but to ‘memorate’ (Denken ist andenhen), to remember 
Being so as to bring it into radiant disclosure” (129).39 One o f the most important things 
the poet does is to recognize, in the sense o f a re-cognition, what is burgeoning forth in 
language as thought. For Heidegger, this “seercraft” was best exemplified in the poetry o f 
Friederich Holderlin (1770-1843). Like Heidegger, Holderlin was “prepossessed by the 
magnitude o f the Greek intelligence” (Middleton, xii). He translated Sophocles and Pindar, 
and Christopher Middleton categorizes him as a poet in the ancient pastoral tradition, 
whose metrics often can be characterized as “Greco-Alemannic” (xi-xii). His 
contemporary philosophical influences included Schelling and Hegel, both of whom he 
met, as well as Herder and Schiller (Middleton iv, xv-xvi). He even attended Fichte’s 
lectures, but, as Middleton notes, could not in the end accept what he perceived in 
Fichte’s ideas as a radical subjectivism (xix).
Steiner contends that Heidegger found in Holderlin’s poetry “one of those very 
rare, immeasurably important expressions o f man’s fallenness, o f his ostracism from Being 
and the gods, and simultaneously, a statement o f  this very condition whose truth and lyric 
power give assurance o f rebirth” (141-142). Heidegger read in Holderlin’s lyrics the 
poetic expression o f his own philosophical project o f  recovering the meaning o f Being.
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In his “Note” attached to “Remembrance of the Poet,” for example, Heidegger remarks 
that he was not attempting literary criticism as such in that essay (which includes detailed 
explication o f specific passages in Holderlin) nor in “Holderlin and the Essence o f Poetry.” 
Instead, he writes, these essays “arise from a necessity o f thought” and can best be read in 
the light o f two o f his more conventionally philosophical essays, “On the Essence o f 
Truth” and “What is Metaphysics” {Existence and Being 232).40 Although Heidegger 
treats at some length a few other poets, such as Rilke and Trakl, it is Holderlin who 
figures most prominently in those o f Heidegger’s lectures and essays that focus upon 
poetry and poetic thought.41
Even the essay “What Are Poets For?” ostensibly a lengthy treatment o f Rilke’s 
poetry, is made to serve as a litmus test o f whether or not Rilke is a “true” poet in 
comparison to Holderlin.42 In the first section o f this essay, for example, Heidegger 
articulates his vision o f the poet’s vocation in the context o f Holderlin’s elegy “Bread and 
Wine.” Midway through the poem, the speaker asks the question that had been used in 
truncated form in the essay’s title: “What are poets for in a destitute time?” The question 
is embedded in a lament that the gods, both o f Greece and Jerusalem, have departed from 
earth. Humans now languish in a “Night,” a time when everyone is “asleep” and no one 
listens to poetry. Yet, the voice says, even the Night is sometimes sweet:
Aber zuweilen liebt auch klares Auge den Schatten
Und versuchet zu Lust, eh’ es die Noth ist, den Schlaf,
Oder es blikt auch gem ein treuer Mann in die Nacht hin,
Ja, es ziemet sich ihr Kranze zu weihn und Gesang,
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Weil den Irrenden sie geheiliget ist und den Todten,
Selber aber besteht, ewig, in freiestem Geist.
Aber sie muB uns auch, daB in der zaudemden Weile,
DaB im Finstem fur uns einiges Haltbare sei,
Nonetheless there are times when clear eyes too love the shadows, 
Tasting sleep uncompelled, trying the pleasure it gives,
Or a loyal man too will gaze into Night and enjoy it,
Yes, and rightly to her garlands we dedicate, humans,
Since to all those astray, the mad and the dead she is sacred,
Yet herself remains firm, always, her spirit most free.
But to us in her turn, so that in the wavering moment,
Deep in the dark there shall be something that endures,
(Hamburger 242-43, 2.7-14)43
Most importantly for the poet, the night is an eschatological sign, a necessary prelude to 
the gods’ return, even though it marks a time o f deafness, blindness, and suffering:
und stark machet die Noth und die Nacht 
BiB daB Helden genug in der ehemen Wiege gewachsen,
Herzen an Kraft, wie sonst, ahnlich den Himmlischen sind.
Donnernd kommen sie drauf.
Night and distress make us strong 
Till in that cradle o f steel heroes enough have been fostered,
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Hearts in strength can match heavenly strength as before.
Thundering then they come. (Hamburger 248-250, 7.8-11)
Meanwhile, the poets flit about, hardly wanted, like Dionysus’ priests, “ Welche von Lande 
zu Land zogen in heiliger Nachf ’ [Who in holy Night roamed from one place to the next] 
(Hamburger 250-51, 7.16) until “Seelige Weise sehns; ein Ldcheln aus der gefangnen /  
Seele leuchtet, dem Licht thauet ihr Auge noch au f” [Blissful, the wise men see it; in souls 
that were captive there gleams a / Smile, and their eyes shall yet thaw in response to the 
light] (Hamburger 252-53, 9.15-16).
Heidegger quickly makes clear that he interprets this poem against the background 
not o f Romanticism, but in the context o f Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical legacy, 
which he understands as having introduced a new historical era, “the era to which we 
ourselves still belong,” chiefly characterized by a “double Not: the No-more o f the gods 
that have fled and the Not-yet o f the god that is coming” {Poetry, Language 91; Existence 
and Being 289). This is not to say, however, that humans have been delivered from a 
world well lost. For Holderlin, at least, the gods were integral to a reality o f which humans 
had lost sight and even memory. Middleton notes, for example, that one o f the questions 
that preoccupied Holderlin from his youth was “[w]hat is to be done when divine and 
human planes o f being cease to connect” (xvi). Heidegger argues that it is this loss o f 
relationship that provokes at once a sense o f melancholia and foreboding within human 
societies: “The time o f the world’s night is the destitute time, because it becomes ever 
more destitute. It has already grown so destitute, it can no longer discern the default of 
God as a default” {Poetry, Language 91). Only a “turn” on the part o f mortals would
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allow the immortals a “return,” but the destitution becomes such that few even realize the 
dire state o f affairs (Poetry, Language 92-93). In the seventh stanza o f “Bread and 
Wine,” the speaker exclaims that even if the gods are willing to return, the very sight o f 
them, in this era o f destitution and forgetfulness, would blind rather than reveal.
Aber Freund! Wir kommen zu spat. Zwar leben die Gotter 
Aber tiber dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt.
Endlos wirken sie da und scheinens wenig zu achten,
Ob wir leben, so sehr schonen die Himmlischen uns.
Denn nicht immer vermag ein schwaches GefaB sie zu fassen,
Nur zu Zeiten ertragt gottliche Ftille der Mensch.
But, my friend, we have come too late. Though the gods are living,
Over our heads they live, up in a different world,
Endlessly there they act and, such is their kind wish to spare us,
Little they seem to care whether we live or do not.
For not always a frail, a delicate vessel can hold them,
Only at times can our kind bear the full impact o f gods.
Ever after our life is dream about them. (Hamburger 248-49, 7.1-7)
The poet is one o f those few who might “hold them” and who ventures into what has 
become a void in consciousness, there to find and listen anew to the gods and afterwards 
return as a herald o f a new age: “Poets are the mortals who . .  . sense the trace o f the 
fugitive gods, stay on the gods’ tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way 
toward the turning” (Poetry, Language 94).
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Holderlin o f course precedes Nietzsche, but Heidegger avoids the charge o f 
anachronism by casting him in this role o f “precursor o f poets”— someone who “does not 
go off into a future; rather, he arrives out o f  that future, in such a way that the future is 
present only in the arrival o f his words” {Poetry, Language 142). In Ho Merlin’s 
“Exhortation,” a voice prophecies:
Und er, der sprachlos waltet und unbekannt 
Zukunftiges bereitet, der Gott, der Geist 
Im Menschenwort, am schonen Tage
Kommenden Jahren, wie einst, sich ausspricht.
And he who silent rules and in secret plans
Things yet to come, the Godhead, the Spirit housed 
In human words, once more, at noontide,
Clearly will speak to the future ages.
(Hamburger 162-63, 25-28)
Heidegger relates this poetic mission to his own philosophical account o f  Being:
The poet thinks his way into the locale defined by that lightening of Being 
which has reached its characteristic shape as the realm o f Western 
metaphysics in its self-completion.. . .  The locality to which Holderlin 
came is a manifestness o f Being, a manifestness which itself belongs to the 
destiny o f Being and which, out o f that destiny, is intended for the poet. 
{Poetry, Language 95)
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The remainder o f the essay “What Are Poets For?” is devoted to answering the 
question o f whether or not “we modems” can identify a contemporary poet who has 
likewise ventured into this “abyss” and found a place from which to recall kindred humans 
to Being; specifically, whether Rilke is such a poet {Poetry, Language 96). Meanwhile, 
Holderlin’s poems remain relevant because it is still night, a “holy” night that in its silence 
waits for a word: “This is why the poet in the time o f the world’s night utters the holy.
This is why, in Holderlin’s language, the world’s night is the holy night” {Poetry,
Language 94).
Greek theology and Christian eschatology are similarly implicit in Heidegger’s 
exegesis o f Holderlin’s long poem “Homecoming,” which appears in its entirety in the 
essay “Remembrance o f the Poet” {Existence and Being 236-242). Rejecting both “elegy” 
and “hymn” as appropriate categories, Heidegger calls it a “meditation” on the “Holy,” 
defined as “that which the poet in his poethood invokes” {Existence and Being 233).44 
Subtitled “To Kindred Ones” and divided into five stanzas, it describes the joys, and (at 
least Heidegger will insist) the sorrows o f a homecoming. The speaker in the poem is 
sailing across a lake towards harbor and home, commenting on the surroundings and at 
times addressing the beloved “kinsmen” who wait on shore.45 Once again it is night, but a 
night that is nevertheless “bright,” and the sailor is cognizant o f  the “Joyous”: “There amid 
the Alps it is still bright night and the cloud, / Writing o f the Joyous, covers the night 
within the yawning valley” (1.1-2). The first stanza continues as a hymn to Nature. In the 
second stanza, the homecomer praises the “[bjlissfiil god rejoicing in the play o f holy 
beams” (2.4) and in the third testifies to praying often to this god (“Much spoke I to him,
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for whatever poets meditate or sing / Is o f  value chiefly to the angels and to him”) on 
behalf o f home and kindred, who seem “beset with care” (3.1 -2, 5). In the fourth and fifth 
stanzas, the speaker offers praises once again for the beauty o f the surrounding hills and 
valleys, expressing a desire to “go out into the much-promising distance, / There, where
wonders a re ......... ” but even more, “[t]o go home, where flowering ways are known to
me” (4.7-8, 14). Lastly, the “Angels” o f house and year are invoked, that they would 
“Ennoble! Rejuvenate! So that no human good, no / Hour o f the day may be fittingly 
hallowed / Without the Joyful Ones and without such joy as now,” adding only that we 
must be careful in our invocations: “No god loves what is unseemly; / To grasp him [god], 
our joy is scarcely large enough. / Often we must keep silence; holy names are lacking” 
(5.21-23, 27-29). For the kindred ones who await the homecomer’s arrival, however, any 
“cares” such as these are to be subsumed under the greater joy; it is the poet alone who, 
“whether he wills or no,” must “bear” them (5.35-36).
Heidegger makes much o f the ultimate phrase o f the poem, uaber die anderen 
nicht” [but the others not] (5.36), arguing that the poem is in fact framed by dual negative 
images o f the traditional, stereotyped picture o f the joy o f homecoming. The first stanza o f 
the poem includes, for example, a description o f the machinations o f  nature that,
Heidegger observes, is not so much homely as terrifically sublime (.Existence and Being 
243): “Cascades are falling, the ground steams under the tumbling, / Echo sounds all 
about, and the imponderable workshop / Moves its arm by day and night, conferring gifts” 
(1.16-18). Heidegger also interprets Holderlin’s use o f seems in “All seems familiar, even
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the hastening greeting / Seems the greeting o f friends, each face seems congenial” (3.17- 
18) which occurs at the end of stanza three, in its strongest sense o f implying that an 
opposite state o f affairs actually obtains. Even though the homecomer is happy to see the 
kindred, true familiarity with them is unlikely; according to Heidegger, they “shut away 
what is most their own” (Existence and Being 244). This reticence and liminal anxiety, 
Heidegger argues, emerges clearly in the last stanza, and he cautions against a simplistic 
reading o f  the poem’s overall message.
Often we must keep silence; holy names are lacking,
Hearts beat and yet does speech still hold back?
But lyre-music lends to each hour its sounds
And perhaps rejoices the heavenly ones who draw near.
This makes ready and thus care too is almost 
Placated already—the care that entered into the joy.
Cares like these, whether he wills or no, a singer
Must bear in his soul and often, but the others not. (5.28-35)
Heidegger first notes that, despite the poem’s consistent reference to the divine, there is 
no “holy name” by which its presence can be invoked such that humans could “grasp” it. 
Thus, the “singer” knows that song, or speech, is inappropriate, which leaves only the 
dumb music o f  the lyre to “perhaps” charm the gods.46 This is the burden of the poet— to 
be filled with a joy that can be expressed only in melody that “perhaps rejoices the 
heavenly ones who draw near” and serves to “placate” those kindred who grow uneasy 
performing a ritual in which they cannot name what they worship:
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Therefore too the people o f the country may not attempt to make to 
themselves a god by cunning and thus put aside by force the supposed lack. 
But neither may they accommodate themselves merely by calling on an 
accustomed god. . . .  So for the poet’s care there is only one possibility: 
without fear o f the appearance o f godlessness he must remain near the 
failure o f the god [to appear], and wait long enough in the prepared 
proximity o f  the failure, until out o f  the proximity o f  the failing god the 
initial word is granted, which names the High One. (.Existence and Being 
265)
Heidegger takes the “others” found in the ultimate phrase o f the last line o f the poem 
“aber die anderen nicht” ‘but the others not’ to mean the homecomer’s “kindred,” who 
are exempted from the care that the singer must always bear, “whether he wills or no” 
(Existence and Being 266).47 This he takes to be fair warning about the sorrows awaiting 
poets who decide to follow their calling. In the autobiographical poem, “Home,” Holderlin 
bears witness to this destiny. It begins:
Froh kehrt der Schiffer heim an den stillen Strom,
Von Inseln femher, wenn er geemdtet hat;
So kam’ auch ich zur Heimath, hatt’ ich 
Giiter so viele, wie Laid, geerndtet.
Denn sie, die uns das himmlische Feuer leihn, 
Die Gotter schenken heiliges Laid uns auch,
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Drum bleibe difi. Ein sohn der Erde
Schein’ ich; zu lieben gemacht, zu leiden. 
Content the boatman turns to the river’s calm 
From distant isles, his harvest all gathered in;
So too would I go home now, had I
Reaped as much wealth as I ’ve gathered sorrow.
For they who lend us heavenly light and fire,
The gods, with holy sorrow endow us too.
So be it then. A son o f Earth I
Seem; and was fashioned to love, to suffer.
(Hamburger 142-43, 1.1-4; 6.1-4)
The poet is forever coming home to dwell once again, if possible, in the homeland. “The 
vocation of the poet is homecoming,” Heidegger observes, “by which the homeland is first 
made ready as the land o f proximity to the source. To guard the mystery o f the reserving 
proximity to the Most Joyous,. . . that is the care o f homecoming” {Existence and Being 
266). And in “The Poet’s Vocation,” Holderlin writes,
Wenn edler, denn das Wild, der Mann sich 
Wehret und nahrt! denn es gilt ein anders,
Zu sorg’ und Dienst den Dichtenden anvertraut!
Der Hochste, der ists, dem wir geeignet sind,
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Daft naher, immemeu besungen
Ihn die befreundete Brust vemehme.
When, nobler than wild beasts, men work to 
Fend, to provide for themselves—to poets 
A different task and calling have been assigned.
The Highest, he it is whom alone we serve,
So that more closely, ever newly
Sung, he will meet with a friendly echo.
(Hamburger 172-733, 3.3-4; 4.1-4) 
Therefore, according to Heidegger, even though the people o f the homeland do not bear 
the poet’s burden, they are not exempt from the responsibility o f  the care o f listening to 
the singer/homecomer: “The ‘not’ [of the last line o f “Homecoming”] is the mysterious 
call ‘to ’ the others in the fatherland, to become hearers, in order that for the first time they 
should learn to know the essence o f the homeland. ‘The others’ must for the first time 
learn to consider the mystery o f the reserving proximity” (Existence and Being 266-67).
According to Heidegger, although this poem is framed by a cautionary tale of 
hearing yet failing to hear, it nevertheless establishes a close association between 
homecoming and joy (variously termed throughout the poem as the “Joyous,” the “Most 
Joyous,” and the “Joyous One”). The epitaph of the address, for example, is a couplet by 
Holderlin: “Little knowledge, but much joy / Is given to mortals. . . {Existence and 
Being 243).48 “The Joyous” occurs as early as the second line, where, in a curious 
personification, a cloud that covers the valley is said to be “writing o f the Joyous” as a
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portent o f hope: “There amid the Alps it is still bright night and the cloud / Writing o f the 
Joyous, covers the night within the yawning valley” (.Existence and Being 236). For 
Heidegger, the cloud is that which both reveals and conceals the gods:
The cloud hovers between the summits o f the Alps, and covers the 
mountain ravines, down into whose unlighted depths the serenifying beam 
of light penetrates. But the cloud . . .  dreams between the heights towards 
the Joyous. The cloud, as it composes, points upward into the Serene.
(.Existence and Being 250)
Serene does not occur in the poem; it is the term Heidegger chooses to describe that into 
which all forms of the joyous resolve: “The cloud is serenified into the Serene. What it 
writes, the ‘Joyous,’ is the Serene” {Existence and Being 247). The cloud, then, works as 
an analogy o f the relationship between Being and being. Just as the cloud, although 
occluding the valley’s view o f heaven, writes the Joyous by virtue o f being lit from the 
brightness o f the Serene above it, so the poet, who has become an ephemera in the 
“destitute time” o f the forgetfulness o f gods, can write Being by virtue o f  dwelling and 
listening in proximity to that which is at present forgotten. And just as the poet, by 
venturing into the nearness o f Being, allows language to come to poetry, so “The cloud 
writes poetry .. . .  The poetry does not come from the cloud. It comes upon the cloud in 
the form o f what the cloud is lingering over against” {Existence and Being 247). Being 
cannot be revealed without human speech; the “high one” cannot reach down to mortals 
without the help o f one who “first (and therefore alone) comes singing to meet the Joyous 
One and already forms part o f him” {Existence and Being 252). This “First” is someone
88
“who poetically rejoices in the face o f the greeting heralds, in order that he, alone and in 
advance, may first conceal the greeting in the word” (Existence 268-69). In “The Rhine,” 
Holderlin reflects again upon this sense o f vocation, although in this poem he is obviously 
less sanguine about home and homecoming:
Es haben aber an eigner 
Unsterblichkeit die Gotter genug, und bedurfen 
Die Himmlischen eines Dings,
So sinds Heroen und Menschen 
Und Sterbliche sonst. Denn weil 
Die Seeligsten nichts fuhlen von selbst,
Mufl wohl, wenn solches zu sagen 
Erlaubt ist, in der Gotter Nahmen 
Theilnehmend fuhlen ein Andrer,
Den brauchen sie; jedoch ihr Gericht
Ist, daB sein eigenes Haus
Zerbreche der und das Liebste
Wie den Feind schelt’ und sich Vater und Kind
Begrabe unter den Trummem,
Wenn einer, wie sie, seyn will und nicht 
Ungleiches dulden, der Schwarmer.
But their own immortality 
Suffices the gods, and if
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The Heavenly have need o f one thing,
It is o f  heroes and human beings
And other mortals. For since
The most Blessed in themselves feel nothing
Another, if to say such a thing is
Permitted, must, I suppose,
Vicariously feel in the name o f the gods,
And him they need; but their rule is that
He shall demolish his
Own house and curse like an enemy
Those dearest to him and under the rubble
Shall bury his father and child
When one aspires to be like them, refusing
To bear with inequality, the fantast. (Hamburger 415, 8)
Steiner comments that for Heidegger, “It is the poet’s calling— literal, soul-consuming, 
imperative to the point o f personal ruin—to bring creation into the neighborhood o f the 
divine” (142). “Homecoming,” then, signifies yet another dual relationship: that between 
the poet and the Joyous One(s) and that between the poet and fellow mortals. The poet, 
“first (and therefore alone)” already has made a homecoming by returning to “the 
proximity o f the source” {Existence and Being 252, 256). Now, however, the poet’s 
vocation calls for an additional homecoming that is “bringing near the Near, while keeping 
it at a distance. Proximity to the source is a mystery” {Existence and Being 259).
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Neither poet nor kindred can know the Source; only the mystery can be known, and it 
must be guarded carefully as such. There is that “reserve” in the kindred that creates 
concern in the homecomer; there also is a guardedness in the poet that reserves for the 
sake o f the holy. Bringing home mystery rather than science, however, makes the poet 
appear foolish: “To say that something is near and that at the same time it remains at a 
distance—this is tantamount either to violating the fundamental law o f ordinary thought, 
the principle o f contradiction, or on the other hand to playing with empty words. . . 
{Existence and Being 260). Because the poet is compelled to speak nevertheless, the 
joyous homecoming, the hymn to God and mortals, heaven and earth becomes an elegy in 
the midst o f the serenity o f joy. It is only nearness and mystery that are “revealed”; the 
poet must bear with both the absence o f holy names and the kindred’s misunderstanding: 
“Therefore the joy o f the poet is in fact the care o f the singer, whose singing guards the 
Most Joyous as the reserved, and brings the sought-for near in a reserving proximity” 
{Existence and Being 262). In this context, Heidegger quotes the epigram that Holderlin 
wrote as a preface to his translation o f Sophocles’ tragedies:
Many have sought in vain to tell
joyously o f  the Most Joyous. Now
at last it declares itself to me,
now in this grief. {Existence and Being 262)
For the poet, grief, sorrow, and care are the ultimate catalysts for true joy: “Grief, 
separated from mere melancholy by a gap, is joy which is serenified for the Most Joyous, 
so long as it still reserves itself and hesitates” {Existence and Being 262).
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However foolish it sounds, the poet is compelled to “sing.” Heidegger’s plea to his 
audience is to take the foolishness to heart. He pleads with his listeners, for example, not 
to separate the literal references in “Homecoming” to the Bodensee (the lake that he 
assumes is the setting for the poem) from allusions in the same poem to “The citadel o f  the 
heavenly ones / As in the ancient belief,” and he delivers a jeremiad against what he 
perceives as the intractable dullness o f his fellow Germans:
How long are we going to imagine that there was first o f  all a part o f  
nature existing for itself and a landscape existing for itself, and that then 
with the help o f “poetic experiences” this landscape became colored with 
myth? How long are we going to prevent ourselves from experiencing the 
actual as actual? (Existence and Being 255)
The “innermost core” o f the poem, he had mentioned in passing in his prefatory remarks, 
“is concealed in a line in the third stanza, which mentions the “‘people o f  the country’” 
{Existence and Being 234). The relevant context is: “Much [I prayed] for you also who 
are beset with care in the fatherland, / To whom the holy gratitude smiling brings the 
fugitive, / People o f the country! . . ( 3 . 5 - 7 ) .  And although he adds that he does not 
intend to address this “core” issue, by the end o f the essay Heidegger is speaking directly 
to this point. His fellow Germans, the “people o f the country,” he will regard as fugitives 
in their own land until they learn to share in the concern o f the poet for the fatherland as 
that place o f “proximity to the Near” {Existence and Being 264). The homecoming o f the 
poet, which “holds concealed the poetic call to the dearest in the homeland,” is destined
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eventually to become “the future o f the historical being o f the German people” {Existence 
and Being 268).
Heidegger expands upon this theme o f the “actuality” o f thinking the world 
poetically in “ . .  Poetically Man Dwells . . .  In this essay, first presented as a lecture in 
1951, Heidegger reiterates that the appeal o f language to which humans must respond is 
“that which speaks in the element o f poetry” {Poetry, Language 216). Listening to 
language and speaking language is the true nature o f homecoming, but this is not symbolic 
homecoming; it is truly a return to an earthly dwelling in time and space. The title o f the 
essay is taken from a line in Holderlin’s three-part poem “In Lieblicher Blaue . . . ” [“In 
Lovely Blueness . . .”] .49 Heidegger comments upon just the last half o f the poem’s first 
section and the very beginning o f the second section. It is the first section that contains the 
phrase upon which he builds his essay. Albert Hofstadter translates the relevant lines as 
“Full o f  merit, yet poetically, man / dwells on this earth” {Poetry, Language 216). The 
lines preceding this phrase are a series o f images that suggest someone looking up at a 
church steeple with its bell tower set off against a bright blue sky. Then follow the 
meditative lines that Heidegger examines:
So sehr einfaltig aber die Bilder, so sehr heilig sind die, dafi man wirklich 
oft furchtet, die zu beschreiben. Die Himmlischen aber, die immer gut sind, 
alles zumal, wie Reiche, haben diese, Tugend und Freude. Der Mensch darf 
das nachahmen. Darf, wenn lauter Mtihe das Leben, ein Mensch 
aufschauen und sagen: so will ich auch seyn? Ja. So lange die 
Freundlichkeit noch am Herzen, die Reine, dauert, misset nicht ungltiklich
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der Mensch sich mit der Gottheit. 1st unbekannt Gott? 1st er offenbar wie
der Himmel? dieses glaub’ icht eher. Des Menschen MaaB ist’s. Voll 
Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser erde. Doch 
reiner ist nicht der Schatten der Nacht mit den Stemen, wenn ich so sagen 
konnte, als der Mensch, der heiBet ein, Bild der Gottheit.
Giebt es auf Erden ein MaaB? Es giebt keines. Nemlich es hemmen den 
Donnergang nie die Welten des Schopfers. Auch eine Blume ist schon, weil 
sie bltihet unter der Sonne. Es findet das Aug’ oft im Leben Wesen, die viel 
schoner noch zu nennen waren als die Blumen. O! ich weiB das wohl!
Yet these images are so simple, so very holy are these, that really often one 
is afraid to describe them. But the Heavenly, who are always good, all 
things at once, like the rich, have these, virtue and pleasure. This men may 
imitate. May, when life is all hardship, may a man look up and say: I too 
would like to resemble these? Yes. As long as Kindliness, which is pure, 
remains in his heart not unhappily a man may compare himself with the 
divinity. Is God unknown? Is He manifest as the sky? This rather I believe. 
It is the measure o f  man. Full o f acquirements, but poetically man dwells on 
this earth. But the darkness o f night with all the stars is not purer, if I could 
put it like that, than man, who is called the image o f God.
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Is there a measure on earth? There is none. For never the Creator’s worlds
constrict the progress o f  thunder. A flower too is beautiful, because it 
blooms under the sun. Often in life the eye discovers beings that could be 
called much more beautiful still than flowers. Oh, how well I know it!
(Hamburger 600-01)
In his introduction to Poetry, Language, Thought, which includes Heidegger’s 
essay “. . .  Poetically Man Dwells . . . , ” Hofstader argues that Heidegger’s conception o f 
truth evolved from an initial sense o f “the showing o f beings in overtness,” the 6iXr]deia 
articulated in the pre-Socratic fragments, to include the sense o f a mutual “appropriation” 
o f Being and beings. He bases this argument on an analysis o f Heidegger’s use o f 
“e r e ig n e n which Heidegger traces etymologically not only to a “lighting” but to a proper 
fitness or proportion that comes as a result o f a measuring:
Ereignen comes to mean . . .  the joint process by which the four o f the 
fourfold [earth, sky, divinities, mortals] are able, first, to come out into the 
light and clearing o f truth . . .  and secondly, to exist in appropriation o f and 
to each other, belonging together in the round dance of their being. . . .  
(xxi)
The Serene, Heidegger states in “Remembrance o f the Poet,” “allots each thing to that 
place o f existence where by its nature it belongs, so that it may stand there in the 
brightness o f the Serene, like a still light, proportionate to its own being” {Existence and 
Being 247). Mortals are those beings who recognize this dimension of existence.
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In “The Way to Language” Heidegger personifies “appropriation,” describing it as “what 
brings all present and absent beings each into their own from where they show themselves 
in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind” (On the Way 127). It is 
what “grants to mortals their abode within their nature, so that they may be capable o f 
being those who speak” (On the Way 128). In “ . .  Poetically Man Dwells . .  .” Holderlin 
suggests it is in looking heavenward that mortals obtain their own measure, the “image o f 
God,” and Heidegger glosses by remarking that this “span” o f earth to sky is the 
recognition that mortals are apportioned a “dwelling” in time and space: “The upward 
glance passes aloft toward the sky, and yet it remains below on the earth. The upward 
glance spans the between o f sky and earth. This between is measured out for the dwelling 
o f man” (Poetry, Language 220). Therefore, “the taking o f measure is what is poetic in 
dwelling” (Poetry, Language 221). God is unknown yet manifest in the sky and everything 
that “blossoms” beneath it:
[T]he poet calls all the brightness o f the sights o f  the sky and every sound 
o f its courses and breezes into the singing word and there makes them 
shine and ring.
. . .  In the familiar appearances the poet calls the alien as that to which the 
invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is— unknown. (Poetry, 
Language 225)
When the poet writes, “In lovely blueness the steeple . . .  blossoms,” the dimension 
o f dwelling has been marked out and apportioned from earth to sky and thus god to 
mortal. And this is speaking the truth because it is “the disclosure o f  appropriatiori,'>
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(Hofstadter xxi). Just as he exhorted his fellow Germans not to make two separate 
realities o f  the Bodensee as a lake and the Bodensee as a dwelling o f gods and mortals, 
Heidegger cautions against taking images as fanciful representations o f the “merely” 
physical. Rather, images are the “visible inclusions o f the alien in the sight o f the 
familiar''’ (emphasis added) (Poetry, Language 226):
Because poetry takes that mysterious measure, to wit, in the face o f the 
sky, therefore it speaks in “images.” . . . .  The poetic saying o f images 
gathers the brightness and sound o f the heavenly appearances into one with 
the darkness and silence o f what is alien. By such sights the god surprises 
us. In this strangeness he proclaims his unfaltering nearness. (Poetry, 
Language 226)
Heidegger had used Holderlin’s phrase . .poetically man dwells . . . ” in an earlier 
lecture, “Holderlin and the Essence o f Poetry” (1936) as the last o f five 
“pointers”— quotations from Holderlin that he believed captured the essence o f poetry.
His commentary on this last “pointer” serves as a summary and conclusion to a cumulative 
argument based on the previous four:
THE FIVE POINTERS
1. Writing poetry: “That most innocent o f all occupations.” (Ill, 377.)
2. “Therefore has language, most dangerous o f possessions, been given to 
man . . .  so that he may affirm what he is. . . . ” (IV, 246.)
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3. “Much has man learnt.
Many o f the heavenly ones has he named,
Since we have been a conversation
And have been able to hear from one another.” (IV, 343.)
4. But that which remains, is established by the poets. (IV, 63.)
5. “Full o f merit, and yet poetically dwells
Man on this earth.” (VI, 25.) (Existence and Being 270)50 
Pointer one is a quotation o f a remark that Holderlin made in a letter to his mother 
{Existence and Being 272). Heidegger interprets Holderlin’s comment ironically, but not 
before offering a persuasive defense o f a straightforward reading:
Writing poetry appears in the modest guise o fplay. Unfettered, it invents 
its world o f images and remains immersed in the realm of the imagined.
This play thus avoids the seriousness o f decisions, which always in one way 
or another create guilt. Hence writing poetry is completely harmless. And 
at the same time it is ineffectual; since it remains mere saying and speaking. 
It has nothing about it o f action, which grasps hold directly o f the real 
world and alters it. Poetry is like a dream, and not real; a playing with 
words, and not the seriousness o f action. Poetry is harmless and ineffectual. 
For what can be less dangerous than mere speech? (Existence and Being 
272)
Here Heidegger sets forth a description o f poetry as “play” t hat is strikingly similar to
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Riffaterre’s characterization o f poetry as a verbal “game” and a “puzzle” (Semiotics 164- 
165). It is, however, this definition he ultimately rejects. This so-called poetry is the poetry 
o f distraction and diversion, not reality. It exerts no influence; it is the least o f the forms of 
language. Juxtaposed to this view is Heidegger’s true estimation o f poetry as the essence 
o f language. In Pointer Two he quotes a fragment from Holderlin: “Therefore has 
language, most dangerous o f  possessions, been given to man . . .  so that he may affirm 
what he is . . . . ” (Existence and Being 270). According to Heidegger, this fragment places 
language in the context o f  a gift from the gods to man as a special creation (“godlike” and 
“given the power to command and to accomplish”) and this power, the power to make 
history, is volatile— simultaneously disruptive and creative (Existence and Being 273). 
Even more importantly, according to Heidegger, is Holderlin’s insight that language is 
dangerous to itself. Language manifests Being while preserving it, that is, allowing it to 
remain concealed, but the perception o f that manifestation is always in danger o f being lost 
in ordinary speech. It may become instrumental, something that is used as a thing at hand, 
because “[i]n it [language], what is purest and what is most concealed, and likewise what 
is complex and ordinary, can be expressed in words” {Existence and Being 275). This is 
not to say that using language is not necessary to historical existence: “Even the essential 
word, if it is to be understood and so become a possession in common, must make itself 
ordinary” {Existence and Being 275). But, as equipment or tool, language runs the 
supreme risk o f being forgotten in its primary function as “that event which disposes o f the 
supreme possibility o f existence” {Existence and Being 276-77). To the poet is given the 
task o f preserving language (bringing its essence to remembrance): “[T]he poet also uses
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the word—not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but 
rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word” (Poetry, 
Language 48).
In his “Celebration o f Peace,” Holderlin calls humanity a “conversation” 
‘Gesprach,’ demonstrating for Heidegger that language must be considered an essential 
characteristic o f  what it is to be human.51
Much has man learnt.
Many of the heavenly ones has he named,
Since we have been a conversation
And have been able to hear from one another. (Existence and Being 277) 
The nature o f conversation as dialogue, both to listen/hear and say/speak, is such that it 
presupposes a ground o f unity (Existence and Being 277-78). Conversation is the locus o f 
language that makes possible learning and “the naming o f the gods,” which for Heidegger 
is a response to their claim regarding us, namely, that we bear the responsibility that 
language bestows for good or evil, openness to Being or forgetfulness o f it. It follows, 
then, that it is the calling o f the poet to preserve language as a conversation, a dialogue 
that induces the memory o f Being. Poetry, therefore, “is the establishing o f being by means 
o f the word”; as pointer four states, “But that which remains, is established by the poets” 
(Existence and Being 280).
Heidegger’s argument, then, to this point: Poetry only appears to be a most 
innocent work; as the essence o f language, it is actually a most dangerous activity. It 
comes to humans and establishes the world by apportioning gods and beings their place in
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the storms o f history, even as it runs the risk o f being forgotten—used merely as a tool.
To avoid this loss, language must be maintained in its essential form o f a conversation that 
calls together and names all o f the elements integral to gods and heaven, earth and 
mortals: “Since language became actual as conversation, the gods have acquired names 
and a world has appeared” {Existence and Being 279). Poets perform this sacred service; 
they measure out the world in word, both revealing and keeping concealed the mystery o f 
Being. “If,” Heidegger observes, “we conceive this essence o f poetry as the establishing of 
being by means o f the word, then we can have some inkling o f the truth o f that saying 
[pointer four] which Holderlin spoke long after he had been received into the protection o f 
the night o f lunacy” {Existence and Being 282).52 It follows for Heidegger that if 
recognition and acknowledgment o f the gods, human existence and history, and the 
establishment o f  the earth as world derive from language, then “our existence is 
fundamentally poetic” {Existence and Being 283).
Heidegger does make a final observation about a sense in which writing poetry 
involves a kind o f innocence {Existence and Being 286). Poets, cast out “into that 
Between, between gods and men,” because they appear to be engaging in useless child’s 
play, inadvertently are protected from and innocent o f what “afflicts and enframes man in 
his existence” in everyday life {Existence and Being 288, 275). Yet, he concludes,
unbeknownst to the many, the “play” o f poets sustains existence, to the extent that what is 
condescendingly called “fancy” is reality:
Poetry looks like a game and yet it is not......... [It] rouses the appearance
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of the unreal and o f dream in the face o f the palpable and clamorous reality, 
in which we believe ourselves at home. And yet in just the reverse manner, 
what the poet says and undertakes to be, is the real.
{Existence and Being 286)
Pindar and Heidegger’s “Fourfold”
Heidegger describes the very nature o f  language as “the movement o f  the face-to- 
face encounter o f the world’s four regions” (On the Way 107). When these four regions 
appropriate one another in the dance o f time and space, humans “dwell” poetically. That 
this reality is the dwelling o f humans, Heidegger articulates at length in “Building 
Dwelling Thinking” [“Bauen Wohnen Denken”] in a liturgy o f the “primal oneness” o f the 
world: earth, sky, divinities, and mortals (Poetry, Language 149).53 Earth is “the serving 
bearer, blossoming and fruiting . . sky is “the vaulting path o f the sun , . . .  the year’s 
seasons and their changes, the clemency and inclemency of the weather. . divinities are 
“the beckoning messengers o f  the godhead”; and mortals are human beings, who are called 
mortals because they are “capable o f death as death.” Each o f these “definitions” is 
followed by the chorus, “When we speak o f [“the earth” “the sky” “the divinities” 
“mortals”], we are already thinking o f the other three along with it [them], but we give no 
thought to the simple oneness o f the four” (Poetry, Language 149-50).
O f the Greek lyric poets, Pindar is closest to this sacramental approach to the 
relationships between gods, mortals, and the world. The structure o f Pindar’s odes 
depends on his perception o f a similarly proper and apportioned relationship between earth 
and heaven, gods and mortals. In his introduction to the Loeb edition o f Pindar (1961),
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John Sandys notes that the odes generally follow a pattern o f 1) offering praises to the god 
in whose name the games were held; 2) extolling the excellence o f the victor and his home 
(city/country and relatives); and 3) retelling a myth (which becomes the ode’s centerpiece) 
that expresses an integral relationship between the victor, his ancestors and ancestral 
home, and the gods (xxi, xxxi). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger 
acknowledges that for Pindar, “to glorify was the essence o f poetry” (87). He relates this 
glorification to the doxa theou in Greek and New Testament theology that connotes a 
beholding o f “grandeur,” and which, in the Greek doxa [aspect, regard] meant (if the 
aspect disclosed if o f the highest order) “to place in the light and thus endow with 
permanence, being” (87). Being is, in turn, the “fundamental attribute o f the noble 
individual and o f nobility” as in Pindar’s advice to Hieron, ‘fyenoi’ olg e a a l |iadcov ,” 
[now that thou hast learnt what manner o f man thou art] (Pythian Ode II, 72). Heidegger 
translates this phrase as “Mayest thou by learning come forth as what thou art,” which for 
him means that “coming forth” is an “appearing” that must take place by virtue of 
“standing-in-the-light” (Introduction to Metaphysics 86). Light, in this instance, is 
important because o f its “inner connection” to Being and being-there, a connection that is 
established by the ancient Greek radicals for being and light, $ T 7fl and $ A 0 , which, 
according to Heidegger, are equivalent: “The radicalsphy andpha name the same thing. 
Phyein, self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai, to flare up, to show itself, to appear” 
(Introduction to Metaphysics 85). If the essence o f poetry is to glorify, the calling o f the 
poet is “to place in the light” (Introduction to Metaphysics 87).
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Pindar’s Olympian Ode IX, written in three stanzas (each consisting o f strophe, 
antistrophe, and epode), can serve as an example of this light ing/glorifying that brings an 
individual, and thus his location in both time and place, to being. The first stanza begins 
with praise to Zeus, “the Lord o f the ruddy lightning,” then (in the antistrophe) to the 
victor (Epharmostus the wrestler) and his city, the “famous Opus.” The city’s history is 
lauded right through to the epode, where Pindar observes, “Lo! I am lighting up that city 
dear with dazzling songs o f praise,. . . ” [6703 Se tol <piXo:v ttoXiv /  paX epalq  
eirupXe7 cov doiSalg] (21-22). The epode ends with an acknowledgment o f the role the 
gods play in the destiny o f all mortals, including his own: “I, by the ordering o f destiny, am 
tilling the choicest garden o f the Graces, for ‘tis they that are givers o f  delight, but men 
become brave and wise according unto fate divine” [ei avv  tivi poipiSicp iraX ap a  /  
e^aCperov XapiTtov v e p o p a i Kctirov /  Kelvai 7 a p  om aaav  to: Tepirv’ • 070:1)01 
8e Kal ao<po! koto S aipov’ avSpeg] (26-28). That acknowledgment serves as a 
transition in the second stanza to the legend o f Heracles’ defense o f Pylos against 
Poseidon. It is unthinkable, Pindar contends, that Heracles would have had the courage to 
withstand “the trident” on that occasion without divine intervention— so unthinkable that 
he begins the antistrophe by cautioning himself against blasphemy: “Babble not, my Muse, 
o f such themes as these;” [pav taicriv  (moKpeKei. /  pi) vvv \o c \a y e i  to: to lout’ •] 
(39-40) and he returns quickly to a genealogy o f the victor’s city o f Opus.
Pindar’s history o f  Opus begins with a passing reference to the legend o f Pyrrha 
and Deucalion, who, by order o f Zeus, were supposed to have founded the city of 
Protogeneia [IIpcoT07eveLa] by fashioning its populace out o f stones. In the epode,
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however, Pindar offers his own account, a “new song” that traces the ancestry o f the 
founder o f the city o f Opus from survivors o f the Deluge to an evolving race o f kings, and 
finally, in the strophe o f the third stanza, to Protogeneia, the daughter o f  an original King 
Opus. Her lineage is then elevated to that o f Zeus himself, who having stolen her away, 
“lay by her side in a silent spot amid the Maenalian mountains” [Ttplv’ OXufjnrpiOQ 
d7e|ju*)v / fivyajp' airo yaq  ’ Erreuov ’ OitoevTog dvap-rraacag, eWXog / plx^fi 
M aivaXtcciaiv ev hetpcdg, . . .] (57-59). Pindar insists that this was an act o f kindness 
on the part o f Zeus, who wished that Locrus, Protogeneia’s husband, would not remain 
childless: “that so Time might not destroy him, laying upon him the doom of childlessness” 
[p.f| KadeXoi piv alwv iroTpov etpctyoag /  optpavov 7 eveag] (60-61). Locrus, for 
his part, “rejoiced,” and gave his son a city, Opus, which subsequently flourished. In fact, 
in the antistrophe we read that Achilles’ friend, Patroclus, was among the many and noble 
settlers in Opus. This most famous o f friendships forms the transition from the epode to 
the last stanza. In the epode, Pindar asks his Muse for one more grace, which is to sing the 
praises o f another pair of friends, Epharmostus and fellow-citizen Lampromachus, for 
their victories in the same Isthmian games, and for Lampromachus’ solo victories at 
various other contests. The antistrophe also is a final summary o f all o f  Epharmostus’s 
victories, although in typical fashion Pindar reminds his listeners that in any case, mere 
human effort is insufficient for success: “[M]any men have striven to win their fame by 
means o f merit that cometh from mere training; but anything whatsoever, in which God 
hath no part, is none the worse for being quelled in silence” [to 5e ipua KpcmaTOV
105
aitav iroAAol be 5i5aKTalg / avOpairtov dpetalg xXeog / wpouaav apeaflai] 
(100-104). In this regard, Heidegger calls attention, in his discussion o f the equivalence o f 
to be and to appear, to a phrase in the immediately preceding line: “That which cometh of 
Nature is ever best.” [to be ipua KpcmoTOV airav.] Heidegger translates the phrase, 
“that which is through and from out o f phya is the mightiest o f all,” and contends that for 
Pindar, “phya was the fundamental determination o f man’s being-there” (Introduction to 
Metaphysics 86). In the final epode, Pindar affirms that Epharmostus indeed had obtained 
the “blessing o f heaven” ‘Tot'S’ dcuepa botipovLa' (109).
In Heidegger’s terms, Pindar has taken the measure o f  earth and sky, gods and 
mortals and established them as a world in which humans “poetically dwell.” For the 
listeners, the world steps forward into the open as what it is. The poet’s revelation, then, is 
not a commentary upon what the world might be—but what it actually is—a “round 
dance” o f the fourfold, in which there takes place “the sublimely simple play o f their [the 
four-fold’s] mirroring” (Hofstader xxi). Holderlin wrote in 1804, “At present I am 
especially occupied with the fable, the poetic view o f history, and the architectonics o f the 
skies, especially o f our nation’s, so far as it differs from the Greek” (qtd. in Poetry, 
Language 227). Heidegger places this quotation in the context o f contending that poetic 
dwelling is in real time and space:
Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on the earth 
beneath the sky, by raising growing things and simultaneously raising 
buildings. Man is capable o f  such building only if he already builds in the 
sense o f the poetic taking o f measure. Authentic building occurs so far as
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there are poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the 
structure o f dwelling. {Poetry, Language 227)
Naming as Waking the Monster
Heidegger suggests in "Holderlin and the Essence o f Poetry" that poetry is the 
essence o f language itself:
[P]oetry is the inaugural naming o f being and o f the essence o f all 
things—not just any speech, but that particular kind which for the first time 
brings into the open all that we then discuss and deal with in everyday 
language. Hence poetry never takes language as a raw material ready to 
hand, rather it is poetry which first makes language possible. {Existence 
and Being 283)
Whatever a poem might bring into the open, however, runs the risk o f being shut up by 
gradual conversion into “everyday language.” He observes in his lecture, “Language,” that 
“What is purely hidden in mortal speech is what is spoken in the poem. Poetry proper is 
never merely a higher mode (melos) o f everyday language. It is rather the reverse: 
everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly 
resounds a call any longer” {Poetry, Language 208). He was perhaps reminding us that 
any reading o f a poem is another poem. For his part, Heidegger could only go so far as to 
say that “we cannot here decide flatly whether poetry is really a kind o f thinking, or 
thinking really a kind o f poetry. It remains dark to us what determines their real relation, 
and from what source that we so casually call the ‘real’ really comes” {On the Way 83).
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Or, as Holderlin expressed it:
Kommt eine Fremdlingin sie 
Zu uns, die Erwekerin,
Die menschenbildende Stimme.
A stranger it comes
To us, that quickening word,
The voice that moulds and makes human. (“At the Source” 385, 2.1-3)
To give face to something is to name it—to demarcate its form as one separate from 
others: “This naming does not consist merely in something already known being supplied 
with a name; it is rather that when the poet speaks the essential word, the existent thing is 
by naming nominated as what it is. So it becomes known as existent" (Existence and 
Being 281).54 Paul De Man compares this naming to invoking a monster—the "visual 
shape o f something that has no sensory existence: a hallucination" that is made "so 
eminently visible that any reader must respond to it" (49). Perhaps that is why Heidegger 
refers without further comment to Holderlin’s “Homecoming” as a “monstrous poem” 
{Existence and Being 282). And in “To Hope,” Holderlin writes,
O du des Aethers Tochter! erscheine dann
Aus deines Vaters Garten, und darfst du nicht 
Ein Geist der Erde, kommen, schrok’, o 
Schroke mit anderem nur das Herz mir.
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Then come, O Aether’s daughter, appear to me 
Out o f your father’s gardens; and if you may 
Not wear the shape o f earthly spirits,
Frighten my heart with a different aspect. (Hamburger 195)
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CHAPTER V
MEDIATING SEMIOTICS AND SEMANTICS IN POETRY: 
METAPHOR, REFERENCE, AND PROSOPOPEIA
“The affirmation o f the opacity ofpoetic discourse and its corollary, the obliteration o f
ordinary reference, are merely the starting-point o f an immense inquiry on the topic o f
reference . . . . ” —Paul Ricoeur
In his essay “Heidegger’s Exegeses o f Holderlin,” Paul de Man argues that the 
question o f whether or not Heidegger’s appropriation o f Holderlin’s poetry actually 
advanced Holderlin studies must be subsumed under the larger question regarding 
Heidegger’s “exegetical” method (246). O f course, characterizing Heidegger’s approach 
to Holderlin as “exegesis” prefigures for de Man an assessment o f Heidegger’s work as 
commentary on sacred text rather than as literary criticism. And de Man does contend 
that, rather than the groundwork for an overall approach to aesthetics, Heidegger’s 
exegesis o f Holderlin is better characterized as part o f  a general quest for an adequate 
ontology (246-47).
In support o f this argument, de Man first notes that Holderlin has become 
notorious among philologists for the number o f extant revisions o f his poems.55 The 
problem o f which revision to regard as authoritative is exacerbated in Heidegger, who
110
generally does not defend his choices among variant texts or comment on other critical 
interpretations. He examines lines, phrases, and even words in isolation and without 
context, bases some o f his word studies on apocryphal texts, and uses without comment 
texts from Holderlin’s so-called mad period (de Man 249-50). Most important, however, 
according to de Man, is that Heidegger’s interpretations o f Holderlin are founded on “a 
notion o f the poetic that seeks to assert the fundamental impossibility o f  applying objective 
discourse to a work o f art” (249). According to de Man, what qualifies as a work o f art 
for Heidegger is that which can reveal what is in essence not capable o f revelation. 
Although this language o f paradox is to be expected from mystics, de Man claims that it 
constitutes a logical contradiction in Heidegger’s supposedly philosophical method that 
ultimately vitiates his attempt to link language and ontology (260).
De Man first likens Heidegger’s estimate o f Holderlin as the “meta-metaphysician” 
who can speak and thereby reveal Being, to Hegel’s utopian vision o f the philosopher who 
has arrived at the end o f the dialectic o f Absolute Spirit (250-51). Alternatively, he frames 
Heidegger’s approach to Holderlin as an apociyphal quest for the “parousia o f Being” that 
ushers Being into presence in poetry by naming it as it reveals itself. The poet is the one 
who can assure us that there is indeed a ground o f being in Being. This is evident, for 
example, in Heidegger’s interpretation of Holderlin’s dictum “Was bleibet aber stiften die 
Dichter” [But what remains, is founded by the poets] as a foundation for the “immediate 
presence o f Being” (251-52). Heidegger himself was reticent about stating whether or not 
he himself had experienced original Being; he was at any rate convinced that the role o f 
the philosopher was not to reveal (something o f which discourse must be deemed
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incapable o f  doing) but to listen and preserve a testimony of revelation. Holderlin’s role as 
poet, on the other hand, was to speak the revelation:
Holderlin [according to Heidegger] knows Being immediately and he says 
it immediately; the commentator need only know how to listen. The work 
is there, itself a parousia. Being speaks through Holderlin’s mouth as God 
did through the mouth o f the seer Calchas in the Iliad, (de Man 253) 
According to de Man, this relationship o f prophet to disciple reduces Heidegger’s 
“criticism” o f Holderlin to commentary: “With Holderlin, there never is any critical 
dialogue [on Heidegger’s part]” (253). Heidegger’s an-denken [sic] “thinking-of ’ is a 
thinking-with or thinking-alongside that does not question; rather, it may on occasion 
successfully recover the wonder o f  Being and share with others what it means to “dwell 
poetically on earth” (254).
It is on this point that de Man criticizes Heidegger most severely. Holderlin, de 
Man argues, actually “says [in his poetry] exactly the opposite o f what Heidegger makes 
him say”; that is, the characteristic note o f  Holderlin’s work is not one o f  revelation but o f 
lamentation over the impossibility o f revelation. Holderlin does not claim to reveal what he 
has become, having ventured into the realm of Being—he can only intend it: “It is not 
because he has seen Being that the poet is, therefore, capable o f naming it; his word prays 
for the parousia, it does not establish it” (258). De Man claims that Heidegger’s attempt to 
ameliorate this problem by arguing that language, although it does mediate the immediate 
in the poem, does not actually reveal the immediate is a contradiction. To insist on 
“showing the poet as naming the presence o f the present,” despite the poet’s frequent
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protestations, is to conflate language, that which merely announces the hope o f revelation, 
with revelation itself, which is an experience o f original Being. Ho Merlin’s “conception o f 
the poetic,” according to de Man, is that o f “an essentially open and free act, a pure 
intuition, a mediated and conscious prayer that achieves self-consciousness in its failure; in 
short, a conception diametrically opposed to Heidegger’s” (263).
There is a sense in which this critique o f Heidegger—that he is overconfident o f 
the capacity o f  language to articulate experience-—is analogous to that argument 
(discussed in Chapter One) which de Man levels against Michael Riffaterre. De Man 
suggests that Riffaterre attempts to “escape the figural” by exhausting its expression in a 
rationale o f semiotic analysis. This reduction would entail a movement downwards, so to 
speak, from apparently extraordinary expression to ordinary speech that is, in turn, 
reducible on structuralist principles, to scientific language. But according to de Man, there 
is no one descriptive linguistic system into which we can reduce all others; structuralism’s 
naive retention o f positivism as a philosophical presupposition reveals a lingering 
overconfidence in the ultimate transparency o f language. Heidegger’s error, on the other 
hand, stems from his desire to recover original experience in language. He therefore 
inflates the power o f language (especially figural language) “upward,” arrogating to it the 
capacity, in the poet, to presence Being, thereby identifying Being and language in a 
mystical manner that is self-contradictory and non-philosophical. Heidegger, therefore, is 
also seeking to “escape the figural” by convincing himself that the figural can transcend its 
own being-in-the-world, that being can be translated into Being by virtue o f the “gift” of 
language.
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De Man therefore rejects Heidegger’s claim that language can mediate between the 
ineffable and the mundane; language always is already and only in the realm o f the 
mundane. He concludes his essay by speculating nevertheless that “the encounter between 
these two possible attitudes could constitute the center o f a valid poetics” (263). How 
could this be so?
Any exegetical method will ultimately have to come to grips with the same 
problem: how to elaborate a language capable o f dealing with the tension 
between the ineffable and the mediate. The ineffable demands the direct 
adherence and the blind and violent passion with which Heidegger treats 
his texts. Mediation, on the other hand, implies a reflection that tends 
toward a critical language as systematic and rigorous as possible, but not 
overly eager to make claims of certitude that it can substantiate only in the 
long run. (263)
It is not so obvious as de Man claims, however, that Heidegger turned Holderlin’s 
elegies into revelations; he was well aware o f the poet’s inability to make Being 
transparent. If  there is a logical battle to be fought, it is on the ground of figure as 
mediator. For Heidegger, the poet’s word “figures” both as disclosure and closure. If we 
protest that it cannot be both, Heidegger will claim we have begged the question. For 
example, de Man sets up an opposition between what can and cannot be expressed in 
language. Rather than between true opposites, however, such as the ineffable (something 
about which nothing can be uttered) and the utterable, his opposite terms are
114
“the ineffable” and “the mediate.” He already has defined, however, the “mediate” as 
language and therefore assumes what he sets out to prove.
Heidegger’s question is whether or not figure pre-figures discourse in such a way 
that when we “listen to the poet,” we hear language as the ground o f discourse. De Man 
observes that “[f]or the poet the anguishing question . . .  is: how can one not only speak of 
Being, but say Being itself. Poetry is the experience o f this question.” But poetry is not 
only the experience o f this question; we know it is poetry only when we hear it speak the 
question. When it speaks the question, Heidegger would contend, it says Being. It is the 
philosopher who is left to “think with” the poet and then carefully to preserve thought in 
order to “dwell poetically.”
Paul Ricoeur and the Mediating Role of Metaphor
For Heidegger, language could be said to act as mediator between Being [Sein] 
and being [das Seiende]. How does it do so? One possibility, according to Paul Ricoeur, is 
through metaphor, conceived o f not as a simple trope o f resemblance and substitution (as 
in semiotics) but as semantic innovation, the production o f meaning in discourse. In a 
sequence o f studies in The Rule o f  Metaphor that outlines the function o f metaphor from 
word to sentence to text, Ricoeur attempts a careful negotiation between semiotics and 
semantics.56 He tries first to demonstrate that metaphor produces a simultaneous effect on 
signification (at the level o f  word) and meaning (at the level o f the sentence). He then 
applies this finding to a critique o f the status o f literary language (especially within the 
genre o f poetry) and its distinction, if any, from philosophical language. In a literary work, 
he argues, metaphor alerts the reader to a bifurcation o f reference, one o f which is, in fact,
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a “redescription” o f the world that is cognitive, that is, it conveys new information or 
knowledge about reality. Ultimately, he concludes that this capacity o f language to deploy 
metaphor as a “semantic innovation” lays the groundwork for concepts subsequently taken 
up in philosophy.
Metaphor as “semantic innovation”
The notion o f metaphor as a word that improves style by “standing in” for a 
properly denotative, but uninteresting, word is familiar enough. Treating metaphor as 
substitution or deviation from the norm implies that the “proper” name always can be 
restored or paraphrased; therefore, “[t]he algebraic sum o f substitution and subsequent 
restitution is zero” (Ricoeur 45-46). As such, no new information is conveyed; the trope 
remains a matter o f style. In Rhetoric 1410b 13-15, however, Aristotle states that “when 
the poet calls old age ‘a withered stalk’ he conveys a new idea [literally: he has produced a 
knowledge] [epoiese mathesin kai gnosin], a new fact to us by means o f the general 
notion [dia tou genous] o f “lost bloom . . . ” (qtd. in Ricoeur 26).57 The poet has set up a 
proportional relationship o f genus to species that states that the general concept o f “old 
age” is to “an old person” as the general concept o f “lost bloom” is to “a withered stalk.” 
The two species are then transposed so that “a withered stalk” comes under the general 
concept o f “old age.”58 This “taking one thing for another by a sort o f calculated error” 
may be a violation o f the logical order, but it is intended to establish a new point of 
view—to redescribe the world: “Thus,” Ricoeur claims, “the category-mistake is the de- 
constructive intermediary phase between description and rediscription” (21, 22). He 
speculates that this may be in fact the way that thought forges the concept o f genus:
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A family resemblance first brings individuals together before the rule o f a 
logical class dominates them. Metaphor, a figure o f speech, presents in an 
open fashion, by means o f a conflict between identity and difference, the 
process that, in a covert manner, generates semantic grids by fusion o f 
differences into identity. (198)
Recalling H.-G. Gadamer’s comment in Wahrheit und Methode that there is a 
“‘metaphoric’ at work at the origin o f logical thought, at the root o f all classification,” he 
suggests that when Aristotle employs metaphor as a verb (metapherein), he supports an 
idea o f metaphor that acts by “creating rifts in the old order” (22-23).59 Even at the level 
o f individual word, metaphor as semantic innovation creates new rather than merely 
equivocal meaning.
Metaphor in the Context o f the Sentence 
Ricoeur notices that Pierre Fontanier, in his classic taxonomy o f figures Les 
Figures du discours, makes a key distinction between “proper” and “improper” metaphor 
that relies on the notion o f catechresis. Improper metaphor, or “figure-trope,” occurs 
when there is a loss for words that results in a “forced” use o f a name: “/«  general, 
catachresis refers to a situation in which a sign, already assigned to a first idea, is 
assigned also to a new idea, this latter idea having no sign at all or no other proper sign 
within the language” (qtd. in Ricoeur 62). Aristotle, Ricoeur also notes, already had used 
the figure epiphora to describe this use o f  metaphor; it implies filling a “semantic lacuna” 
with a word for which no truly “natural” name has been yet discovered (19, 20).6° By 
virtue o f this denotative invention, according to Ricoeur, metaphor impacts not only a
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word but (simultaneously) the sentence as a whole because it is the sentence, not the 
word, that functions as the basic semantic unit o f language. He therefore takes as his 
“working hypothesis” that “the semantics o f  discourse is not reducible to the semiotics of 
lexical entities” (66).61
Making a distinction between influences at the level o f  the word and level o f  the 
sentence helps to distinguish between sense and reference as well, since we may say that 
“signs refer to other signs within the same system. In the phenomenon o f the sentence, 
language passes outside itself; reference is the mark o f the self-transcendence o f language” 
(74) .62 At the level o f the sentence, semiotics, or the “intra-linguistic relationship,” is 
superseded by the intention to refer. Alluding to Husserl’s analysis o f intentionality, 
Ricoeur affirms that “[L]anguage is intentional par excellence-, it aims beyond itself, so 
that it is the intended, not the signified, whose reach goes outside language” (74).63 In this 
sense, all metaphors are, on first use, “improper” in Fontanier’s sense; they transgress the 
linguistic code in order to denote at a level that transcends intra-textual signification.
When a metaphor is created, it emerges as a meaningful event; it is said to be 
“alive.” When its meaning eventually is accepted into general usage and lexicalized, it 
“dies.” Ricoeur calls this the “circle” o f language and speech, a term he derives from 
Roman Jakobson’s analysis o f the “interchange” between code and message in the essay 
“Linguistics,” where Jakobson states that “without a confrontation o f the code with the 
messages, no insight into the creative power o f language can be achieved” (qtd. in Ricoeur 
121). Ricoeur takes Jakobson to mean that language exists as a polysemy that is 
continually evolving with the introduction o f new metaphors in speech, which are in turn
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taken up in common usage and eventually become embedded in the original matrix o f 
language ( 121).
Ferdinand de Saussure’s traditional “disjunction” between sign and thing therefore 
becomes problematic “because discourse, through its referential function, sets signs fully 
into relation with things. Denotation is a sign-thing relation, whereas signification is a 
relation between signifier and signfiied” (123).64 The question is therefore whether or not 
an analysis o f the code, even at the level o f the sentence, can be separated from an 
interpretation o f its message.
In a certain discourse situation, in a given social milieu and at a precise 
moment, something seeks to be said that demands an operation o f speech, 
speech working on language, that brings words and things face to face. The 
final outcome is a new description o f the universe o f  representations. 
(Ricoeur 125)
Metaphor as substitution involves a semiotic analysis whereas metaphor as “new 
pertinence” requires a semantic analysis: “As a lexeme, the word [a metaphor] is a 
difference in the lexical code . . .  As a part o f discourse, it bears a part o f the meaning that 
belongs to the entire statement” (157).65
Ricoeur’s description o f the relationship o f metaphor to sentence is remarkably 
similar to Michael Riffaterre’s analysis o f the relationship between “ungrammaticality” and 
hypogram in the poem. Ricoeur (following Monroe Beardsley’s general analysis o f the 
figure) affirms that “a metaphorical word functions only when it is contrasted and 
combined with other non-metaphorical words . . .  the self-contradiction o f literal
interpretation is necessary for the unfolding o f metaphorical interpretation” (138). On this 
account, “what the figure contrasts with is a literal interpretation o f the sentence as a 
whole, the impossibility o f  which motivates the constitution o f the metaphorical meaning” 
(139).
This process o f reconstitution corresponds to Riffaterre’s use o f ungrammaticality 
as an heuristic that compels a second reading intended to capture the non-literal matrix o f 
the text. Although Riffaterre calls this first reading o f a poem “heuristic,” it can only be so 
if the reader is already aware that for poetry, “decoding” can only take place as 
ungrammaticalities are noted and interpreted. The second reading, which he calls 
“retroactive” is thus the reading that employs the heuristic proper to poetry and, as he 
states, “This is the time for a second interpretation, for the truly hermeneutic reading” 
(Riffaterre 5). It is telling, however, that Riffaterre does not describe the second reading as 
a semiosis but instead uses the technical term for a process he ultimately is trying to 
avoid— interpretation. The result o f  Riffaterre’s hermeneutics is nevertheless not so much 
an interpretation as a translation. He translates the poem into what Jean Cohen, in 
Structure du language poetique calls the “least marked” language— that o f science, 
assuming that the essential characteristic o f  scientific language is that the translation o f any 
other “language” into it is equivalent; it conveys “identity o f information” (qtd. in Ricoeur 
139). This accomplishes a “reduction o f deviation” or “self-correction that re-establishes 
the integrity of the message” (159).
Cohen articulates this violation as a two-step process: “The totality o f  the 
procedure comprises two inverse and complementary phases— ( 1) situation o f deviation:
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impertinence-, (2) reduction of deviation: metaphor” (qtd. in Ricoeur 152). More accurate, 
perhaps, is that the reduction itself consists o f two steps. Transgression of lexical “law” 
does alarm the reader, who then reads again and recognizes the impertinence for what 
is—metaphor. This recognition, however, renders the deviation harmless; it reduces it to 
nothing because the meaning it lends to the sentence is, to the relief o f the reader, 
equivalent to the meaning o f an ordinary statement. The difference that the deviation 
seems to make is legitimately interpreted as affective or connotative. Cohen may argue 
that “impertinence” as deviation does indeed yield a “new pertinence” that is unique to 
poetic language. But for him this new pertinence is “harmless” in the sense that it is non- 
cognitive: “emotional unity is the obverse side o f notional inconsequence” (qtd in Ricoeur 
155). What Ricoeur calls the “semiotic postulate” for metaphor, because it is so generally 
held, is that there is an equivalency between the transformation o f deviation to reduction 
back to deviation (157). The same can be said for Riffaterre’s sense o f the translatability of 
the text o f the poem into ordinary language.
Ricoeur argues that this cognitive/non-cognitive distinction made by Cohen and 
others has been assumed to correspond to the traditional difference recognized between 
denotation and connotation, but that “the properly positivistic presupposition according to 
which only the objective language o f scientific prose would be able to denote . . . .  is a 
prejudice that must be exposed to direct interrogation” (148). A figure is understood to be 
so only in the context o f a sentence-statement that refers; metaphor must therefore pass 
beyond simple substitution and a semiotics o f  the word. According to Ricoeur, this means 
that “what is intended by discourse [/ ’ intent e], the correlate o f the entire sentence, is
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irreducible to what semiotics calls the signified, which is nothing but the counterpart o f the 
signifier o f  a sign within a language code” (216).
For his part, Ricoeur concedes, like de Man, that “the merit o f the [reductionist] 
method is undeniable” but doubts that a complete reduction is possible, especially when 
the simultaneous effects o f metaphor at the level o f word and sentence are recognized 
(140). Instead, Ricoeur argues that it is legitimate to ask what the metaphorical statement 
might say about the world. Insofar as a metaphor is inextricably linked to a sentence 
statement, it is involved in a predication (assigning a quality or qualities to a subject) 
which is the central function o f semantics and the origin o f communication. It must convey 
an intended adumbration o f the subject that originates in an exterior world: “[Gjrounded 
on the predicative act what is intended by discourse [/ ’intente] points to an extra-linguistic 
reality which is its referent” (Ricoeur 216):
The affirmation that the figure’s surplus o f meaning depends on 
connotation is the exact counterpart o f  the affirmation discussed earlier that 
the figure is translatable with regard to its sense— in other words that it 
carries no new information . . .  But if metaphor is a statement, it is possible 
that this statement would be untranslatable, not only as regards its 
connotation, but as regards its very meaning, thus as regards its denotation. 
It teaches something, and so it contributes to the opening up and the 
discovery o f a field o f reality other than that which ordinary language lays 
bare. (148)66
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Literary Text as Metaphor
For linguists generally, it is only what is not sublimated in a literary text that is 
denoted. What is left untranslatable in a text is wholly connotative and affective. Ricoeur 
nevertheless argues that just as in the case o f  the metaphorical statement, “it is entirely 
conceivable that the opacity o f words [in a literary text] implies some other reference and 
not no reference at all” (146). He first invokes the analogy Beardsley makes in his 
Aesthetics between the literary work and the sentence, where both can be considered as a 
“unit o f discourse.” There are two levels o f  signification in a sentence, the explicit (what it 
states) and the implicit (what it suggests), and these are, in turn, analogous to the 
distinction we make between the denotation and connotation o f individual words. Based 
on Beardsley’s argument, “a semantic definition o f literature—that is, a definition in terms 
o f meaning— can be deduced from the degree to which a discourse involves implicit or 
suggested secondary meanings” (91).
Beardsley also articulates a difference between the “the world o f the work,” or 
“projection o f a possible and intelligible world,” and its verbal design. It is possible, when 
analyzing a work, to confine oneself to the verbal design, but “in spontaneous discourse, 
understanding does not stop at the sense, but passes by sense towards reference” (92). 
Ricoeur therefore offers a new formulation o f literary reference: “[Discourse in the 
literary work sets out its denotation as a second-level denotation, by means o f the 
suspension o f the first-level denotation o f discourse” (221). Poetry, either considered as 
typical o f literary language in general or as a specific genre, does not exclude reference or 
abolish it but “splits” it: “[P]oetry is not the suppression o f the referential function but its
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profound alteration by the workings o f ambiguity” (224). If, for modem critics, reference 
is destroyed in the literary work, this merely shows that the epistemology o f logical 
positivism has been imported as a presupposition into this critical approach to literary 
language (226-27).
The Problem o f Mimesis
Ricoeur’s approach to mimesis becomes particularly important in his analysis o f 
metaphor’s role in sense and reference at the level o f the work o f art. Ricoeur contends 
that in Aristotle’s elucidation o f tragedy as the imitation o f human action, metaphor plays 
a role larger than traditionally assigned. Aristotle conceives o f metaphor, he contends, as 
part o f the lexis, or ordering and organizing, o f the mythos that is recalled in tragedy. As 
such, it actively participates in creating the mimesis o f human action represented in the 
poem. Quoting Aristotle’s comment in Poetics 1456 b 6, t 'i 7a p  a v  e’tv to Ae^ovtog 
ep7 ov, e l tpo^o tto  iq 5eoi x a l pr) 5 ia  tov X070V; [What, indeed, would be the 
good o f the speaker, if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he 
says?] Ricoeur argues that lexis (and therefore the role that metaphor plays in producing 
it) makes possible “the coming into language, the fact o f having been made manifest, o f 
appearing in spoken words” (37). As an element o f lexis, metaphor is no mere matter of 
style: “The subordination o f lexis to muthos already puts metaphor at the service o f 
‘saying,’ o f ‘poetizing,’ which takes place no longer at the level o f the word but at the 
level o f  the poem as a whole” (40).
These observations prompt Ricoeur to clarify his understanding o f the relationship 
between mimesis, lexis, and metaphor. The traditional interpretation o f mimesis as
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imitation, he argues, is more Platonic than Aristotelian. Plato’s concept o f “definition” 
implies a one-to-one correspondence between an idea and the word that “really” applies to 
it; everything else, therefore, is merely a resemblance (37-38). For Aristotle, however, 
mimesis is, like metaphor, an act. It is a “making,” which, in tragedy, structures the plot 
(39). It is discursive rather than duplicative, which is what inspires Aristotle to state in 
Poetics 1451 b5-6 that poetry is “something more scientific and serious than history, 
because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts” [rj pev 
7 ap  ttolt|olq paAXov to: Ka$oAou, r) S’ laTopia to: x a d ’ eKaaTOV Aeyei.] (85). 
In the tragedy, mimesis is both faithful to human action (reality) and “original” in its 
structuring o f the mythos to portray human action as more noble than or worse than the 
human behavior found in reality (Ricoeur 40).67
For Ricoeur, Aristotle’s sense o f art imitating nature is as much o f a distinction as 
a relation because it distinguishes the poetic, a “making,” from the organic, so that “reality 
remains a reference, without ever becoming a restriction” (42):
If this hypothesis is valid, it can be understood why no Poetics can truly 
ever have done either with mimesis or phusis. In the last analysis, the 
concept of mimesis serves as an index of the discourse situation; it reminds 
us that no discourse ever suspends our belonging to a world. All mimesis, 
even creative—nay, especially creative—mimesis, takes place within the 
horizons o f a being-in-the-world which it makes present to the precise 
extent that the mimesis raises it to the level o f muthos. (43)68 
Ricoeur’s conclusion is startlingly similar to Heidegger’s plea for his countrymen to listen
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to the poet’s “saying” o f Being not as merely symbolic but real or “actual.” Ricoeur, too, 
asserts that “when the poet writes that ‘nature’ is ‘a temple where living columns. . . , ’ the 
verb to be does not just connect the predicate temple to the subject nature . . . .  It implies 
besides . . .  that what is is redescribed; its says that things really are this way” (247-48). 
We may conclude, then, that 1) poetry “seeks to redescribe reality by the roundabout 
route o f  heuristic fiction”; 2) language uses metaphor to rise beyond direct description to 
the level o f mythos; and 3) metaphorical truth is a consequence o f the redescriptive power 
o f language (247) (Fig. 9).
Figure 9. Ricoeur’s proposed recursive relationship between reference and meaning.
According to the schema o f Figure 9, Being is retained, as in Heidegger, as an 
unspoken category that is simultaneously revealed and not revealed when spoken by the 
poet. Mythos, already ensconced in the human life o f “being-there,” [Dasein\ is ordered 
according to logos in the lexis and metaphor o f the poem. As soon as the poem is 
recognized as fiction, its first-order reference is exploded, as it were, releasing a 
polysemous surplus that is both connotative (emotive) and meaningful. Meaning rise to the
emotive connotation
Being----------►Mytho s/being-------->  Poem
A (canceled denotation)
I
production o f meaning
second-order reference < -------- interpretation (hermeneutics)
(new denotation)
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level o f a  second-order (cognitive) reference to the encounter between Being and being 
that first compels the poet to speak. Thus, “in the metaphorical discourse o f poetry 
referential power is linked to the eclipse o f ordinary reference; the creation o f heuristic 
fiction is the road to redescription; and reality brought to language unites manifestation 
and creation” (239).
Negotiating Poetry and Philosophy
We can now take up de Man’s question about the relationship between “listening 
to the poet,” and carrying out a philosophical project. Like Heidegger, Ricoeur seeks an 
ontology o f discourse that would preserve the pluralism o f modes o f discourse and deny 
the reduction o f philosophy into poetry. He observes, along with Heidegger, that
the philosopher fights on two fronts, against the seduction o f the ineffable 
and against the power o f ‘ordinary speech’ (Sprechen), in order to arrive at 
a ‘saying’ (Sagen) that would be the triumph neither o f inarticulateness nor 
o f the signs available to the speaker and manipulated by him . . . .  (310)
The poet uses language metaphorically to express the apperception o f a new object of 
knowledge revealed in Being. The philosopher, alert to the deconstruction o f reference 
and redescription o f reality that language can intend, takes up this tension into thought. 
When taken up in self-reflection (philosophy), poetry becomes conscious o f its relationship 
to Being. What the philosopher thus expresses in a separate mode o f language is indeed a 
commentary on what has been heard by another— a bringing-to-bear o f thought on 
language.
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At the moment o f “hearing,” however, there occurs a disjunction between poet and 
philosopher that on the one hand ends communication with Being while providing the 
ground for concepts. Having heard, the philosopher cannot simply repeat, but attempts to 
stir up or re-awaken in other listeners what the poet has returned to memory. According 
to Ricoeur, “Philosophical discourse deliberately has recourse to living metaphor in order 
to draw out new meanings from some semantic impertinence and to bring to light new 
aspects o f  reality by means o f semantic innovation” (291). Although philosophy must turn 
away from poetry towards discourse and, eventually, the merely instrumental use o f 
language, it nevertheless must begin as an understanding o f what is revealed by the poet, 
and it therefore originates in a shared matrix o f second-order references. Its use o f living 
metaphor cannot produce a concept; rather, living metaphor is the condition for the 
possibility o f  concepts: “What is given to thought in this way by the ‘tensional’ truth o f 
poetry is the most primordial, most hidden dialectic— the dialectic that reigns between the 
experience o f belonging as a whole and power o f  distanciation that opens up the space of 
speculative thought” (313).
As Ricoeur himself notes, onto-theology—the attempt to bridge the gap in 
language between the word o f God and the word o f humans— looks for a third term to do 
so: “This “human, too human, discourse o f  ontology attempts to respond to the entreaty 
o f  another discourse, which is itself perhaps only a non-discourse” (269). In the analogia 
entis, St. Thomas looked to “participation” as a way to preserve the sense o f analogy o f 
Being with beings and the notion o f proportional being where the relationship between
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terms is not mathematically determined, so that intellect is to soul as sight is to body 
(274). The criticism o f this “too human” struggle has since culminated in the 
deconstructive criticism o f Jacques Derrida and others, who claim that unacknowledged 
metaphor lies behind any metaphysical claim (284-287). De Man’s criticism of 
Heidegger’s exegeses presupposes this limit to thought and language. Heidegger, 
however, denies that in philosophy, hearing and seeing, for example, are used 
metaphorically in conjunction with grounding thought (280-81). It is rather the case that 
the hearing and seeing to which we commonly refer are known by virtue o f a participation 
in or analogy with the apperception o f Being. The “blossoming forth” o f  words in poetic 
language, as Heidegger proposes it, is intentional and metaphorical, but philosophy is at a 
critical distance from it; it must take up the metaphor into speculation to see how it 
qualifies as knowledge. Analogously, scientific thought requires a model in order to begin, 
before it uses logic in ordering, experiment, and verification:
Concepts in scientific language as well as in ordinary language can never 
actually be derived from perception or from images, because the 
discontinuity o f the levels o f discourse is founded, at least virtually, by the 
very structure o f  the conceptual space in which meanings are inscribed 
when they draw away from the metaphorical process, which can be said to 
generate all semantic fields. (300)
The metaphor, too, is the initial opening up o f the world for the understanding, even 




Language Explanation (linguistic origin)
>k















Figure 10. A model o f  the relationship between the literary work and knowledge based 
upon Heidegger and Ricoeur’s analysis o f literary language.
and semantics in literature is not so much a hierarchy as a division o f labor. Borrowing 
from both Heidegger and Ricoeur, we could construct a model o f  approaches to literary 
language that preserves both realms o f activity and investigation (Fig. 10).
Poetic Language and Lyric Poetry
For the most part, Ricoeur uses the terms poetry, poetic language, and literary 
language interchangeably. All o f  the genres, from his perspective, are characterized by the 
split reference that occurs in metaphorization. This common marker does not, however, 
collapse the genres nor even sub-genres into one category, although we also can say that 
the lines o f distinction can not be firmly drawn; rather, the traditional divisions, first 
between types o f poetry and then types o f narrative, exist on a continuum (Fig. 10). The 
lyrical expression is a metaphorical statement that uses prosopopeia to set a stage, to 
provide a mask for, a hypothetical situation that redescribes the world in a way not 
attainable in an ordinary expression o f emotion or in mere melody. The work comes
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Poetry Epic and Drama Narrative
- r  ----------------------------;-------------------------------------- i---------------------->
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Lyric assimilated Lyric integrated Lyric (lyrical “moments”)
Figure 11. A model o f literary language as a continuum o f poetic language, 
alongside experience to open up a new space previously not accessible to the poet or to 
the reader. As narrative claims a larger part o f the production o f a literary work, pure lyric 
becomes increasingly an element or constituent o f a total effect rather than its framework; 
it nevertheless may remain the essence o f a work, depending on the author’s purpose.
Ricoeur does agree with critics such as Northrop Frye that the thrust o f  the lyric 
poem is to create a mood by the direct expression o f emotion, pure and simple. He points 
out, however, that an “alternate” emotional world is a powerful form o f redescription that 
can modify knowledge about the world in a most profound manner. As Ricoeur suggests, 
“feeling has an ontological status different from relationship at a distance; it makes for 
participation in things” (246).69 Although its direct manner o f expression makes it closely 
linked to the wordlessness o f music, its “making” within the world o f words makes it 
complicit with the play o f logos on human experience. However musical, the lyric poem is 
a metaphorical statement that intends a truth about the world. It is perhaps the 
consciousness o f this power that compels lyric poets to meditate upon poetry itself, at 
which point Lyric becomes self-conscious. Enter the philosopher, who listens and attempts 
the andenken, the ‘thinking with.”
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Epitaph and Epiphora
As we noted in Chapter One, the epigram written in the form of epitaph, although 
ostensibly referring to a dead person or persons through direct denotation by a name or 
specific description, quickly evokes an heuristic by which the reader participates in a ritual 
o f reading that recognizes a variation on an ancient theme of statements about death and 
dying. By virtue o f this semiotics o f  reading, epitaphs could in fact dispense with the 
material monument and become completely virtual, no longer written upon stone but upon 
the relative evanescence o f papyrus or paper—and no longer dependent even upon 
someone in particular having died. The explanation o f a given epitaph can, in this sense, be 
achieved quickly and completely— it is a catechresis achieved through expansion of a 
matrix o f protestations against death. Anything added to this explanation is an 
interpretation o f its meaning, even if we are quite sure (as Riftaterre seems to be, for 
example) that what we are dealing with is an intent to nullify death through a reprise, in 
the form of the epitaph, o f  its power to destroy. It could be that this is what the epitaph is 
teaching us, but to say so is to acknowledge that an explanation, and the interpretation 
that leads to understanding and knowledge, are inextricably linked to something that lies 
outside the text, namely, human experience. The epitaph therefore is certainly a verbal 
artifact, a construction, whose intertextual genealogy can be traced to an oral tradition of 
the funeral oration or logos epitaphos and to the earliest o f death rituals. Even by the time 
o f ancient Greece, “the world was old,” as Mackail observes in the introduction to his 
anthology of the Anthology, adding:
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Then, no less than now, men trod daily over the ruins o f  old civilisations 
and the monuments o f lost races. One o f the most striking groups o f poems 
in the Anthology is the long roll o f  the burdens o f dead cities; Troy, Delos, 
Mycenae, Argos, Amphipolis, Corinth, Sparta. (66)
All o f this has the effect o f reducing the text to its kernel matrix, which, for the earliest 
humans, may have been only a cry o f pain. Here, at the very origin o f language, we face 
questions about the respective ontologies o f emotion and intellect. Borrowing terms from 
Heidegger, we could ask whether a cry o f pain, enlightened by the “gift” of language 
could “blossom forth” in a “saying” about human experience that is true not just in the 
sense o f being an authentic expression o f emotion but in terms o f rendering a description 
o f the world that is, indeed, true. For their part, the Greeks were, according to Mackail, 
the “sayers” o f death, par excellence:
Here [in the epitaph], if anywhere, the Greek genius had its fullest scope 
and most decisive triumph; and here it is that we come upon the epigram in 
its inmost essence and utmost perfection. “Waiting to see the end’ as it 
always did, the Greek spirit pronounced upon the end when it came with a 
swiftness, a tact, a certitude that leave all other language behind. (68)70 
Using Ricoeur’s hermeneutic o f metaphor, perhaps we can approach the sepuchral 
epigrams in particular in terms o f epiphora, that is, as a movement or event o f  writing 
coming alongside the monument, real or imagined, to bring forth a redescription o f the 
world. This redescription would have the potential to create a topology of human 
experience that is both new and cognitive— new because this particular emotional and
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intellectual landscape has never before been made present, and cognitive because lexis, its 
ordering in logos, makes it cognizable as an objective description o f the world of 
experience.
Mackail divides his selection o f sepulchral epigrams (which, he notes, “would 
otherwise have been much the largest o f the divisions,”) into a section o f “epitaphs 
proper” and a section entitled “Death,” made up o f epigrams “dealing with death 
generally” (31). He does not elucidate this criteria, but it seems that “epitaphs proper” are 
those which he suspects are the most simply stated o f the epigrams, written on the 
occasion o f specifically named people, and devoid o f pronouncements, subtle or not, about 
the concept o f death—those that deal with the species rather than the genus o f death. 
Although the “death” epigrams may still be epitaphs for particular people, often what is 
foregrounded in the text itself is a commentary on the human condition. For example, 
Macedonius o f  Thessolonica, an epigrammatist o f the Byzantine period, has the deceased 
wonder, in his or her death, about the purpose o f life:
T a la  Ka! E iA fjduia, au p.ev Texeg, r) be KaAutrreig- 
XcapeTOV d|jupotepag fivnaa to a r a b io v  
Eip.i be, pf| voetov irodi v e ta o j ia r  ovSe Yap upeag  
rj Tivog, rj t ig  ewv, otSa -rrodev |xeTe(3r)v.
Earth and Birth-Goddess, thou who didst bear me and thou who coverest, 
farewell; I have accomplished the course between you, and I go, not 
discerning whither I shall travel; for I know not either whose or who I am, 
or whence I came to you. (11.1)
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Yet many o f the “death” epigrams do refer to specific people— famous warriors, a favored 
slave, a child, parent, or even a favorite pet. This epigram by Simonides (556-467), for 
example, is very specific, and although it makes a statement about the universal lot o f all 
mortals, it is hardly distinguishable from what Mackail categorizes as epitaph:
Eapa per aXAoSairfi nev& ei Kovig- e v  be o e  ttovtco,
K X e ia d e v e g , [xotp eKixev Oava-rou
IIAa£6p.evov, YXuKepoi) be  peAuppovog oiKahe vocttod 
TlptrAaKeg, ou8’ ixev Xlov €7r’ dp.cpipuTr]v.
Strange dust covers thy body, and the lot of death took thee, O 
Cleisthenes, wandering in the Euxine [Black] Sea; and thou didst fail o f 
sweet and dear home-coming, nor ever didst reach sea-girt Chios. (11.20) 
Perhaps more often than not it is a heavy-handed use o f  metaphor, such as afflicts 
this epigram by Bianor, a Roman writer o f the early first century CE, that renders, from 
Mackail’s perspective, a “death” epigram more o f a commentary on the inevitability o f 
death than a simple epitaph.
IlavTa Xapcov atrXiriaTe, tl tov veov rjpTraaag ocvrug  
’'ArraAov; oh oog; eiqv, Kav {krye YiqpaAeog;
Ever insatiate Charon, why hast thou wantonly taken young Attalus? was 
he not thine, even if he had died old? (11.39)
The general tactic o f accusing death for an unseemly eagerness to take possession o f life is 
more effectively delivered by this anonymously written epigram, in which the writer “gives 
face” to the dead person, who then speaks directly to the reader:
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Karffavov, a W a  p.evco oe- ptevelg 5e re Kai a v  tiv’ a X k o v  
IlavTag opwg #VT}Toug elg ’AiS^g SexeTai.
I died, but I await thee; and thou too shalt await some one else; one Death 
receives all mortals alike. (11.52)
And Simonides achieves this same effect in a strangely doubled manner when he places his 
epigram in the context o f a dramatic dialogue between father and son.
$fj 7roTe IIpuTOfjiax0^ itaTpog irepi xelpag exovTog,
VjviK’ dip’ l|xepTT|V eirveev TjAuuiriv 
Tip/rivopibiq, 7rat56g cpiAou ouitoTe Xrjcrr) 
out’ dpenrjv itodewv outc oaocppoauvT]v.
Protomachus said, as his father held him in his hands when he was 
breathing away his lovely youth, ‘O son o f Timenor, thou wilt never forget 
thy dear son, nor cease to long for his valour and his wisdom.’ (11.40) 
Rather than invoking the dead to speak from the grave, Simonides embeds the dead 
person’s last words in the epigram, creating a masque that would be a poignant one were 
it not for the sudden and inappropriate hubris with which it ends. We can understand it, 
nevertheless, as an epitaph that would be appreciated (and written) by a proud but grief- 
stricken father. This simultaneous memorialization o f three generations is a “true” epitaph 
in Mackail’s own sense o f remembering, not death, but the person who died. More 
understated, however, is Simonides’ epitaph celebrating the friendship between Theognis 
and Glaucus:
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Ef)|ia 0 eo7 VL8og elfii Eivwireog, u |T eired^Kev 
rXauKog e-raipeirig d u n  ttoXuxpovlod.
I am the monument o f Theognis o f Sinope, over whom Glaucus set me in 
guerdon o f their long fellowship. (3.63)
Having the monument itself speak, rather than the deceased or Glaucus, the person who 
commissioned the monument, seems a gesture o f humility, as if Glaucus were stepping 
discreetly to the side to point to the monument rather than call attention to himself as its 
builder. Yet the epitaph is clearly an epigram on fellowship, just as Brotachus’s epitaph is 
an epigram on the fragility o f life and unpredictability o f death:
Kpr|g 7evedv Bpojaxog TopTuviog evdaSe Keipm 
ou Kcrra tout eXdcov, aXXd kcct ep/iropCav.
I Brotachus o f Gortyna, a Cretan, he here, not having come hither for this, 
but for traffic. (3.66)
Many o f the epigrams, therefore, whether or not strictly classified as epitaphs by 
Mackail, express this general concept o f humans’ vulnerability and death’s inevitability. In 
that sense they are reflexive, that is, they extrapolate a universal from a particular 
situation. They are a mimesis in Aristotle’s sense o f  the actions o f humans. But they are 
not self-conscious; there is no evidence that the inscriber is contemplating the vocation of 
the poet nor o f that anxiety a poet might feel over the capacity o f words to express the 
truth o f the matter. On the contrary, there is a confidence apparent, even in the 
expressions o f despair, that the articulation o f emotion reifies it. In this sense the epigrams 
can be regarded as epiphora—metaphorical statements that open up a new topography of
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human experience, that, were it not experienced through the logos o f  the poem, could not 
be experienced at all, much less articulated.
The development o f the “technology” o f the prosopopeiaic method marks in 
particular this arrival by poets at an unselfconscious approach to Being, the proposal o f an 
“I-Thou” relationship. This relationship in turn establishes the ground for a second 
encounter with the reader. The Greek lyricists were confident that both encounters could 
issue in dialogues that were transparent-both in the particulars o f speech about individuals 
(the record o f history) and the extraction o f concepts (the universality o f human 
experience). They employed a variety o f  prosopopeiaic structures, including tableaus in 
which, for example,
• the dead (individually or in chorus; human or animal) speak
• the commemorator o f an event speaks
• the mourner speaks
• the tomb speaks
Memorials to the famous comprise most o f the first and second type, but there are 
many epitaphs spoken in the voice o f the common person, such as this young wife and 
mother, who wishes she might have lived longer:
’ApxeXeco pe S a p a p ra  IIoXi)^eivT|v, ©eoSeKTon
TTodba Kai a ivo iradobg  evveite Ainpapenqc,
"Oaaov e-tr’ toStaiv Kai pr^-repa- ira lS a  be Saipan* 
e<p$aaev ou5’ aim ov eiKooiv fieXicov
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’OKTtoKoaSeKeTig 8’ at>TT| davov, apTi Tenoucra, 
a p ti 8e kocl vvpipp, iravToXryoxpoviog.
Name me Polyxena wife o f Archelaus, child o f  Theodectes and hapless 
Demarete, and a mother as far as the birth-pangs; but fate overtook the 
child before full twenty suns, and myself died at eighteen years, just a 
mother and just a bride, so brief was all my day. (3.49) 
and this by an old man, who wished never to have been bom.
' E|r)KOVTOiJTT]g Aiovuoxog evdaSe net pa i
Tapaevg, pr) 7 fjpag- a ide 8e pirjh’ 6 iranqp.
I Dionysius o f Tarsus lie here at sixty, having never married; and I would 
that my father had not. (3.65)
Even animals could be made to express themselves in this way, providing lighthearted 
guidance to weary travelers who happened upon the marker:
AapoKpiTO) pev e y u ,  XiYupav ona pouoav dveCiqv 
axplg airo -rrrepiryMv, top (3adup cfyop uirvov 
AapoKpiTog 8’ eiv’ epol top eoiKOTa Tnp(3ov, oSiTa, 
e7 7 ndev ’Opanrou xe^ev atrocpdipeva.
On Democritus would I the grasshopper draw deep sleep when I let loose 
shrill music from my wings; and Democritus over me when I was dead 
reared this fitting tomb, O wayfarer, nigh to Oropus. (3. 59)
According to Mackail, among the epigrams on death, losing one’s life at sea was 
the type “upon which the art o f the epigrammatist lavished its utmost resources”:
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And death at sea had a great horror and anguish attached to it; the 
engulfing in darkness, the vain struggles for life, the loss o f burial rites and 
all the last offices that can be paid to death, made it none the less terrible 
that is was so common. From the Odyssey downward tales o f sea-peril and 
shipwreck had the most powerful fascination. (74-75)
Fourteen o f the sixty-seven epigrams in his “Epitaph” section are on this theme and 
illustrate several prosopopeiaic structures. The first, in the voice o f  the tomb, creates a 
nice ambiguity in the meaning o f “husbandman” by imagining the grave (metonymically, 
“death”) as both the great leveler and that which finally compels eveiyone, sailor or 
farmer, to be a tiller o f the earth:
Nauiryyou Tchpog e lp r  6 6 ’ avTtov ea-n 7ecj)p70\f 
cog aXi koci 7odr| £i>vog uireoT’ ’ A'lhiqg.
I am the tomb o f one shipwrecked; and that opposite me, o f a husbandman; 
for a common Hades lies beneath sea and earth. (3.17)
On the other hand, some o f these epitaphs simply wish fellow-mariners better luck, even 
registering at times a certain indifference toward death:
Ncorri7ou Tacpog elpX' av be irXee- Kca yap  oft' ripelg 
coAoped’, a t Aonvai vfjeg eTrovToiropouv.
I am the tomb o f one shipwrecked; but sail thou; for even while we 
perished, the other ships sailed on over the sea. (3.19)
Cheerful sentiments, however, are unusual; the overall theme, namely, the baleful 
insouciance o f death itself, quickly returns. Callimachus (fl. 250-270), for example, writes:
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Tig £evog, <5 vaw)ye Aeov-rixog evdabe vexpov 
eupev eir’ ai/yiaXong, x<«>ae be ra5e tacpw 
Aaxpuaag ernKTipov eov (3(ov ovbe 7ap ai)Tog 
rjauxog, ai$uir) b laa  daXacraoitopel.
What stranger, O shipwrecked man? Leontichus found me here a corpse 
the shore, and heaped this tomb over me, with tears for his own calamito 
life; for neither is he at peace, but flits like a gull over the sea. (3.22)
The strange form o f address at the beginning o f this epitaph has worried commentators, 
but Mackail assures us that, although “extremely elliptical,” it is in keeping with 
Callimachus’s style (363-64). It begins by addressing the person who died, then reverts 
suddenly to the more commonly used form of the dead person addressing the reader. The 
epitaph as a whole, however, is really not about the person who died nor about death at 
sea, but is rather a lament by Leontichus over his own misfortune. He feels himself dead 
while he lives, and this evokes his empathy for the shipwrecked victim, sorrow for his o 
life, and the apprehension that his own life, such as it is, will end as well in shipwreck, 
both literal and figurative.
This epitaph by Leonidas o f Tarentum (3rd century C.E.), written in first-person, 




Eupou pe Tpnixeta kgT alirrjeaaa xaTa^ig
Kai vu£ Kai bvocpeprig Kupxrra iravSimiqg 
vE(3Xa\J>, , flpCa)vog- airaXiaftov be (3ioio
KaXXaiaxpog AipuKou peaaa flecov ireXcfyeug-
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A rough and steep-down squall out o f the East, and night, and the waves of 
the gloomy setting o f Orion were my bane, and I Callaeschrus lost my hold 
o f life as I sped through the mid Libyan sea;
He ends by implicating the empty tomb in a deceit practiced upon the reader:
KaYw pev ttovtw Siveupevog lx $ u o i Kuppa
ox A en p ar cpeuarria 8’ ourog eirea-ri Ai$og. 
so I am rolled drifting in ocean, to be the prey o f fishes, and this stone says 
falsely that it is over me. (3.26)
The reader already knows that an inscription does not refer in any case to a body lying 
within; the inscription always is doubly false. It nevertheless makes transparent the 
inscription’s purpose, which is not to refer to a specific person but to make a metaphorical 
statement that refers to a world o f experience. In Simonides’ uncharacteristically lengthy 
treatment o f the same idea, the drama o f the tragedy also comes first, with just the last 
two lines again calling attention to the empty tomb.
'Hepi/q Tepaveia, kockov Aeirag, axpeAeg TaTpov 
TfjAe Kctt eg Xkudecov paKpov opav Tavatv 
M^Se ireAag voaeiv EKeipwviKov ol5pa daAaaaing 
aYKea vupopevag apcpi MeAovpiaSog- 
Nuv 8’ 6 pev ev ttovto Kpuepog veKug- oi 8e Papelav 
NauTiAC-qv Keveoi Tf)8e Pocoai Ta<pot.
142
Cloudcapt Geraneia, cruel steep, would thou hadst looked on far Ister and 
long Scythian Tanais, and not lain nigh the surge o f the Scironian sea by 
the ravines o f the snowy Meluriad rock : but now he is a chill corpse in 
ocean, and the empty tomb here cries aloud o f his heavy voyage. (3.24)
The speaker in this inscription first addresses the rocks upon which the sailor’s ship 
foundered. Then, in a sudden turn, the speaker suggests that it is the tomb that tells this 
story and, in so doing, mourns. Simonides, however specific he makes his setting, does not 
name the deceased, and it is the mystery o f the pronoun that heightens the absence o f the 
deceased. Here, we do not even know who “he” is—-just that a corpse now floats 
somewhere in the cold depths.7' The empty tomb, however, has come alive by virtue o f 
the inscription.
Prosopopeiaically Proposed Subjects
For both the epitaphs and “death” epigrams, whenever the speaker can not be
identified explicitly as the moumer/writer, the reader quickly assumes that an object has 
been made capable o f speech; it has become a subject/addressor (Table 1).
Table 1. Prosopopeiaic creation o f virtual subject-addressor in the sepuchral epigram.
Object/addressor Proposed Subject/addressor
Deceased (human or animal) hypothetical deceased
T omb/Monument hypothesized speaker/person
Alternatively, the addressee often is an object (physical or mental) that is personified 
(Table 2).
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Table 2. Prosopopeiaic creation o f virtual subject/addressee in the sepuchral epigram.
Object addressed Proposed Subject/addressee
deceased (human or animal) deceased personified
concept o f death death personified
natural feature nature personified
animal animal personified
deity god personified
In all cases, since the inscription is public, the reader is the always-intended addressee 
(Table 3).









There also are combinations o f these dialogic structures. This epitaph by Roman 
epigrammatist Diodorus, for example, is unusual in that it is a husband’s defense, 
supposedly offered by his dead wife, against the rumour that he killed her:
7/Iotw vuKTog ep/rjg a p.e Kexpixpev ouaa Taura 
A cava, Kgokutou t’ d|npi70T|T0v uScop,
Outl |T avrjp, o Aeyouai, KaTGKTavev eg 7 ap.ov dAXi^g 
TraTtTaivoov tl [xanqv onvopa 'Poucpiviog;
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AXXa |i€ Kfjpeg a y o u a i p ep o p p ev a i- ou p la  SriTtoi)
IlauXa TapavTiviq Ka-rdavev (OKupopog.
Bear witness this my stone house o f night that has hidden me, and the wail- 
circled water o f Cocytus, my husband did not, as men say, kill me, his eyes 
set on marriage with another; why should Rufinius have an ill name idly? 
but my predestined Fates lead me away; not surely is Paula o f Taretumn the 
only one who has died before her day. (3.47)
The category o f the imagined dialogue also utilizes the same technique o f address, 
but in the form of a dialogue that asks questions on behalf o f the reader and then 
immediately offers the answer. The interrogator in Epitaph 3.62, for example, queries both 
the tomb and the deceased and provides their answers:
TH p’ imo ooi XapC8a g  dva-itomeTca; e l tov A p tp p a  
toO Kupirpcaou ira i8a  Xeyeig, u it’ epoL 
XapCSa, ti to: vepfte; iroXug okotoq. a l  8’ avoSoi tl;
<pe08og. 6 6e IIXoutuv; pudog- arrcoXopeda.
Does Charidas in truth sleep beneath thee? If  thou meanest the son o f 
Arimmas of Cyrene, beneath me. O Charidas, what o f the under world? 
Great darkness. And what o f the resurrection? A lie. and Pluto? A fable; 
we perish utterly. (3.62)
This form o f epitaph becomes as well an interesting study in the cancellation o f initial 
reference, since it is obvious that, if what it articulates is true, Charidas can not answer any 
inquiries. There is no ambiguity here, as there can be in epigrams that address the
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deceased directly, about an empirical reference or reference to the world outside the 
poem; rather, outside reference is precluded by an explicitly stated philosophical position. 
In Ricoeur’s sense, the epigram demonstrates an attempt, at least, to make metaphorical 
reference to a general state o f affairs that either does or does not obtain in the world.
An Aesthetic o f Thought and Figure
Mackail includes two epitaphs on the famous battle between the Greeks and the 
Persians at Thermopylae (481 B.C. E.) where three-hundred Spartans died fighting against 
an overwhelming Persian force. The first is a commemoration o f the event by Parmenio, a 
first-century Roman writer:
Tov 7 caT|g k«1  ttovtoi) a p e u p d e ia a ia i  KeXeudoig 
vaurr)v f|ireipou, ire^oiropov TreXcryoug,
’Ev Tpiaaalg boparoov eKarovTaatv eo ie y e v  ap^g 
EirapTiQg- a ia x u vead ’ oupea: Kai ireXcfyTn.
Him, who over changed paths o f earth and sea sailed on the mainland and 
went afoot upon the deep, Spartan valour held back on three hundred 
spears; be ashamed, O mountains and seas. (3.3)
The second is by Simonides:
£elv, aY^eiXov A aK ehaipovioig oti Tribe
Keip-efla rolg kcivcov pfjpaai rreidopevoL.
O passer by, tell the Lacedaemonians that we lie here obeying their 
orders. (3.4)
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Pannemo celebrates the event by first alluding, via metaphor, to Xerxes’ herculean 
achievement o f crossing the Hellespont on pontoons and digging a canal across the Athos 
peninsula. Additional figures (“valour” that “held back” the Persians, and the metonymy of 
“three hundred spears,” to represent the Spartan army) contrast that accomplishment with 
the miracle o f the Spartans’ defense. He heightens his attribution o f honor to the Spartans 
by addressing two natural features that traditionally had prevented a successful invasion by 
virtue o f their apparent size and strength, the mountains and the seas. What they could not 
do—hold out against the Persian military juggernaut—the Spartans did. (Of course, 
Parmenio’s readers knew that the Spartans ultimately succumbed to an overwhelming 
force.) The kenning that Parmenio employs is clever: the “changed paths o f earth” he 
quickly interprets for the reader in the striking images o f  “sailing on the mainland” and 
going “afoot upon the deep.” The closing phrase o f “mountains and seas” is an effective 
return to the same pretty figures. Although addressing topographical features (mountains 
and seas) as representatives o f deity is traditional, staging the address in the form not o f 
prayer but o f accusation achieves a certain fresh effect. An argument could be made, on 
Ricoeur’s grounds, that the accomplished use o f figures used here do initiate a 
“redescription” o f the event at Thermopylae that culminates in the epitaph as a whole; 
however, the poverty o f the metaphors tends to defeat the attempt, that is, the figures 
already had become cliches, such that they add nothing to a reader’s repertoire of 
understanding the world. They merely justify the commemoration.
In his epitaph upon these same soldiers, Simonides’ also employs prosopopeia, but 
rather than addressing the landscape, he has the dead themselves speak to the passers-by
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who chance upon the monument. Their address to the living is pregnant both with 
meanings and questions. Whoever would take the message back to their fellow Spartans 
(the Lacedaemonians) would find it difficult to paraphrase, for example, “we lie here 
obeying your orders” without abandoning its ambiguities. Underlying the entire message is 
the question o f whether or not their obedience was truly worth their sacrifice, since they 
were betrayed by one o f Thermopylae’s own residents and ultimately failed in their efforts. 
Parmenio skillfully uses figures to make a point about a type o f courage already 
recognized—the epitaph is a form o f paideia, or perhaps even propaganda. On the other 
hand, Simonides uses figure as a cataylst that works upon the liminal structures o f 
courage—those thresholds o f bodily experience out o f  which individual acts o f  courage 
arise, the grounds upon which the logos o f  courage emerges. In this way it achieves a 
redescription o f the world that both articulates and confuses, teaches and confounds, 
reveals and withdraws.
Simonides also wrote two epigrams on the battle at Plataea, one for the Athenians 
and one for the Spartans. The first is written in the voice o f  those who died; the second is 
a straightforward announcement:
El to KaXoiq dvrjaKeiv aperqg pepoq e<m p e7 icttov 
Tip.iv ex TtavTtov tout’ aTteveipe Tux*!'
'EAAa6i 7ap oiteu5ovTeg eXevfteplav ttepidelvoa 
KeCpefl’d^inpavTcp xp^M-evoi euXo7 iT|.
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I f  to die nobly is the chief part o f excellence, to us out o f all men Fortune 
gave this lot; for hastening to set a crown o f freedom on Hellas, we lie 
possessed o f praise that grows not old. (3.1)
The elliptical structure o f the first two lines comprises a wonderfully compacted 
logic. It is a definition, but it is not a tautology because the predicate adds information, 
enlarging the subject to include o f a new set o f meanings. In one sense, dying nobly is set 
out as the greater part o f a set o f values that comprise excellence. To convey this 
information is to use a quantitative figure o f possession such that o f the “parts” that 
comprise “excellence” (which remains undefined in the epigram), dying nobly is the 
largest. Alternatively, or at the same time, the “chief part” can be taken, figuratively 
speaking, as a qualitative, rather than quantitative, superiority o f part over part. In a third 
sense, the phrase can be understood as a definition in reverse, namely, as a statement that 
the most important thing to know about the topic o f  excellence is that one should die 
nobly. This reverse definition conveys new information as well; dying nobly introduces a 
whole world o f dying. Finally, because o f this reverberating interaction o f dying and 
achieving excellence, we can see that the “lot” assigned to the fallen soldiers is a double 
one that includes two set o f  references: one is having died nobly, the other is the 
achievement o f excellence. The first reference establishes a real death; the second 
establishes a moral reality that is no less real than the perishing o f the physical body. The 
third and fourth lines let death lie, but they reserve for the soldiers a deathless honor.
In the second epitaph on the same subject, Simonides doubles the effect of the 
men’s martyrdom:
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7'A<j(3€cjtov xAeog oibe <piXT) irepl ircapCSi devreg 
Kvaveov davaTOu apflefSaXovTO vetpog- 
Oi) 5e Tedvaai da  wo v Teg, eitei aip’ dp€TT| Kaduirepdev 
KuSaivoua’ avaYei btopaTog e£ ’ AiSeu.
These men having set a crown o f imperishable glory on their own land 
were folded in the dark cloud o f death; yet being dead they have not died, 
since from on high their excellence raises them gloriously out o f  the house 
o f Hades. (3.2)
In this case, having obtained that “chief part o f  excellence,” it is they who live eternally, 
having been raised out o f Hades, while they have at the same time obtained for their 
country an eternal life in the form o f “glory” or fame. This glory nevertheless redounds as 
well upon the benefactors, the soldiers. Despite the grim imagery, then, the second epitaph 
is sanguine about death and denies its reality. Taken as epiphora, in both epitaphs 
Simonides brings alongside his stylized obituary a supplement intended to refer to a new 
and different state o f affairs. The first epitaph allows the dead to speak in chorus, and 
when they do, they acknowledge a type o f good fortune that turns the tables on the bad 
fortune of death itself; yet, death is not denied, and the reader understands that their 
acknowledgment is one that only the living can attribute to them. On the other hand, the 
second epitaph makes an announcement o f belief. The dead, although said to be alive, are 
not present in speech, and somehow their absence makes this credo unbelievable, however 
exalted the dead soldiers’ state is said to be. That epitaph which is most a figure is, o f the 
two, the epitaph that is most convincing.
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Although it is difficult, then, to maintain a clear distinction between a “pine” 
epitaph and what might be called a philosophical epigram or proverb, perhaps there is a 
distinction to be made among the epigrams in terms o f what we could call “thinking 
poetry” and “poetic thinking.” Thinking poetry I take in Heidegger’s sense, which 
Ricoeur seems to affirm, o f the poet’s discovery o f a new cognitive landscape and an 
articulation of a “topology,” that necessarily references both new and old realms of 
experience and lets the truth o f Being appear. As Heidegger writes in his poem “The 
Thinker as Poet,”
But poetry that thinks is in truth 
the topology o f Being 
This topology tells Being the 
whereabouts o f its actual 
presence. (12)
This thinking “. . .  holds to the / coming of what has been, and / is remembrance” (“The 
Thinker as Poet” 10). In contrast, poetic thinking is the use o f style to heighten the effect 
o f a conclusion already established in language and tradition. It is vulnerable to “[t]he bad 
and thus muddled danger” of “philosophizing” (“The Thinker as Poet” 8). This distinction 
entails an aesthetic criterion that values thoughtful poetry more highly than poetic thinking 
because of its heuristic power to bring humans closer to the horizon of Being.
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ENDNOTES
1 .Fiorillo also claims, however, that Onchi did not consider this “equivalence” as 
exhaustive and observes that later in his career Onchi extended his ascription o f “lyrical” 
to that art which best captured “the subjective mood.” (Fiorillo, John. “Viewing Japanese 
Prints: Koshiro Onchi” 2004. 8 August 2005
<http://spectacle.berkeley.edu/~fiorillo/texts/sosakutexts/sosaku_pages/onchi3.html>
My thanks to Dr. Donald Poochigian, Department o f Philosophy, University o f North 
Dakota, for this reference.
2. Although on Riffaterre’s premises the second reading indeed should be considered 
“semiotic,” I note in Chapter Two that RifFaterre calls this reading “hermeneutic,” thus 
raising the question o f whether he is equivocating on the meaning o f this term in its 
possible contexts o f “meaning” and “understanding.”
3 .1 capitalize Lyric when using it as a noun that refers to it as a subcategory o f the genre 
o f poetry.
4. According to Jaeger, the idea o f art-for-art’s-sake “does not appear in the great Greek 
poets” (35). The third chapter, therefore, o f “Book One: Archaic Greece,” in his Paideia: 
the Ideals o f Greek Culture, bears the title “Homer the Educator.” “Hesiod’s 
contemporaries viewed Homer primarily as a teacher,” he claims, and “Hesiod is a poet 
because he is a teacher” (74).
5. Because the earliest known inscription in Greek is an hexameter line on a wine jug 
dated approximately 740 B.C.E., Havelock places the final development o f writing using 
the Greek alphabet at approximately 700 B.C.E. He also argues that the line on this vase 
may have been inscribed considerably later than the vase was made (15). The line reads 
“who now o f all dancers sports most playfully,” and may have commemorated a dance 
contest for which the vase was a prize (Havelock 193).
6. Havelock borrows this term from Berkley Peabody in his review o f Peabody’s The 
Winged Word.
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7. According to William Harris, for example, ancient Greece inherited Mycenaean values 
centered on a strict warrior code o f honor, as subsequently reflected in Homer. By the 
time o f Archilochus, however, these values had been destabilized, and the interests and 
values o f the merchant class were exerting an influence on public morality (38-40). On the 
other hand, Archilochus is equally well known for a poem that, in legend at any rate, 
contained such malicious invective that it induced the person it was directed against to 
commit suicide.
8. These dates are derived from Havelock, particularly from his essay entitled “The 
Character and Content o f the Code,” where he provides a brief review o f the “course o f 
Greek literature” (146-147).
9. Even in Riffaterre’s rigorous method, however, there remains a place for a musical 
analogy for this semiotic process, namely, “theme and variation,” with one significant 
difference. In musical composition the theme is prominently announced first, making it a 
transparent point o f comparison, while in Lyric the theme (matrix) may very well remain 
unstated {Semiotics 26).Variations, on the other hand, are made visible and “marked” as 
ungrammaticalities, destined for recognition in the second and subsequent hermeneutic 
readings as equivalent: “The text is in effect a variation or modulation o f one 
structure—thematic, symbolic, or whatever— and this sustained relation to one structure 
constitutes the significance” {Semiotics 6).
10. De Man probably uses “Slavic” to include the Prague School o f structuralism and 
Russian Formalism as influences upon Riffaterre. In his entry in The John Hopkins Guide 
to Literary Theory, Lubomir Dolezel claims that the Prague School actually “preempts 
much o f the poststructuralist technique.” Among its characteristic themes, according to 
Dolezel, is the contention that “[tjhanks to its empirical character, Prague school 
epistemology was able to overcome the postpositivistic split between sciences o f nature 
{Naturwissenschaften) and human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). ”
11. A poem’s complete explication, although theoretically possible because it is derived 
from a finite number o f texts, is virtually unattainable for a single reader, who becomes 
involved in a recursive process o f re-interpretation, “a kind of semiotic circularity” 
{Semiotics 166).
12. De Man makes this claim on logical grounds, which o f course catches him in his own 
net, since any claim that he makes must, by definition, already be infected by metaphor.
13. Unfortunately this prayer to Aphrodite is the only extant complete poem by Sappho:
TTOiKiAodpov' ddavctT AippoSiTa 
irat Aioo SoAottAokc, ACaaopaC oe, 
pi) p’ aaa tae  pr|5' oviaiai 6apva,
•rcoTvia, 60poi<,
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aXXa tui8 eXd' , at itOTa Ka-repaTa 
tda epaa au8aa oaotaa irrjXoi 
eitXuea, ird-rpoo Se Sopov Xiitoiaa 
xpuaiov rjdeo
app’ u irac^v fa iaa- KaXoi be a ’ a y o v  
UKeea OTpoudot itepl y a a  peXaivaa  
■nvKva SivvevTeo i n e p  air’ lipavcofte- 
poa 8ia peaaco,
alipa 5’ e^ LKOVTO' au 8’ u pckaipa, 
peiAaiaaia diSavdiu irpoacoitco 
ripe’ o m  8t)ut6 ireirovda kmttl 
8-qirre KaXiqppi,
kutti p o i p a X iu ta  deAco yeveadai 
p a ivoX a  ftvpor Ttva 8t)ut€ ireu'Jai 
dip a ’ a 7T|v ea  £av ipiXoTaTa; tlo a ’, u 
$d inp ’ , a8KT|ei;
Kai. ^dp a i  ip e ^ e i ,  raxew a 8iw£ei- 
a t  8e 8<5pa pr) SeKe-f , aXXa Suaei/ 
a l  be  pr| ipuXei, Taxecoo ipiXi^aei 
kcouk eO eX oiaa
eXOe pot Kal viiv, xaX eirav be: X v o o v  
eK pep ipyau , o a a a  be  pot -reXeaaai 
Ovpoa ipeppei., TeX eaov a v  8’ airra  
auppaxoa eaao.
Omate-throned immortal Aphrodite,
wile-weaving daughter o f  Zeus, 1 entreat you;
do not overpower my heart, mistress, with
ache and anguish,
but come here, i f  ever in the past
you heard my voice from afar and acquiesced
and came, leaving your father’s golden house, with
chariot yoked: beautiful swift sparrows
whirring fast-beating wings brought you
above the dark earth down from heaven
through the mid-air and soon they arrived;
and you, blessed one, with a smile on your immortal face
asked what was the matter with me this time
and why I was calling this time
and what in my maddened heart I most wished to happen for myself:
“Who am I to persuade this time to lead you back to her love?
Who wrongs you, Sappho? If she runs away, soon she shall pursue; 
i f  she does not accept gifts, why she shall give them instead; 
and if  she does not love, soon she shall love even against her w ill.”
Come to me now again and deliver me from oppressive anxieties; 
fulfil all that my heart longs to fulfil,
and you yourself be my fellowfighter. (Campbell 53) (versification added)
14. In his introduction to Bamstone’s Greek Lyric Poetry, William McCulloh argues that 
the first line o f the couplet would have been a proper hexameter, with the second line 
substituting a spondee after the third and sixth foot.
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15. All epigrams are taken from Mackail’s Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology. 
Mackail numbers the epigrams in Roman numerals and his translations in Arabic numerals. 
For the sake o f convenience, I follow the Arabic system assigned to the translations.
16. For example, Mimnemus’ 'H fia fioi, (p'lXe &vp€' r a x  ocXXol ea o u ra i /  
avdpeq, e y a  8e docp&v ycrta  peXcttv e a o p a l. [Be young, dear my so u l: soon will 
others be men, and I being dead shall be dark earth.] (Mackail, Select Epigrams 12.6).
17. This inverse relationship o f connotative value between matrix and poem, where the 
matrix is expanded in the poem into a reverse-image of itself, is an element in keeping with 
Riffaterre’s theory as a whole, and is examined later in the chapter.
18. My thanks to Prof. Michael Beard for pointing out that Edward Said makes a similar 
point in Beginnings (1975): “[0]ne cannot have recourse [in structuralist practice] to a 
direct unfolding (as in the Enfaltung o f hermeneutical interpretation) o f the kernel o f 
meaning within a statem ent. . . . ” (327).
19. Neither Riffaterre or de Man call attention to the cultural dialogue figured in the 
transformation o f the old cities’ chimes, which faithfully ring the hours o f  the bourgeois 
working day, into the fanciful form o f an elfin Andalusian dancer. Hugo certainly gives it a 
prominent role in his initial address to Flanders, “where the benumbed North warms itself 
in the sun of Castille and mates with the South.” This dimension o f the poem warrants 
inclusion in any full explication o f the poem.
20. According to Kristeva, with the arrival o f Nerval, Lautreamont, and Mallarme, poetry 
“became a practice involving the subject’s dialectical state in language” that was “the end 
o f poetry as delirium . . . [or] literature as an attempted submission to the logical order” 
{Revolution 82). Kristeva here characterizes the subject’s attempt to be fully rational as a 
self-subversive form o f irrationality.
21. Kristeva offers only a general example o f this diachronic phenomenon but one that is 
pertinent to Greek poetry: “the Pindaric obscurity that followed Homeric clarity and 
community” {Revolution 15). Clarity is valued when the symbolic order has been 
established; nothing must be found that escapes its thesis, and obscurity would threaten 
this linguistic surveillance. In this passage, however, it is possible that Kristeva uses clarity 
in her sense o f the unalloyed signification in language of the semiotic chora and obscurity 
in the pejorative sense o f a delirium produced by an overbearing reason {Revolution 82). 
Unfortunately, she offers no further comment.
22. Kristeva argues, for example, that theology attempts to foreclose semiosis and attain 
to a thesis wholly conformable to the symbolic {Revolution 80). Maritain, on the other 
hand, uses both mystical and moral experience as analogues to the experience o f creative 
intuition (235, 236-7n).
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23. This imperative is found in other epigrams, such as Callimachus’ “say not that the 
good die” (Mackail, Selections, Sect. 3, LXVII).
24. According to Elizabeth Nitchie, the second line o f  an earlier version of the epigram 
read “Ere thy new light had fled.” She speculates that “there was a later manuscript 
showing ‘new’ as the result of further thought and revision. The repetition in the original 
Greek o f  the verb (eXap.Ttea . . . Xd(jnreig) tends to support the repetition o f the 
adjective in the paraphrase” (277).
25. I f  the intended incompatibility o f codes is not recognized, a simple misunderstanding 
occurs that ruins the joke and cancels communication.
26. In their articulations o f the “intentional fallacy,” New Critics made it axiomatic that 
speculation about authorial intention was illegitimate, and in this sense they anticipated 
what also can be recognized in structuralism as a move toward reader-response criticism. 
Their metaphor o f a poem as an icon or, in T. S. Eliot’s phrase, as an “objective 
correlative” o f the poet’s experience, however, leaves them in the realm o f hermeneutics 
rather than structuralism and does not diminish for them the author’s importance and 
presence. Structuralists and post-structuralists, on the other hand, are inclined to invert the 
relationship between author and text. Thus Foucault, for example, can redefine author 
merely as “a certain functional principle” involved in the dissemination o f meanings (352- 
53). '
27. “Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he 
produces can be either ‘exclusively’ semiotic or ‘exclusively’ symbolic, and is instead 
necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both” {Revolution 24).
28. Even the majority o f epigrams categorized under “Life” in Mackail’s Selections are in
the temper of, for example, Palladus’s IIoXXo: X aX elc av$ponte, 5e Ti$r|
p e ra  [iiKpov o iy a ,  m l  peXeTa fyov e t i  tov davaTOV.” [You talk much, O Man, 
and after a little while lie in the earth; / be silent, and while living, think on death.] 
(Mackail, Selections, Sect. 12, XLVII) or, in the wry vein o f Julianus Aegyptius’ 
“IIoXXaKi pev to6 ’ a e ia a ,  m l  ex Tupfyou be (3of|(r m v e te , irpiv toutt]v 
dp-rufyaXiriade kuviv.” [I often sang it, and even from the grave will cry it: “Drink, 
before you put on the clothes o f death”] (12.12).
29. Kristeva also uses an analogy o f “internal” music: “[T]he space underlying the written 
is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, 
anterior to judgment, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax,” and she claims that 
Mallarme expresses his notion o f the “mystery o f literature” in this manner {Revolution 
29).
161
30. Campbell notes that Sapphic authorship o f this fragment is disputed as well as its 
arrangement in four, rather than two, lines (173).
31. From the essay “Words,” in On the Way to Language (1971), translation by Joan 
Stambough.
32. The complete title o f the dialogue is “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese 
and an Inquirer.” According to the translator, Peter D. Hertz, the dialogue was written on 
the occasion of a visit by Professor Tuzuka o f the Imperial University, Tokyo, in 1953 or 
1954(199).
33. George Steiner observes that for Heidegger the only real question for philosophy is the 
one Leibnitz first posed as: Why is there something rather than nothing? Heidegger frames 
it in his own terminology as: “What is the Being \das Sein] which renders possible all 
being [das Seiende]?” (35).
34. Krell notes Heidegger’s claim that the forms “to ov” and “to: ovTa,” were derived 
from the ancient Ionian and Aeolian forms “to eov” and “t eovTa.” Liddell and Scott 
translate them respectively as “Being” and “the world o f things” (7).
35. According to Werner Brock, this recognition o f temporality can be understood as the 
production o f time: “Whenever the understanding [Heidegger’s ‘running-forward-in- 
thought-to . . . ’] projects its potentiality from the matter of its care, Time is produced by 
rendering it present, while the ‘moment’ arises from the authentic fiiture” (82).
36. According to Krell, Heidegger, in his quotation o f the Diels-Kranz translation, changes 
the semicolon that appears at the end o f the last phrase to a colon (80).
37. Heidegger’s conception of the “saying” that “disappears immediately” is dangerously 
close to silence, and, as we shall “hear” in Heidegger’s exegeses o f  the poetry o f 
Holderlin, it is this very threat o f not being able to “say” at all or, alternatively, to speak to 
an audience who hears nothing, that confronts the true poet.
38. In his essay “On the Essence o f Truth,” Heidegger emphasizes once again that 
concealment is the necessary attendant condition to the disclosure o f  ’ AXri’&eux, even 
arguing that the term is derived from X ctvdaveiv  (to escape notice) (Brock 129).
39. Steiner adds that “memoration” is, from Heidegger’s point o f  view, a “pre- 
logicaf’phenomenon (129-130).
40. These four essays were published together in English translation in Existence and 
Being (1949) along with an extensive introduction by Werner Brock.
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41. The major essays (largely drawn from lectures and addresses) are “Holderlin and the
Essence o f Poetry” (1936), “Remembrance o f the Poet” (1943), “What Are Poets For” 
(1946), “. .  . Poetically Man Dwells . .  (1951), “Language in the Poem” (1953), and
“Words” (1958).
42. Not unexpectedly, Heidegger judges that Rilke does not quite rise to Holderlin’s 
standard, although he concedes there are instances o f  “valid” poetry among his works, 
which he faithfully points out in the body o f the essay {Poetry, Language 96-98).
43. Where Heidegger has not provided the specific lines o f a poem to which he refers, I 
cite page numbers, as well as stanza and line numbers o f the poems when appropriate, in 
Michael Hamburger’s 1967 bilingual edition o f selected poems by Holderlin.
44. “According to Heidegger, he [Holderlin] meditates on the “Holy” just as the true 
philosopher meditates upon “Being” (Brock 121-22).
45. Heidegger assumes that the poem is autobiographical, pointing out that Holderlin in 
the spring o f 1801 made such a journey “back over the Bodensee from the Thurgau town 
o f Hauptwyl near Konstanz to his home in Swabia” {Existence and Being 243).
46. In his essay “Words,” Heidegger relates the notion o f “singing” to what he has 
described in Early Greek Thinking as X eye iv  ‘Saying’: “Singing is the gathering o f 
Saying in song. If  we fail to understand the lofty meaning of song as Saying, it becomes 
the retroactive setting to music o f what is spoken and written” {On the Way 148).
47. Michael Hamburger’s translation, however, would vitiate Heidegger’s interpretation of 
this line. He takes the pronoun others to refer to cares rather than to the people o f the 
homeland: “Whether he likes it or not, and often, a singer must harbour / Cares like these 
in his soul; not, though, the wrong sort o f cares” (261).
48. In “The Nature o f Language,” Heidegger asks, “What is it that the poet reaches?” and 
answers, “Not mere knowledge. He obtains entrance into the relation o f word to thing. . . .  
The word itself is the relation which in each instance retains the thing within itself in such 
a manner that it ‘is’ a thing” (On the Way 66).
49. The complete first line, from which the title is taken, is “In lovely blueness with its 
metal roof the steeple blossoms. ‘In lieblicher Blaue bluhet mit dem metallenenen Dache 
der Kirchthurm. ’ (Hamburger 600). Heidegger comments only in passing that “it [the 
poem] comes to us by a curious route” (213). Michael Hamburger explains further that the 
poem first appears in Wilhelm Waiblinger’s novel Phaeton (1823). Since Waiblinger (also 
a poet) spent considerable time with Holderlin, and apparently had access to some of 
Holderlin’s unpublished manuscripts, Hamburger speculates that Waiblinger indeed may 
have adapted the poem “from one or more poems given to him by Holderlin and now lost,
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possibly adding and omitting passages in the process” (612-13). Hamburger formats it as a 
prose-poem; it appears in verse form in Poetry, Language, Thought.
50. Heidegger’s parenthetical references are citations o f a German edition o f Holderlin’s 
works published by Propylaen-Verlag, Berlin, 1914 (Existence and Being 232).
51. Hamburger translates Gesprach as “discourse” (438).
52. According to Hamburger, Holderlin’s “madness” dates from 1806, when he was 
admitted to a clinic in Tubingen. He was later placed under foster care and apparently 
lived there in relative tranquility until his death, occasionally writing poetry. “In Lovely 
Blueness . . is from this period (16).
53. The essay was first presented as a lecture in 1951, then published in Vortrdge und 
Aufsatze in 1954 (Hofstadter xxiv).
54. Steiner comments that according to Heidegger, “The nerve o f poetry is the act o f 
nomination.. .  . The underlying motif here, familiar to Pietist thought, is o f Adam’s 
nomination in the Garden of every living thing” (145).
55. De Man notes that even in Friedrich Beissner’s critical edition o f Holderlin’s works, 
accepted as the most authoritative collection to date, there remain unresolved questions 
about the exact texts o f  some important poems (248).
56. Rule o f  Metaphor is based on a seminar held at the University o f  Toronto in 1971 (3). 
Its French title is La Metaphore Vive', however, translator Robert Czerny chose to use a 
certain “metaphorical suggestiveness” in his translation o f the title that he hoped would 
convey Ricoeur’s sense o f metaphor as both following rules o f  language and itself ruling a 
certain domain of language, as well as Ricoeur’s frequent recollection o f Aristotle’s 
maxim that the touchstone o f genius in poetry and rhetoric is the mastery o f metaphor 
(“Translator’s Introduction” vii).
57. The context for Aristotle’s quotation is the Odyssey (XIV, 213). Odysseus, disguised 
as a beggar, says to his swineherd: “I think that, looking on the stubble, you will recognize 
my former strength . . . . ”
58. Aristotle also takes up this topic in Poetics, 1457 b 7.
59. After commenting in Poetics (1459a) that the “token o f genius” in a writer is knowing 
how to use metaphor, Aristotle writes, “to y a p  ev peracpepeiv to to opoiov 
decopelv eoTtv.” Since English does not have an infinitive form o f metaphor, the 
translator must use a phrase such as “the right use o f metaphor . .  .” The phrase occurs 
also in the Rhetoric (1412a): “A el 8e peTaipeireiv, K adarrep e ipeT ai irpOTeirpov, 
airo  oiKeitov Kai p r| tpavepcov, . . . . ” The Loeb translation avoids the infinitive:
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“As we have said before, metaphor should be drawn from objects which are proper to the 
object, but not too obvious;. . . ( 4 0 7 ) .
60. Poetics 1457 b 7: M ercopopa  5e e o n v  ouoparog ocXXorpiov errupopot rj onto
rod yevovq eiri edog rj onto t o v  eldovg . . . .  “Metaphor is the application o f a strange 
term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species......... ” (81).
61. This means that Saussure, for example, erred in treating language as a system 
composed entirely o f  signs. More accurate, according to Ricoeur, is the distinction Emile 
Benveniste makes in Problems o f General Linguistics between semiotics and 
semantics—that semiotics has to do with the elements of a sentence (signs) whereas 
semantics has to do with units o f language (beginning with the sentence) (69).
62. According to Ricoeur, Fontanier unfortunately inherited and then bequeathed a 
conception o f language that nouns can somehow bestow names. I. A. Richards, among 
other rhetoricians, has since demonstrated that nouns do not carry a “proper” or “real” 
meaning; they derive meaning from context. It is at the sentence level that reference is 
achieved: words sign, sentences refer (76).
63. Ricoeur notes in this context Monroe Beardsley’s affirmation in his Aesthetics (1958) 
that when a new metaphor is used “something develops in the language” (97). Following 
Beardsley, we can say that a new metaphor is “a semantic innovation without status in the 
language as something already established with respect to either designation or 
connotation” (98).
64. According to Ricoeur, this in the end is what separates the followers o f Saussure from 
the followers of “Carnap, Wittgenstein, and so on, for whom semantics is fundamentally 
the analysis o f the relationships between signs and the things denoted” (124).
65. Ricoeur in fact suggests that rather than metaphor, “metonymy—one name for another 
name— remains a semiotic process, perhaps even the substitutive phenomenon par 
excellence in the realm o f signs. Metaphor—unusual attribution—is a semantic process, in 
the sense o f Benveniste, perhaps even the genetic phenomenon par excellence in the realm 
o f the instance o f discourse” (198).
66. Ricoeur notes that both Benveniste and Frege hold that “semiotics is an abstraction 
from semantics, which relates the internal constitution o f the sign to the transcendent aims 
o f reference” (137). Semiotics is “subordinate” to semantics in that “the sign owes its very 
meaning as sign to is usage in discourse” (137) Ricoeur does concede, however, that at 
least for Frege, the sense/reference schema nevertheless “applies only to scientific 
statements, and seems quite clearly to be denied to poetic statements” (220).
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67. Here we can recall (from Chapter One) Eric Havelock’s comment that mythos is “is 
displayed at a second ‘diachronoic level’ o f the memory; the song [text] is a ‘feedback’” 
(Havelock 157).
68. Ricoeur’s reference to “a world” as opposed to “the world” should not, I believe, be 
taken as an allusion to “possible worlds” but rather in its ordinary sense o f “the world” of 
space and time. The thrust o f his argument, in The Rule o f Metaphor at least, reaches 
only to a claim that mimesis reminds readers o f their own experience as physical and 
historical human beings.
69. Ricoeur, however, is not willing to go as far as Nelson Goodman, for example, who in 
Languages ofArt contends that “[i]n aesthetic experience the emotions function 
cognitively.” (qtd. in Ricoeur 231). While Goodman places metaphor in a generalized 
theory o f denotation, Ricoeur insists there are relevant and helpful distinctions to be made 
in terms o f the “rightness” o f descriptions and the redescriptions o f art (Ricoeur 239).
70. The Palatine Anthology, for example, included 750 “sepulchral” epigrams, in contrast 
to 380 “amatory” epigrams and 358 “dedicatory” epigrams (Mackail 7).
71. Bergk, for example, argues that this epitaph should be combined with another two-line 
epitaph in the Palatine Anthology (vii.511), also attributed to Simonides, that would 
provide a name. Mackail, on the other hand, believes this merger doesn’t work, adding 
that in many cases the names o f the persons memorialized in the epitaph were inscribed 
apart from the epitaphs themselves (Mackail 364).
166
